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The aim of this work is to investigate the coupled dynamics between infection and behavioural response 
at the population level in the case of the novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) in Norway. For this 
purpose, a System Dynamics simulation model has been developed that proposes a number of 
modifications on classical differential equations epidemiological models to better apply in the case of 
COVID-19. Moreover, this work attempts to bring together well-establish theories under the umbrella 
term Health Behaviour Theories that investigate the response of individuals to environmental threats to 
their well-being. We have tested both components of the model in isolation and combination and were 
able to replicate, with a sufficient degree of accuracy and under logical assumptions, the observations 
of the spread of COVID-19 in the country. More importantly, we have developed a simulation model 
that captures numerous of the common elements identified in Health Behaviour Theories in one 
composite structure that can allow for experimentation with various assumptions.  
Our model highlights the importance of communication strategies in the management of 
environmental Threats and, in line with known theories, suggests that it is optimal to share messages 
that not only highlight the significance of the Threat, but also emphasise the Efficacy of a proposed 
behavioural response in mitigating it. Communication is important but we need to ensure that we 
minimize and understand the Costs associated with any proposed measure. Despite limitations in our 
work that do not allow us to propose specific policies for the management of COVID-19, our model 
suggest caution with “return-to-normal” scenarios. 
This work has provided support for the attempt to develop a common theoretical framework of 
peoples’ response to threats and provided with important focal points for further iterations. Those are 
considered significance due to their possible applications beyond COVID-19, both in other 
epidemiological contexts and health-related decision making, but also in the general understanding of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
When a social contagion is coupled to a biological contagion, the resulting disease-behaviour 
system can exhibit dynamics that do not occur when the two subsystems are uncoupled and in 
isolation from one another. This illustrates the lesson of complexity science that the whole is 
more than the sum of the parts. 
(Bauch & Galvani, 2013, p. 47) 
 
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
In late December 2019, reports emerged about cases of pneumonia of unknown origin in Wuhan, China 
(World Health Organization, 2020a). The pneumonia was described as caused by a new coronavirus, 
later named the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (Wu et al., 2020) which, due to its high 
infection potential among other factors, soon started spreading throughout the world. COVID-19 was 
declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by the World Health 
Organization the 30th of January 2020 (World Health Organization, 2020c) and was later characterized 
as a pandemic on the 11th of March (World Health Organization, 2020d).  
As of May 28th, 2020, there have been 5,593,631 reported cases globally (World Health 
Organization, 2020b), although the actual numbers of infected cases could be much higher. The death 
count of the disease has reached 353,334 (World Health Organization, 2020b) and many more people 
have been hospitalised in critical condition. The impact of the virus at a global level is undeniable (see 
Figure 1) and almost all countries in the world have had been affected by COVID-19 directly (AL 
JAZEERA NEWS, 2020) and definitely all indirectly through the financial consequences of the disease. 
In many countries, the death toll has been very high as COVID-19 has significantly strained public 
health systems, global supply chains, and research capacities. COVID-19 has led to enormous 
disruptions in economy and peoples’ daily lives, and the socio-economic impact of the pandemic is 
undeniable (United Nations Development Programme, 2020) 
 
Figure 1: Daily new Confirmed COVID-19 cases and Cumulative deaths, July 8, 2020. (European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control, 2020; in Roser, Ritchie, Ortiz-Ospina, & Hasell, 2020) 
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The severity of COVID-19 has led to an unprecedented response at both the global and local level and 
by actors at the highest and lowest “influence” spheres: from global institutions and organisations, 
governments, the scientific community, to each individual. Indeed, this “natural experiment” (Sibony, 
2020) has highlighted the significance of the interplay between the different actors at all levels of 
influence in the effort to “flatten the curve”. Governmental responses include but are not limited to 
testing policies and adjustments of the health care system’s capacity for testing and treatment, 
quarantine and lockdown decisions, communication of the prevalence and severity of the virus, etc. 
Those responses have to a large extent been informed and supplemented by the information provided 
through the response of the scientific community. Computational epidemiological modelling in 
particular has proven crucial in providing evidence on how to respond to the pandemic, both by offering 
guidance and assistance to governments to decide on and implement efficient policies and by helping 
engage the public.  
A very important insight of the global experience with COVID-19 has been the significance of 
actions of individuals, aggregated to the population level. Social distancing is a term that became 
globally known and that refers to “any non-pharmaceutical intervention, taken by individuals or by 
policy makers, which acts to decrease the contact rate between infected and susceptible individuals” 
(Toxvaerd, 2020, p. 1). Self-isolation denotes the voluntary decision by individual agents to maintain 
“physical separation by reducing the number of times people come into close contact with each other 
across whole populations” (Bonell et al., 2020, p. 1) and is thus different from quarantine or isolation 
of diagnosed or suspected carriers of the disease. Moreover, in the case of a transmissible disease, other 
hygienic measures can have a large effect on transmissibility. Hand washing, maintaining proper 
distance, protective coughing and masks, all have been emphasised as significant measures to reduce 
infections (e.g. Khetrapal Singh, 2020; Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020d). Compliance 
with the above measures and all other “sacrifices” of individuals have proven one of the most important 
resources in fighting the pandemic and this knowledge leads to the understanding that “the stakes have 
never been so high when it comes to incorporating behavioural insights into policy design” (Sibony, 
2020, p. 353). Social and Behavioural Sciences are valuable resources as they can provide insights and 
support to our efforts to combat COVID-19, as well as learn from it. The topics that are relevant in 
studying the human response to the pandemic as well as its effects on individuals are many and can be 




Figure 2: Some relevant for COVID-19 topics from social and behavioural sciences (infographic by van Bavel et al., 2020, 
fig. 1) 
 
In this project, we will focus on the initial response of the population to Covid-19 and how the 
perception of the Threat that the virus poses to an individual’s wellbeing might lead them to follow 
advice and proposed measures that can act to mitigate this environmental Threat. There have been 
numerous studies using computation approaches in order to investigate individuals’ responses to 
epidemics, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, however, most such models focus only on 
information regarding the prevalence of the disease (termed usually “prevalence-elastic response” 
(Funk, Salathé, & Jansen, 2010, p. 1247)). Such approaches, while very valuable, have been criticised 
as treating individuals as “Homo EconomSickus” (Epstein, Parker, Cummings, & Hammond, 2008, p. 
1): fully rational agents making decisions under some hypothesised (or optimised) utility function 
and/or under perfect information. An alternative approach to studying the response of the population 
comes from the Psychological field and well-established Health Behaviour Theories that have a long 
tradition in studying health-related decision making or, more generally, peoples’ response to 
environmental threats, particularly pertaining to one’s wellbeing (see, for example Glanz, Rimer, & 
Viswanath, 2008; Redding, Rossi, Rossi, Velicer, & Prochaska, 2000). Attempting to couple the two 
traditions, Computational Models and Health Behaviour Theories can, we believe can be a valuable 
approach to understanding the phenomenon at-hand. 
The response and effectiveness of different governmental policies and individual decision-
making in the case of COVID-19 offer public officials and researchers valuable lessons on best 
responses under global crises. For the one currently underway, despite the success that can be observed 
in many of the cases, the “fight” does not seem to be over; development of vaccines is a slow and 
uncertain process, mutations of the virus can easily bring new waves of a similarly or more deadly 
disease, and in such an interconnected world, even 1 undetected infection can threaten the stability we 
have managed to achieve. But this crisis also provides us with the opportunity to explore and, hopefully, 
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gain understanding of how we can optimally responses to future crises, both at the level of policy 
making and communication, as well as individually. This work hopes to assist in this effort. 
 
Research Objective & Research Questions 
In this project, we aim to contribute to the tremendous response of the global scientific 
community with a simulation model emphasizing the coupling between viral dynamics and the 
behavioural response of the population. For this, we develop a model that builds upon classic 
epidemiological models in a way that we believe better describes COVID-19 and we apply this structure 
in the case of Norway to assess its validity. While Norway can be considered one of the “success stories” 
in the fight of COVID-19, the virus did penetrate the society causing serious health and socioeconomical 
disruptions (see Figure 3 )  
 
 
Figure 3: Number of reported COVID-19 cases per specimen collection date & Number of new patients admitted to hospital 
with COVID-19 as the main reason for admission. Source: Norwegian Institute of Public Health – FHI (2020c) 
 
Regarding the behavioural response of the Norwegian population, we will attempt to bring together 
insights from earlier computational models as well as psychological theories described under the 
umbrella term Health Behaviour Theories. Our aim is to combine theoretical insights into a compound 
theoretical construct which we will build and test via a simulation model. With this, we aspire to provide 
an endogenous view of peoples’ response to the threat posed by COVID-19 and begin exploring what 
decisions, at the governmental and individual level, can facilitate responses that can assist in mitigating 
that threat.  
 
Research Questions 
1. Can well-known models of infectious disease be adopted for the case of COVID-19? 
a. Could accounting for gradual progression among stages of the disease accurately 
describe the reality of Covid-19? 
b. Can such a model offer us additional information? 
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c. Could such a model be utilised for other viruses or diseases?  
 
2. Is the behavioural response of the population, in terms of compliance with proposed 
behavioural measures, significant for the prevalence of Covid-19 in the population? 
a. If so, is it sufficient that this response is grounded in information on the prevalence of 
the disease? 
b. Are there additional mechanisms that can be utilised to enhance compliance with 
proposed behavioural measures? 
a. More specifically, are communication messages important in helping mobilise 
the desired response? 
b. can targeted information regarding the effectiveness of the proposed measures 
have a significant impact? 
 
3. Can existing theoretical frameworks of decision making in response to environmental threats 
to our wellbeing be combined in a unified framework? 
a. Can they be translated and represented in a dynamic, computational model and, if so, 
is System Dynamics an appropriate method? 
b. Is such a framework relevant only for the COVID-19 pandemic? 
 
Methodology 
To examine those questions, we will develop a simulation model to represent the spread of COVID-19 
in Norway and allow us to test the endogenous behavioural response. The approach we will follow is 
represented in the following sections 
Simulation Modeling 
As already briefly discussed, simulation modelling has had a main influence in the response to 
CCOVIDovid-19 at a global level. This is to be expected as “[…] when experimentation in real systems 
is infeasible, simulation becomes the main, and perhaps the only, way you can discover for yourself 
how complex systems work” (Sterman, 2000, p. 38). In this study, we will develop a computation model 
using the System Dynamics (SD) modelling method to explore the dynamics of the spread of COVID-
19. SD is a simulation method that applies to complex, dynamic problems and it involves dynamic 
definition of those problems (as they develop over time) and an endogenous view focusing on the 
complex feedback between elements of the system. Those elements are represented as levels and rates 
(or stocks and flows), and are explored as continuous quantities (Forrester, 1961; Richardson, 2011). 
SD is “an iterative and interdisciplinary process, which views problems holistically” (Palmer, 2017, p. 
2) and, as such, lends itself well to a complex, interconnected problem such as COVID-19 (for a more 
extended discussion on SD modeling for the case of Covid-19, see Currie et al., 2020).  
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Moreover, the SD method has a long tradition of applications to Public Health (for a brief 
review, see Homer & Hirsch, 2006) and has already been utilised successfully in the case of COVID-
19 (for example, Homer, 2020; Pruyt & PEAS CENTER, 2020; Struben, 2020). Decision-making, in 
general, has been at the core of the methodology since its inception (see, for example Forrester, 1987) 
and SD modeling has been applied widely to investigate responses to environmental situations at the 
individual or aggregate level (e.g. Batchelder, Gonzalez, Palma, Schoenbaum, & Lounsbury, 2015; 
Hirsch, Levine, & Miller, 2016; Jacobsen & Bronson, 1987).  
Not least, SD has been developed and grown as an applied method, focused largely on policy 
design and testing but it also has and will continue to be successfully used for the development and 
testing of theoretical insights (de Gooyert, 2019; De Gooyert, 2016; de Gooyert & Größler, 2018). Since 
our work is situated somewhere in the middle of this continuum between application and theory, the 
methodology fits our purpose.  
 
Specific Approach 
The approach we use combines elements of Phenomenon driven explanation (de Gooyert, 2019) and 
Grounded Theory (see, for example Chun Tie, Birks, & Francis, 2019).  
With a Phenomenon-Driven Explanation process, the researcher begins with a phenomenon for 
which they “develop a simulation model as a ‘dynamic hypothesis’, a potential explanation of the 
phenomenon by proposing the structure, in terms of causal relations, that drives the behaviour” (de 
Gooyert, 2019). The simulation model is validated through its ability to replicate the reference mode of 
behaviour and, if valid,  “what-if” scenarios can be tested to develop new insights on the phenomenon. 
Grounded Theory is a method “that focuses on creating conceptual frameworks or theories 
through building inductive analysis from the data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 187). In this framework, a 
researcher “begins with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the data” (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2014, p. 12). This emergence of theory from the data is possible as the researcher “links” 
concepts and insights together, and as Luna-Reyes & Andersen suggest “since ‘linking’ is at the heart 
of SD, grounded theory speaks to the same goal of drawing relationships among factors in a targeted 
system” (2003, p. 284). We find the multi-grounded theory framework proposed by Goldkuhl & 
Cronholm (2003) to be very insightful in adding the process of Theoretical Grounding in addition to 
Empirical and Internal Grounding (see Figure 4). Theoretical Grounding refers to the process whereby 
the emerging theory is contrasted with established theories representing the same phenomenon in order 
to provide validation of the proposed structure. 
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Figure 4: The three complementary grounding processes proposed by Goldkuhl & Cronholm (2003) 
  
Data Collection 
The data required to build and validate the model to test our hypotheses can be broadly categorised in 
two categories: 
• Epidemiological Data: data on the characteristics of the viral agent (e.g. relative infectivity, 
duration of infection, severity proportions), as well its spread in Norway (e.g. number of 
infected that have been hospitalised, in critical care, tested). 
• Health Behaviour Data: data of usually more “soft” nature on how individuals respond to 
environmental threats or make health-related decisions. Established theories and studies under 
those theories, as well as mathematical models of response of the population to an epidemic 
fall under this category 
 
A more detailed view of specific data sources utilised in this research with relevant examples, as well 
as the method of collection of the data and their contribution to the simulation model can be found in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Data Sources, Collection, and their Contribution 
Source Type Examples Collection  Contribution 
Epidemiological 
numerical data 
Characteristics of viral agent (Ferretti et 
al., 2020; Gaythorpe et al., 2020; 
Gudbjartsson et al., 2020; He et al., 2020; 
The WHO-China Joint Mission on 
Coronavirus Disease 2019, 2020); 
Prevalence of the virus in Norway 
Literature Review with focus on 
information about the viral agent. 
Peer-reviewed papers were 
prioritised but, due to the 
circumstances around COVID-19, 
preprints were included in the 





(Norwegian Institute of Public Health - 
FHI, 2020c, 2020b) 







SD Models (Homer, 2020; ISEE 
Systems, 2020; Struben, 2020 etc.); 
Other Simulation Models, e.g. (Ferguson 
et al., 2020; Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health - FHI, 2020a; NTNU 
COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
Review of published models with 
documentation of assumptions 
regarding structure and parameter 
values. SD models both published 
and informally peer-reviewed and 
published in the SD Society’s 












(Funk, Gilad, Watkins, & Jansen, 2009; 
Funk, Salathé, et al., 2010; Liao & You, 
2014; Poletti, Caprile, Ajelli, Pugliese, & 
Merler, 2009; Reluga, 2010; Toxvaerd, 
2020) 
Review of published mathematical 
and computational models 
focusing on structural 
understanding of population-wide 





Health Behaviour Theories and Models 
(e.g. Champion & Skinner, 2008; M. 
Conner & Norman, 2005; Glanz et al., 
2008; Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992; 
Norman, Boer, & Seydel, 2005; 
Weinstein, 1993; Witte, 1992) 
Literature Review focusing on the 
structural understanding of the 
behavioural response of the 
population to environmental 








This work did not involve primary data collection and, as such, ethical considerations regarding the 
treatment of research participants are not applicable. However, every modelling attempt needs to be 
ethically evaluated as “[t]he consequences of the use of a model are morally relevant” (Diekmann, 
2011). Some of the identified principles for such an evaluation are presented here. 
Integrity represents the modeler’s obligation to follow professional standards. Modelers need 
to act “in an ethical manner as they apply the generally accepted best practices of their profession” 
(Walker, 2009, p. 1051). Best-practices of our field have been employed in the development, testing, 
and documentation of our model according to long-standing guidelines in our field (e.g. Barlas, 1996; 
Martinez-Moyano & Richardson, 2013; Rahmandad & Sterman, 2012; Sterman, 2000) 
 
1 Available at https://www.systemdynamics.org/covid-19  
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Transparency refers to clear stating of assumptions, an understandable model design, and 
explicit explanation of its applications and restrictions (Diekmann, 2011). SD models inherently call 
for transparency of assumptions as they are causal-descriptive, and as such,  “white-box” models 
(Duggan, 2016, p. 123). In contrast to “black-box” models, where the internal workings of the model 
are not explicitly known, white-box models call for explanation of each causal link and assumption 
(Barlas, 1996, pp. 185–186). Detailed descriptions for each part of the model are presented in the 
relevant sections and an explicit documentation following the standards proposed by Rahmandad & 
Sterman (2012) can be found in Appendix. In terms of an “understandable design”, we have attempted 
throughout the development of the model, with a degree of success to be judged by the reader, to utilise 
terminology that is known or commonly utilised, directionality of variables that might be more intuitive 
and fitting to the terms, and disaggregate variables to assist in the understanding of the equations. 
It is important to note that, in simulation modelling approaches, “[t]ransparency depends on the 
ethical behavior of the modeler, though it is the model itself that is ethically charged” (Palmer, 2017, 
p. 3). The modeler, besides adhering to research ethics of general conduct, has to answer additional 
ethical questions, as for example: 
 
“Who matters? What matters? What time horizon matters? What are the boundaries of the 
system/model to be considered? For many system dynamicist, the criterion determining 
whether an element or a structure is modelled or not –and hence where the boundary lies–, is 
whether the inclusion/exclusion changes the behaviour of the model, which is a technical 
criterion. But these questions are essentially ethical questions”  
(Pruyt & Kwakkel, 2007, p. 4) 
 
The above has been a consideration of ours, especially working on a topic that has so serious 
implications for everyone and, perhaps even more so, since our focus is on the behaviour of individuals. 
The “Who matters” question has been particularly difficult to answer and, as further described at later 
sectors, we have decided on including a mechanism of direct communication between people (which 
we will refer to as the “bottom-up” mechanism). Many decisions regarding this mechanism, heavily 
influenced by lack of data and parameter uncertainty, have perhaps led us to underestimate its 
importance in the behaviour produced by the model. As such, its exclusion would not “change the 
behaviour of the model” sufficiently and, if anything, would make things easier. The eventual decision 
to maintain it, and try to understand its value,  was an ethical one.  
In terms of Transparency of the applications and limitations of the model itself, it is firstly 
significant to state that our model’s purpose, according to the classification proposed by Mayer, Van 
Daalen, & Bots (2004), is to “research and analyse”, that is, to produce knowledge in a specific domain. 
This knowledge might be relevant to policy, however “the translation of the results of their research 
into a policy design or recommendation is not a major part of the purpose” (Walker, 2009, p. 1052). 
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While the model is aimed to explore policy options for a current high-stakes problem, its main purpose 
is not to suggest specific policies. Significant limitations and uncertainties in both parameter values and 
structural components of the model, as well as lack of field-specific knowledge of the modeler,  limit 
its ability to be used as a policy recommendation tool at its current iteration. It is crucial to remember 
that “Mathematical models are a great way to explore questions. They are also a dangerous way to assert 
answers” (Saltelli et al., 2020, p. 484). We have remained conscious of this fact during the development 




Chapter 2: Modelling the Virus 
The most common model of infectious diseases forming the basis of almost all the disease models 
studies since its inception is the SIR (Susceptible – Infected – Recovered) model (Kermack & 
McKendrick, 1927). In this model, the total population is divided in three categories, or three main 
stocks: 
1. Susceptible (S): The population which has not been infected by the disease but can be infected 
upon contact with an infectious person. 
2. Infected (I): The population currently infected with the disease 
3. Recovered (R): The population which has contracted the disease and recovered (most 
commonly being immune to further re-infection) 
 
The SEIR model was later developed to account for what is known as the latency period: the period a 
person is exposed to the disease but not infectious. The class of Exposed individuals (E) is the only 
















= 𝜎𝛦 − 𝛾𝐼 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
=  𝛾𝐼 
 
where N represents the total population, 1/σ is the average duration of incubation, and 1/γ the average 
duration of infection. The probability of transmission between a susceptible and an infected person β is 
«the product of the per capita contact rate and the probability of infection after contact with an infected 
individual» (Radulescu & Cavanagh, 2020, p. 3). It can therefore also be represented as: 
 
β =  𝑘𝑏   
 
where k represents the average contacts per person daily (or contact rate) and b the infectivity per 










This formulation is significant as it highlights the element that has been mostly utilized in the attempts 
to control the pandemic: the contact rate k. As evident from the above equations, the system is very 
sensitive to (or largely determined indeed by) this parameter. 
A number of modifications to the classic SEIR model of disease dynamics were proposed by 
Pål I. Davidsen, for its application in the case of COVID-19. Those include a gradual progression 
towards more severe symptomatology, a breaking of the, common to classic SEIR models, “perfect-
mixing” rule with the introduction of high order delays in the symptom progression, and a structure that 
allows us to “track” the number of people at any particular day of their disease. Those modifications 
will be presented in more detail in the following section.  
 
Modifications of the Classic Model 
Severity Status 
A usual categorisation of the severity status of COVID patients is in cases that are mild, moderate, 
severe, or critical (see, for example Pan et al., 2020). This differentiation between different severity 
categories is important for numerous reasons: 
i. It can help us best determine the strain on Health institutions (hospital beds, ventilators, etc.) 
as well as the number of deaths from the disease.  
ii. Testing Capacity in most countries had not been sufficient to test all persons reporting with 
symptoms that could be attributed to COVID-19. A common practice has been to prioritise 
testing in more severe cases. Differentiating between severity categories allows us both to make 
better estimates of the true number of infected and determine how prioritised testing decisions 
can be considered . 
iii. While much still remains unknown, there are indications that different severity categories might 
also have different disease characteristics, from disease duration to viral loads and, most 
importantly, infectivity (e.g. Byambasuren et al., 2020) 
iv. Not least, different symptoms can lead to different behavioural tendencies: the more severe the 
symptoms, the more likely it is that people will isolate or be quarantined (voluntarily or 
mandatory). Population not experiencing any symptoms, even if they carry the disease, are 
expected to make the same decision regarding isolation as the general population.  
 
Gradual Progression across Severity Categories 
Besides the disaggregation of the infected population across severity categories which has been 
relatively common in modelling attempts of COVID-19 due to its significance, we account for a gradual 
progression towards more severe symptoms and eventual hospitalization or need for critical care. 
Unlike other early-response SD models which disaggregate infected persons across severity categories 
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as soon as they enter the infectious period of the disease (Fiddaman, 2020; ISEE Systems, 2020), we 
conceptualise the development of more severe symptoms as a gradual process, a progression through 
all the previous severity stages. As an example, an individual who has died after spending time in critical 
care, has gradually progressed from no symptoms, to more and more severe symptoms, hospitalization, 
and some time in critical care before dying. While the average stay in all the previous stages is lower 
than that of a patient not reaching a critical care requiring severity, there is some time spent in all those 
stages.  
Moreover, in many of the proposed models, we observe what is termed as the “perfect mixing 
rule”: formulating the movement between the different stocks as a first-order delay where material 
leaves the stock over some average delay time D. In this way, we allow each item the same probability 
to exit the stock, independently of its arrival time. This perfect-mixing does not fit well, in our opinion, 
with the dynamics of COVID-19 as the probability of movement to more severe stages of the disease 
has some dependency on the arrival time. A common way to break this rule is the introduction of higher 
order delays where “the higher the order of the delay, the less mixing and the smaller the variance of 
the output” (Sterman, 2000, p. 420). We conceptualise here the movement between the severity 
categories to be best represented by a third-order delay, represented as three distinct stages at each 
severity level. 
We believe both those mechanisms to increase the capacity of the model to fit the reference 
behaviour, especially for those Infected who will eventually develop more severe symptomatology. 
 
Tracking individuals based on day of illness 
The structure we propose utilises Conveyor Stocks to “keep track” of individuals at different days of 
their infection. A Conveyor, akin to a conveyor belt, allows material within it to move progressively (at 
every DT) across the conveyor’s “slats” (for more information, see ISEE Systems, n.d.). As such, it can 
provide us with the exact number of material (here, infected people) that has entered the conveyor at 
some previous point in time or information on how long it has been within the conveyor. This type of 
information is significant for various reasons: 
i. The discrete nature of Conveyors ensures that individuals characteristics are maintained as they 
would in reality (a person in the fifth day of Infection has passed discretely four days as 
Infected), and those can be utilised to better understand movements of individuals according to 
such characteristics. 
ii. The structure can help us clearly associate different characteristics that seem to change across 
days of the disease (viral load, relative infectiousness, testing efficiency, etc.). While there are 
other methods in the SD toolbox to do so (we are refering to co-flow structures. For a 
discussion, see Gambardella, Polk, Lounsbury, & Levine, 2017), we find such associations via 
conveyors to be easier to formulate and, perhaps, easier to communicate.  
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iii. It allows for a more “individual-based” view of the disease progression that can improve the 
communication potential of the infectivity model.  
 
Main Infection Model (SEIR) 
As described above, the model is a modified version of the classic SEIR model accounting for a gradual 
disease progression through a number of stages and days of infection. The main stocks are the 
Susceptible population (S), the Exposed Non Contagious population, the Infected population at each 
severity category (Asymptomatic Infected AI, Symptomatic Infected SI, Hospitalised Infected HI, and 
Critical Care Infected CCI) and at each stage in their severity category (e.g. Asymptomatic Infected at 
first stage AI, Asymptomatic Infected at second stage AI s2, and Asymptomatic Infected at third stage 
AI s3). The Recovered and Dead stocks are also disaggregated according to the severity category the 
individual recovered from or died from respectively: for example, a person recovering as Hospitalised 
Infected will be moved into the respective Hospitalised Infected Recovered stock (HI Recent 
Recovered) at the same “day slot” they were occupying when they recovered. The Recent Recovered 
and Recent Dead conveyors hold recovered individuals for 45 days (the Transit Time) since those 
entered the infection chain as Asymptomatic Infected (that is, through the becoming infectious rate or 
the importation rate). After this period, the Recovered and Dead stocks keep track of the long-term 
recovered and dead population. The same stocks are replicated for the Tested Infected across severity 
categories and stages within each category (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Top-Level View of the main Infection Model. In black are the stocks for the non-tested Infected, in blue those for 
the Tested Infected & purple variables represent parameters 
 
A Susceptible person (S) can become Exposed to COVID-19 (E) upon contact with any Infectious 
person (𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙). Initially, Infected cases are imported from abroad and data estimates on imported cases 
(Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020c) are used to initiate the spread of infection in 
Norway. We assume an additional 40% imported cases than those reported, which is in line with 
estimates on the proportion of Asymptomatic Infected (see Table 2 below). Those imported cases are 
assumed to be entering the infection chain at the Asymptomatic stage through the importation rate.   
Exposed individuals remain Non-Contagious for a period of 2 days, which represents the 
latency period of the virus (Tuite, Fisman, & Greer, 2020). After this period, they become contagious 
and move to stock of Asymptomatic Infected AI. An Asymptomatic Infected person at this first stage 
can either move to Asymptomatic Stage 2 or recover as Asymptomatic (move to the stock AI Recent 
Recovered and then to the “long-term” AI Recovered stock). An Asymptomatic Stage 2 can, again, either 
move to Asymptomatic Stage 3 or recover as Asymptomatic and so on. In this way, a fraction of those 
Infected will progress to develop symptoms (become Symptomatic), while some will recover as 
Asymptomatic, from either of the three stages. Symptomatic Infected SI follow the same journey, either 
towards recovery or towards gradually more severe stages, with a fraction eventually becoming 
Hospitalised Infected HI. As individuals enter the severity stage of Hospitalised Infected, the risk of 
mortality due to the disease presents itself. Hospitalised Infected can therefore, as before, recover or 








































































































































































































































































































Individuals would in this case be moved through the dying rate of their stage to the HI Recent Dead 
and, eventually, the HI Dead stocks. The final, most severe stage is that of Critical Care Infected CCI 
– individuals requiring intensive care due to complications of their infection. The mortality risk in this 
case is higher and Critical Care Infected either recover or die from each of the three severity stages2.  
 The structure described above is duplicated as is for the Tested Infected across all severity 
categories and stages. Infected individuals at each stage can get tested through the respective testing 
rate of their stage and be moved at the Tested structure, at exactly the same position (both in terms of 
severity and stage and at the same “day-slot”) they were holding in the Non-Tested / original structure. 
As Tested, they progress through the same subsequent stages or recover in exactly the same way they 
would as non-tested. For a more focused view of the progress from infection until the first stage of 
Symptomatic Infected, see Figure 6 
 
Figure 6: Partial View of the Infection model. The three stages that an Asymptomatic Infected needs to go through before 
becoming Symptomatic are similar at each of the severity categories. The lighter blue structure on the right represents the 
Tested infected 
 
Main Assumptions of Infectivity Model 
Asymptomatic Infections / Proportion of severity categories 
The fraction of Asymptomatic Infections remains one of the major uncertainties regarding 
COVID-19. There is a significant distinction between those who remain Asymptomatic throughout the 
entire infection period of the infection, and those who develop symptoms at later stages of their 
progression. Unfortunately, many of the studies do not use a longitudinal approach that would allow us 
to estimate the fraction who is, at the time of the study, and remains Asymptomatic.. Due to symptom-
based screening, especially at initial stages of the epidemic, the possibility of variations of the 
Symptomatic proportions due to age, as well as the previously mentioned non-longitudinal data, 
 
2 In this model, there is no consideration of movement of individuals “back” in previous stages: an infected person 













































































estimates of Asymptomatic cases vary significantly from 5% to 80% (for a quick review, see Heneghan, 
Brassey, & Jefferson, 2020).  
Interestingly, modelling studies report on average higher fractions of Asymptomatic infections 
(Buitrago-Garcia et al., 2020). The Imperial College modelling team estimates that “two-thirds of cases 
are sufficiently symptomatic to self-isolate (if required by policy) within 1 day of symptom onset” 
(Ferguson et al., 2020, p. 5) but the most usual estimate for the Asymptomatic proportion seems to be 
40% (Ferretti et al., 2020; Gudbjartsson et al., 2020). The model developed by the Norwegian Institute 
of Public Health (2020a) uses the same assumption, while a similar model developed by the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU) assumes that 50% of those exposed will actually 
develop symptoms (2020) (for a more detailed view, see Table XXX). 
Reported data from over 72.000 cases in China, estimate 81% of cases as mild, 14% as severe, 
and 5% as critical (The Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Emergency Response Epidemiology Team, 
2020), although those estimates might underrepresent mild cases as only 1,2% of the analysed patients 
were identified as Asymptomatic. Similar data for China have been reported by the World Health 
Organisation (The WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019, 2020). Table 2 presents 
the values used for the relative fraction of infected at each severity category as well as evidence from 
the relevant literature. 
  
Table 2: Proportions of Infected at each of the severity categories: chosen parameter values and values identified in the 
literature either as estimates or as parameters used for Models of Covid-19 
Proportion Asymptomatic = 45% 
Estimates 17,9% (Mizumoto, Kagaya, Zarebski, & Chowell, 2020) 
1/3  (Arima et al., 2020) 
 43%* (Gudbjartsson et al., 2020) 
56%* (Arons et al., 2020) 
87,9 (Sutton, Fuchs, D’Alton, & Goffman, 2020) 
Model 
Assumptions 
1/3 (Ferguson et al., 2020) 
40% (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a) 
50% (NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
 40% (Ferretti et al., 2020) 
*reported at the time of study: some might develop symptoms later 
Fraction Symptomatic Infected becoming Hospitalised Infected = 40% of Symptomatic (accounting for 22% 
of all Infected) 
Estimates 13,8%* (The WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019, 
2020) 




according to age 
(Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a); (NTNU 
COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
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16% (Homer, 2020) 
*of total Infected 
Fraction Hospitalised Infected entering Critical Care = 45% (accounting for 11% of all Infected) 




30%  (NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020); (Ferguson et al., 2020) 
26% (Tuite et al., 2020 based on estimates by Wang et al., 2020) 
*of total Infected 
 
It is significant to note that all fractions were calibrated and the discrepancies observed between our 
estimates and those described in other models are expected due to the structure we have developed. For 
example, Asymptomatic Infected are not “separated” from the other severity categories after infection 
at an Asymptomatic stock from which they can only recover. Instead, the continue “leaking” to the 
Symptomatic stock until their recovery.  
Latency Period and Symptom Progression 
The term latency period is used to describe the time from infection to the beginning of infectiousness 
while the incubation period refers to the average time between infection and onset of symptoms (see 
Figure 7). The duration of the latent period is a significant while uncertain factor (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Sadun, 2020). If individuals become infectious immediately or shortly after their 
infection, the reproduction number will be higher as they can immediately infect others around them. 
Assuming the same incubation period, a higher latency period would tighten the “window” for infecting 
others prior to realizing that one might be infected. Reported values for the latency period are 2.56 (with 
ST DEV 0,72, Peirlinck, Linka, Sahli Costabal, & Kuhl, 2020) and usual parameter values used range 
between 1 and 3 days (Bi et al., 2020, see also Table 3)  
 
Figure 7: Key time period of COVID-19 infection. Adapted by Z. Liu, Magal, Seydi, & Webb (2020) with the incorporation 
of Hospitalised and Critical Care periods 
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Uncertainty around the latency period of the disease’s and the relevant time of progression to more 
severe symptomatology is still rather high. Differences in age, prior health, capacity of health systems, 
and the overall uncertainty regarding when an individual got the infection, lead to large variations of 
reported values. Moreover, very common estimates of those parameters from modeling studies are 
heavily structure dependent. In our model, we introduce additional, high order delays in the progression 
between severity stages, so some deviation is to be expected. In Table 3, we present the values used for 
the average time individuals spent at each severity stage or recover / die together with estimates from 
the relevant literature or assumptions from modeling approaches.  
 
Table 3: Durations of residence at different stages across all severity categories: chosen parameter values and values 
described in the literature 
Asymptomatic & Symptomatic Infected 
Average Duration of Infection for Asymptomatic Infected = 201 
Average Duration of Infection for Symptomatic Infected = 16 (with 4 days average incubation period – time 
from infection to becoming Symptomatic)1 
 
Estimates 20,8  (Bi et al., 2020) 
1. We need to note that this is not the same as the duration of infectivity (see Infectivity Module section below) and hence 
this parameter is used to mainly give us information about the number of people experiencing symptoms of COVID-19. 
Average Incubation Period (time from infection to symptom onset) = 4 (with 2 days latency period) 
Estimates 5 (Ferretti et al., 2020) 
5,2 (Li et al., 2020) 
5,5 (Lauer et al., 2020) 
6,4 (Backer, Klinkenberg, & Wallinga, 2020) 
4 to 6 
(Systematic 
review of 41 
studies) 
(M. Park, Cook, Lim, Sun, & Dickens, 2020) 
Model 
Assumptions 
5 (3 days latency 
& 2 days 
Asymptomatic) 
(Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a) 
6 (1 day of 
latency & 5 
Asymptomatic) 
(NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
6 (2 days latency 
& 4 
Asymptomatic) 
(ISEE Systems, 2020) 
5,4 (Homer, 2020) 
Hospitalised Infected 
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Average Time to Hospitalisation after symptom onset = 5 days  
Estimates 9,1 to 12,5 (Li et al., 2020) 
1,5 to 5,5 (Sanche et al., 2020) 
5,76 (Gaythorpe et al., 2020) 
5,2 to 5,9 (Tindale et al., 2020) 
Model 
Assumptions 
5 (Ferguson et al., 2020); (Struben, 2020) 
9 (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a) 
6 (NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
Average Stay in Hospital before ICU admission = 3 days 
Model 
Assumptions 
3 (Tuite et al., 2020 based on estimates by Wang et al., 2020) 
4 (NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020); (Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health - FHI, 2020a) 
Average Stay in Hospital no Critical Care admission = 8 days 
Estimates 13,3 (Gaythorpe et al., 2020)* 
14,5 (Tindale et al., 2020)* 
11,5 (Sanche et al., 2020) 
Model 
Assumptions 
8 (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a); (NTNU 
COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
10 (Tuite et al., 2020 based on estimates by Wang et al., 2020) 
*no distinction between need for ICU admission and not 
Average Stay in Hospital before death = 8 days 
Estimates 8,6 (Linton et al., 2020) 
 11.2 (Sanche et al., 2020) 
Model 
Assumptions 
8 (Ferguson et al., 2020); (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - 
FHI, 2020a) 
 10 (NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
Critical Care Infected 
Average Stay in Critical Care before Recovery = Average Stay in Critical Care before Death = 12 
Estimates 16 to death; 
20,51 to 
recovery* 
(Gaythorpe et al., 2020) 
 17,8 to death; 
24,7 to 
recovery* 
(Verity et al., 2020) 
 14,5 to 20,2* (Linton et al., 2020) 
Model 
Assumptions 
21 (Tuite et al., 2020 based on estimates by Yang et al., 2020) 
10 (Ferguson et al., 2020) 
12 (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a); (NTNU 
COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
 26 
*from Symptom Onset. Note that, Symptom Onset to death for those in Critical Care = 20, while Symptom Onset to death 
for Hospitalised = 15 
 
Infectivity Module 
The structure describing the infection rate is a modified version of the one developed by ISEE Systems 
in their COVID-19 model (2020) to account for two (2) significant mechanisms: 
a) Modification of behaviour as a direct result of infection and/or testing 
b) Declining Infectivity profile over the duration of the infection 
 
As described earlier, in our brief description of SEIR models, the infection rate is equal to: 
 
(Contact rate k * Susceptible S) * Infectivity b * (Infected I / Total Population N)  
(Sterman, 2000, p. 302) 
In a graphical representation, the aggregated infection rate and its causes are presented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Determinants of Infection Rate, Aggregated View 
 
The Infection rate is guided by two main loops, a Reinforcing loop of contagion and a Balancing loop 
of depletion (Sterman, 2000, p. 302). Infected individuals come in contact with Susceptible individuals 
at a (global) contact rate k. Contacts between a Susceptible and an Infected person have a probability 
equal to the infectivity to result in an infection. At the early stages of the spread of the virus, there are 
many Susceptible individuals who, after coming in contact with Infected individuals, might become 
themselves Infected, and pass on the infection to another Susceptible person the next time around. The 
reinforcing loop that is operating strongly at the early stages results in the exponential growth pattern 
of the COVID-19 spread that we have observed. As more and more people become Infected (and then 
Recover), the “pool” of Susceptible individuals in the population decreases and the Balancing loops 
gains more and more strength, leading to saturation in the total number of Infected. The two loops give 
















To account for differences of the infection potential of different severity categories (see the 
following sections), we disaggregate this structure and develop an infection rate for each of the severity 
categories (see Figure 9) 
 
Figure 9: Infection Rate from Asymptomatic Infected 
 
The number of Susceptible (S) and Total Population (N), as well as the Infected (I) at different stages 
and days of infection are direct inputs from the main viral model. The Global Contact Rate k is a 
function of the Baseline Contact Rate (the average “normal” number of contacts per person daily) and 
the reduction in contacts due to the behavioural response of the population. This behavioural reduction 
includes 
i. a fractional mobility reduction due to social isolation 
ii. an additional reduction of “dangerous” contacts due to the total effect of hygienic behaviour on 
risk reduction 
Behavioural Dynamics Directly from infection 
Infected individuals (I) are assumed to directly change their behaviour and reduce their contacts with 
others (Del Valle, Hethcote, Hyman, & Castillo-Chavez, 2005). This change can come directly due to 
the symptoms of the disease (people feeling unwell would more often stay at home), governmental 
instructions (quarantine), or individual decisions based on the status of knowingly posing a threat of 
infection to others. Our main assumptions are presented in Table 4. It is important to note that, due to 
no consideration of quarantine of close contacts (e.g. people at the same household or with multiple 
interactions with the infected person that would be expected to be quarantined under suspicion or 
confirmation of infection of the infected person), these assumptions might seem more strict than they 
might be in reality.  
 
Table 4: Contacts adjustment as a direct effect of Infection status 
Infection Status  Value Comments 
Asymptomatic Equal to global 
contact rate 
Asymptomatic individuals do not change their behaviour based on their 
status as infected as this status is not known to them. 
Symptomatic 1 contact per day 
(10% of normal 
contacts) 
Symptomatic Infected are assumed to reduce their contacts from the time 
they start experiencing symptoms & to generally comply with governmental 


















/ Critical Care) 
1 contact per week 
(1,45% of normal 
contacts)  
Individuals who are hospitalized (or in Critical Care) do not have many 
chances of coming in unprotected contact with individuals around them.  
Tested Positive 1 contact per week  Individuals who are tested positive for COVID-19 are assumed to comply 
with self-isolation protocols.  
 
With this addition, the Infection rate from, for example a Symptomatic Infected person, looks like 
Figure 10. The main differences from Figure 8 above is in the Contact Adjustment for Symptomatic, 
and the utilisation of information regarding the day of Infection of the individual. 
 
Figure 10: Infection rate from Symptomatic Infected 
 
Infectivity: Declining Infectivity Profile & relative infectiousness of Asymptomatic 
Evidence suggests that viral shedding, considered a main metric of infectiousness, declines over the 
duration of the disease (He et al., 2020; To et al., 2020; Wölfel et al., 2020; Zou et al., 2020). The 
information on the day of infection that each individual is at is utilised in this section of the model in 
order  to assign the relative infectiousness according to the profile described by He et al. (2020) and 
presented in Figure 11. Similar assumptions of declining infectivity have been used in other models 
(Zhu & Chen, 2020). 
 


























While there might be differences in the infection potential between infected of different severity 
categories, (e.g. Y. Liu et al., 2020), we do not have sufficient evidence to introduce such a 
differentiation except for the Asymptomatic Infected. The relative infectiousness of this population is 
still a quite uncertain factor but there have been evidence that it might be lower relative to those 
developing symptoms (Byambasuren et al., 2020). Despite the viral load potential, the mere presence 
of symptoms can, in this case, increase the probability that a contact can result in infection: “Since 
coughing and sneezing increase the amount of droplets that are expelled, the highest transmission 
potential (in absence of containment measures) seems to be for symptomatic individuals” (Sciensano, 
2020, p. 7). The model used by the Norwegian health authorities uses an estimate of 10% relative 
infectiousness of Asymptomatic (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a), but, here, we 
decided to use the more modest estimate of 50% (Ferguson et al., 2020; Kucharski et al., 2020) 
 
Testing Module 
We represent the testing policies following the structure developed by ISEE systems in their COVID-
19 model (2020). This structure can be considered as a somewhat simplified representation as it does 
not explicitly account for both positive and negative tests. Rather, it establishes Target Test Rates for 
the different severity categories than can only be achieved if sufficient testing capacity is in place. These 
Target Test Rates represent the maximum fraction of infected individuals at each severity category that 
can be identified through testing, given sufficient Testing Capacity. As such, they incorporate not only 
the ability to test an individual at any of the severity stages as deriving from the testing capacity and 
prioritisation decisions, but also the ability to identify an individual to be tested. The actual testing 
capacity of Norway is not known to us. Moreover, due to limited and prioritised testing, especially at 
the earlier stages of the virus spread, establishing the relationship between number of administered tests, 
fraction of positive tests, and overall prevalence of the virus in the population is a difficult feat that goes 
beyond the purpose of this model.  
While the COVID-19 model from ISEE Systems represents the Target Test Rates as constant, 
behavioural validation from observed data, and knowledge of governmental practices led us to here 
conceptualise them as increasing relative to the Testing Capacity so as, the higher the Testing Capacity, 
the higher the Target Fraction for each severity category is (the assumptions used can be examined in 
Figure 12). The Norwegian Public Heath Institute - FHI (2020e) established rules for prioritised testing 
of suspected cases. As is to be expected, patients in need of hospital admission or in nursing homes 
with significant symptoms were the most prioritised. Our structure follows this prioritisation with 




Figure 12: Target Test Rates for Symptomatic, Hospitalised, and Critical Care Infected (left-axis) and Overall Testing 
Capacity (right-axis) 
 
Moreover, persons that have been in close contact with a confirmed case are also in one of the priority 
testing categories. The Contact Tracing mechanism takes as its input the number of recent positive tests 
and assumed both a number of contacts tested per each positive test and an effectiveness of identification 
(what fraction of these tests might be actually infected persons). This effectiveness is assumed to be 
10% (1 positive identification per 10 contacts traced), and a 7-day delay between the first test and a test 
of a contact is assumed (testing smooth time) The contacts that are being traced per positive test are 
unknown – we assume a number that is increasing over time and various shapes and upper bounds can 
be experimented with (for the baseline assumption, see Figure 14 below).  
 
Partial Testing of Main Infection Model 
In this section, we will present the partial testing of main infection model to evaluate its ability to 
reproduce the data of the reference period (January 1st to June 1st). For a partial model testing, we use 
exogenous values instead of endogenously produced and the main assumptions and data used for this 
test are presented hereafter. 
Mobility 
The overall mobility of the population for the reference period was based on data by Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation (IHME, 2020). We, moreover, assumed an adoption of hygienic behaviour by 
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Figure 13: Assumptions used in Partial Model Testing: behaviour of Risk Reduction due to hygienic behaviour (left) and 
mobility reduction based on data (right) for the reference period 
Testing 
The assumption used for the daily addition in Testing Capacity was 200 tests per day, leading to the 
behaviour that can be seen in Figure 14. The Contact Tracing Mechanism also operates and, in the same 
graph, we present our assumptions for the number of contacts that are tested per positive test. 
 
 
Figure 14: Assumptions used in Partial Model Testing: behaviour of the Testing Capacity (left) and of over time contacts 
traced per positive test (right) over the reference period 
Main Feedback Mechanisms 
As can be seen in the Causal Loop Diagram (CLD; Figure 15), as Infected come in contact with 
Susceptible, the Infection Rate increases, leading to more Infected the next time around (R loop). Higher 
Infection Rate means that fewer people remain Susceptible, reducing the probability of “hot contacts” 
(loop B1). This loop is not very strong during the reference period, as the Behavioural Response of the 
population (describing Reduced Mobility & Hygienic Behaviour) greatly reduces the Global Contact 
Rate (average daily contacts per person), and thus, the Infection Rate. Moreover, loops B2 and B3 that 
describe the contact reduction of quarantined Infected, either due to having been Tested (B2) or due to 
Hospitalisation (B3) further reduce contacts between Infected and Susceptible, both acting to hinder 
the spread of the virus. The strength of the B2 loop depends on the Testing Capacity: more Capacity 
makes the loop stronger and leads to lower number of Infected. The strength of B3 depends on 




























Figure 15: CLD of main loops leading to the spread of COVID-19 
Results 
In figure 16, we present the Daily New Infected, the Cumulative Tested Infected, as well as Cumulative 
Deaths, and compare them to data from the Norwegian Health Authorities. It is important to note that 
the data can only capture confirmed cases (Infected Tested).  
 
Figure 16: Results of Partial Model Testing: Daily New Cases, Cumulative Infected Tested, and Cumulative Deaths 
compared to data for the reference period 
 
Our model seems to behave rationally during the reference period. Looking at the severity categories 
for which we have more information, namely Hospitalised Infected and Critical Care Infected, the 





















































Figure 17: Results of Partial Model Testing: Hospitalised Infected (Current) and Critical Care Infected (Current) compared 
to data for the reference period 
 
The overall behaviour in this case seems to fit quite well the behaviour of the real system, despite a 
small overestimation of the Critical Care Infected. Importantly, the growth in both Hospitalisations and 
Critical Care Admissions fits the observed growth in the data, providing evidence that the gradual 
progression structure that we have utilised, can accurately fit real-world observed values.  
A final and significant comparison we need to perform is whether our model manages to 
approach estimates regarding the fraction of Infected falling under different Severity categories. The 
World Health Organization – WHO (2020) has suggested that, of all Infected, around 40% are 
Asymptomatic, 16-20% become Hospitalised, and 4-6% enter Critical Care. Other estimates point 
to 80% of Asymptomatic and Symptomatic, 15% requiring Hospitalisation and 5% as Critical. Those 
values come rather close to the ones produced by our model (see Figure 18), although we might be 
underestimating the fraction of Hospitalised and Critical Care Infected. It is important therefore to look 
for, perhaps more recent,  information on this estimates as well as other parameters used in this model 
and update in order ensure that the model approaches better the appropriate fractions.   
 
 
Figure 18: Results of Partial Model Testing: Fraction of (recovered) Infected at each of the severity categories 
 
Moreover, our model captures the number of individuals at each severity category and according on 
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(left), as well as Tested Symptomatic and Hospitalised (right) who are at a specific day of infection as 
indicated by the values of the x-axis (notice the different ranges of the y-axis for each graph). We can 
easily see the long-tail distribution that is expected as most individuals recover or move to the next 
category over time, as well as the “delay” in the movement of individuals to the next severity stage: the 
larger number of hospitalised patients are close to the 10th to 15th day of infection. 
 
 
Figure 19: Partial Model Testing: Infected at each day of their infection 
 
A test with no Contact Tracing 
To look a bit closer into the behaviour of the model, we decide to run a Scenario with no Contact 
Tracing. We have evidence that contact tracing is a highly efficient mechanism for the management of 
COVID-19 (e.g. Matt J Keeling, Hollingsworth, & Read, 2020; Kucharski et al., 2020), and we would 
expect a higher number of New Infections and Deaths if it was not operating. As can be seen in Figure 
20, the model does respond reasonably to the absence of the contact tracing mechanism (remember that 
we start slowly testing contacts at the end of April, hence differences before that date are not expected 



























































































































































































































Figure 20: Results of Partial Model Testing of main Infection Model with and without the Contact Tracing mechanism 
 
Overall our model seems to fit the curves of the data and behave rationally under reasonable 
assumptions (see the Validation section for a more detailed discussion). 
Some comments on the Structure & Assumptions 
Before moving to the Behavioural Model, we would like to address some issues 
Are the relative fractions across severities correct? 
We have tried to maintain the relative fractions of the different severity categories at reasonable levels, 
as can be seen in Fig 18. Those approach known estimates, but it is very important that they are revisited 
as new information are collected. We hope that serological tests, measuring the presence of antibodies, 
can provide better information on the actual prevalence of the virus in society through random sampling 
of the population. Different spread of infected at different categories can have implications for the 
estimation of the overall prevalence of the disease. Our model does not aim to provide policy 
suggestions aimed at handling the epidemic and as such, an even more accurate representation of its 
spread is somewhat outside our aim: here, we are particularly focused on the number of Severe cases 
(Hospitalised and Critical Care Infected), the number of Deaths, and the number of Tested Infected, as 
we will see in more detail in the next section. While optimally calibrating our model and continuously 
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Is the testing mechanism sufficient? 
For the purpose of our model, yes. For policy recommendations, no. The relationship between the 
number of performed tests, the overall prevalence of the virus in the population, and the probability per 
test to identify a positive case is a complex one and outside the boundaries of our model. 
Is it reasonable that all people have the same probability of being infected or become hospitalised? 
No. We have not dissagregated the population in age groups or geographically. Network dynamics in 
the population are significant for the spread of the disease (see, for example Isham, Kaczmarska, & 
Nekovee, 2011; M. J. Keeling & Eames, 2005)  
Can the reduction in mobility as a direct effect of a COVID-19 infection be overestimated here? 
Perhaps. We acknowledge that infected people would still have some contacts, especially if they were 
experiencing minor symptoms. However, we also know that close contacts of confirmed infected have 
been quarantined, a mechanism which we have not incorporated here. To somewhat mitigate for this, 








Chapter 3: Behavioural Dynamics 
 
“The overwhelming focus of governments’ responses to the epidemic on behavioural responses of the 
population makes it incumbent upon researchers to be clear about how and why individuals act as the 
epidemic unfolds. What are their constraints and incentives? Will they voluntarily comply with 
directions given by public health o¢cials or do governments need to compel certain behaviours, as has 
now been seen across the world?”  
(Toxvaerd, 2020, p. 2)  
 
As it hopefully became evident through the description of the main infection model, the spread of an 
infectious disease does not only depend on the characteristics of the viral agent. Infections occur 
between people and the scientific community is responding to what Squazzoni et al. termed “the 
COVID-19 modelling human behaviour challenge” (2020). The behaviour each individual decides to 
adopt is a very significant factor in the spread of a transmissible pathogen and “[e]ven gradual and mild 
behavioural changes can have a dramatic impact in slowing an epidemic” (Del Valle et al., 2005, p. 
228). Moreover, not accounting for the behaviour of individual agents can impede our understanding 
of the viral agent, as it might lead to underestimations of its transmissibility or, at early-stage 
observations, predictions of a faster peak of the epidemic (Poletti, Ajelli, & Merler, 2011b, p. 5). 
 Due to their significance, epidemiological models that include behavioural dynamics are not 
rare (for a meta-analysis, see Funk, Salathé, and Jansen, 2010). In terms of methodology, Game Theory 
(von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Weibull, 1995) has been a popular choice in decision making in 
epidemiological context (Chang, Piraveenan, Pattison, & Prokopenko, 2020; Poletti, Ajelli, & Merler, 
2011a; Poletti et al., 2009; Reluga, 2010; Zhao, Bauch, & He, 2018) and economic epidemiological 
models have been applied specifically in the case of COVID-19 (Quaas et al., 2020; Toxvaerd, 2020 
etc). Behavioural dynamics have also been included in models of COVID-19 in the field of SD (e.g. 
Homer, 2020; Struben, 2020).  
Besides computational approaches, responses to threats posed by a health-related stimulus such 
as COVID-19 can draw upon long traditions in psychological research. Health behaviour theories are 
“a family of theories that were developed in health psychology or were adopted from research on 
attitude-behavior relations and goal pursuit to predict and understand health actions” (Sheeran et al., 
2016, p. 3). Numerous theories of health-related decision making have been proposed and empirically 
evaluated (for a review, see M. Conner & Norman, 2005; Redding et al., 2000). Such theories, while 
not necessarily focusing on “crisis” situations as a global pandemic, provide meaningful insights to 
peoples’ decisions to adopt or not a healthy behaviour such as, in our case, social isolation and other 
prophylactic measures.  
 38 
To develop our dynamic hypothesis, we will look at main causal elements that computational 
approaches and health behaviour theories share.  
 
Hypothesis & Theoretical Grounding 
In this section, we will be presenting our main assumptions for the variables we will be using in our 
model and their connections. To do so, besides the overall literature review, we will present a process 
of “theoretical grounding”, part of the “multi-grounded theory” proposed by Goldkuhl & Cronholm 
(2003). Theoretical grounding is a process where “the evolving theory is confronted with other existing 
theories” (p.5) and was used here to evaluate our hypothesis as it compares to known theoretical 
constructs and theories. Hence, for each of the main assumptions and links, we will present a brief 
review of the literature, our main hypothesised variables and causal connections, and we will look at 
whether those variables and connections are present at and supported by the main Health Behaviour 
Models we have utilised to propose our combined theory. The theories we will consider for the 
theoretical grounding process are: 
i. the Health-Belief Model (HBM) (Champion & Skinner, 2008; Rosenstock, 1974; Sheeran & 
Abraham, 1996) 
ii. Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000; Maddux & 
Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975; Rogers & Mewborn, 1976) 
iii. the Theory of Reasoned Actions (TRA) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) & the later developed 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985; Madden et al., 1992)  
iv. the Transtheoretical Model (DiClemente & Prochaska, 1982; Prochaska & DiClemente, 
1983)  
v. Cognitive appraisal theory (CAP) (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 
1986; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)  
vi. the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992, 1994, 1995; Witte & Allen, 
2000) 
vii. the Health Action Process Approach (HAPA) (Ralf Schwarzer, 1992, 2001; Ralf Schwarzer 
& Fuchs, 1995) 
 
Due to the multiple mechanisms, we will begin by presenting the main Drivers and main loops of the 
behaviour. Then, we will briefly reiterate those main mechanisms and their effect on the spread of 
COVID-19 before continuing to additional ones.  
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Drivers of Behaviour 
Intention 
As we have described earlier, the behaviour that is relevant for and will feed back to the main Infection 
model is the actual adoption of a prophylactic behaviour (here, mobility reduction and level of adoption 
of other hygiene measures). Behaviour has, in many Health Behaviour models, conceptualised as being 
distinct from the intention to adopt the behaviour (see table 5). Intention is considered to precede and 
lead to the enactment of the target behaviour (when behaviour is explicitly considered). Game 
Theoretical approaches tend to view behaviour as emanating from an evaluation of costs and benefits 
associated with it. We perceive intention to be a good proxy for an evaluation of the benefits associated 
with the behaviour: to build an intention, one is expected to perceive that there are some benefits of the 
behaviour.  
We will follow the term used by Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) & by the Extended 
Parallel Process Model (EPPM) and term this intention to adopt the proposed behaviour Protection 
Motivation. Protection Motivation has a positive relationship with Prophylactic Behaviour: higher 
Motivation leads to higher adoption of the Behaviour (Table 5)  
 
Model Variables & Connections 




The motivation to act 






Table 5: Relationship between Intention and Behaviour 
Y=Yes, N=No, N/E=Not Explicit. HBM: Health Belief Model, PMT: Protection Motivation Theory, TRA/TBA: Theory or 
Reasoned Action/Theory of Planned Behaviour, EPPM: Extended Parallel Process Model, CAT: Cognitive Appraisal 
Theory, TM: Transtheoretical Model; HAPA: Health Action Process Approach 
 
Perceived Costs of the Prophylactic Behaviour 
As mentioned above, Game Theoretical approaches propose that individuals, when deciding on what 
strategy to follow (here, to adopt the protective behaviour or not), weight the payoffs, the values 
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usually used experimentally in such approaches: by manipulating the costs relative to benefits, 
researchers can examine equilibrium solutions for such systems (REFS). Health Behaviour models also 
incorporate Costs and, while the weighting process does not assume the same degree of rationality 
common to Economical and Game Theoretical models, Costs considerations represent various 
hindrances or resistance towards adopting the new behaviour.  
In terms of evidence on the relationship between Costs and Behaviour, meta-analyses 
conducted by Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell (2000) and by Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers (2000) under 
the framework of Protection Motivation Theory found that costs associated with the proposed response 
had significant effects in eliciting favourable responses (for a discussion, see Norman et al., 2005). 
Prochaska et al. (1994), performing research under the Transtheoretical Model, found that the cons of 
changing a behaviour outweighed the pros only at the Action and Maintenance stages of behaviour 
adoption rather than in the Pre-Contemplation and Contemplation stages, providing evidence that the 
main contribution of costs is on the actual Behaviour rather than the intention (Protection Motivation). 
Different behaviours have different associated costs, so we use here the term Perceived Costs 
of Prophylactic Behaviour denoting that we are referring to the costs of a specific prophylactic 
behaviour. Costs influence behaviour directly and in a negative direction: the higher the Perceived Costs 
of a behaviour the lower the adoption of the Behaviour (Table 6).  
 
Model Variables & Connections 
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Table 6: Relationship between Costs of Prophylacitc Behaviour, Protection Motivation, and Behaviour 
Y=Yes, N=No, N/E=Not Explicit. HBM: Health Belief Model, PMT: Protection Motivation Theory, TRA/TBA: Theory or 
Reasoned Action/Theory of Planned Behaviour, EPPM: Extended Parallel Process Model, CAT: Cognitive Appraisal 
Theory, TM: Transtheoretical Model; HAPA: Health Action Process Approach 
 
Drivers of Protection Motivation 
Threat Appraisal 
Most computational models take as main cause of the response of the population information regarding 
the prevalence of the disease (termed usually “prevalence-elastic response”, Funk, Salathé, et al., 2010, 
p. 1247). Explicit or implied to the connection between the disease’s prevalence and the behavioural 
response is the perception of what is usually referred to as the “risk” of contracting the disease  
This notion of risk is usually utilised in Game Theoretical and other approaches as an input to 
the previously described cost/benefit process that is believed to guide adoption of a specific response. 
Thinking of risk as a cost, it is not unusual that it incorporates not only the probability of infection but 
an evaluation of the consequences of infection. Susceptibility Assessment (the perceived probability 
of getting infected) and Severity Assessment (how severe would the consequences of infection be for 
me) are present in most of the main health behaviour models as well (see table XXX) as drivers of one’s 
perceptions of risk or Threat, as we use in this context.  
The inclusion of both assessments also makes sense for the specific case study. Let us consider 
the early stages of the pandemic and the notion of COVID-19 being “like a normal flu” (see for example 
Grady, 2020). This comparison was, for good reason, considered as dangerous by public health 
authorities who issued statements to counteract it (WHO, 2020). While it can be argued that many 
people indeed considered that they have a high probability of getting the disease, the fact that it was 
considered “no more dangerous than the flu”, could reduce the likelihood of avoiding getting infected 
by it. In our model, we will incorporate Susceptibility and Severity Assessments as the individual’s 
compound Threat Appraisal: the perception of the Threat that is posed to the individual’s wellbeing by 
COVID-19. Both Assessments have a positive relationship to Threat Appraisal: higher Assessment of 
Susceptibility or Severity lead to higher overall Threat Appraisal. This Threat Appraisal, in turn, has a 
positive relationship with Protection Motivation: the higher the individual perceived the Threat to be, 
the more Motivated they are to be protected against it (Table 7). 
 
Model Variables & Connections 
Variable Description Influencing Polarity   
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1. “Attitudes” is the term used to represent people’s “beliefs about the likelihood of various consequences of 
particular actions, combined with the person’s evaluations of those consequences” (Smith & Stasson, 2000, p. 447). 
We perceive this notion to be conceptually very close to our definitions of Threat Appraisal and the inclusion of 
Susceptibility Assessment (likelihood of infection) and Severity Assessment (evaluation of consequences). 
Table 7: Relationship between Severity, Susceptibility, Threat Appraisal, and Protection Motivation 
Y=Yes, N/E=Not Explicit. HBM: Health Belief Model, PMT: Protection Motivation Theory, TRA/TBA: Theory or Reasoned 
Action/Theory of Planned Behaviour, EPPM: Extended Parallel Process Model, CAT: Cognitive Appraisal Theory, TM: 
Transtheoretical Model; HAPA: Health Action Process Approach 
Efficacy Appraisal 
The notion of Efficacy as a subjective perception has also been prominent in various frameworks. In 
Game Theoretical approaches, especially pertaining to collaborative games, Efficacy has been 
described as “an individual's estimate of the impact of their contribution on the likelihood of public 
good production” (Kerr, 1992 in Dijkstra & Bakker, 2017). In Health Behaviour models, it has been 
defined the belief of the individual in their capacity to prevent potential harmful outcomes from a 
potentially harmful encounter (Folkman et al., 1986; in L. Wang & Lin, 2020). More specifically, in 













effectiveness, feasibility, and ease with which a recommended response impedes or averts a threat.’’ 
(Witte, Cameron, McKeon, & Berkowitz, 1996, p. 320). Efficacy has also been described as involving 
two concepts: self-efficacy (belief about our own ability to respond adequately) and response efficacy 
(whether the proposed response works to mitigate the threat) (Witte & Allen, 2000).  
While results on the effect of Efficacy vary, especially when both self-efficacy and response-
efficacy are studied, perceptions of efficacy have been consistently found to increase individual 
contributions to common-good causes (Kerr, 1992, 1996) and adoption of health protective behaviours 
(e.g. Floyd et al., 2000; O.-H. Park, Hoover, Dodd, Huffman, & Feng, 1989; Webster et al., 2020)3. The 
latter was also observed for the case of COVID-19 (L. Wang & Lin, 2020) and hypothetical scenarios 
of epidemics (Timpka et al., 2014). Research suggests that Threat (or fear) appeals are more effective 
when coupled with Efficacy messages (see, for example Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014; 
Tannenbaum et al., 2015). It follows then that including Efficacy is a reasonable choice as there are 
evidence that people perceiving a Threat is not sufficient to elicit the optimal response: they need to 
know that they can perform some action(s) that can reduce the threat.   
In our work, we do not separate self-efficacy from response efficacy as we believe that elements 
of self-efficacy for the case of an infectious disease are distributed between response efficacy beliefs 
and Costs of the Prophylactic Behaviour (I can successfully perform the behaviour if the Costs are 
manageable). We therefore use the term Efficacy Appraisal to describe the overall belief that the 
proposed responses can efficiently act to mitigate the environmental Threat. Efficacy has a positive 
relationship with Protection Motivation (intention) so as, higher Efficacy Appraisals leads to higher 
Protection Motivation. 
 
Model Variables & Connections 
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Table 8: Relationship between Efficacy Appraisal and Protection Motivation 
Y=Yes, N=No, N/E=Not Explicit. HBM: Health Belief Model, PMT: Protection Motivation Theory, TRA/TBA: Theory or 
Reasoned Action/Theory of Planned Behaviour, EPPM: Extended Parallel Process Model, CAT: Cognitive Appraisal 
Theory, TM: Transtheoretical Model; HAPA: Health Action Process Approach 
 
The interaction between Threat Appraisals and Efficacy Appraisals 
While most models differentiate between appraisals of the actual Threat and appraisals of the Efficacy, 
Cognitive Appraisal Theory and the Extended Parallel Process Model make explicit mention of how 
this comparison can elicit adaptive or maladaptive behavioural responses. For Cognitive Appraisal, 
coping can be either problem-focused or emotion-focused, with the former describing coping efforts 
“intended to alter the source of stress by acting on it directly” (Forsythe & Compas, 1987, p. 474) while 
the later focuses on moderating the emotional responses to the Threat. In a very similar way, the 
Extended Parallel Process Model differentiates between Danger Control and Fear Control responses. 
Danger Control, like problem-focused coping, leads individuals to accept the recommendations of the 
message, while Fear Control describes “Coping responses that diminish fear, such as defensive 
avoidance, denial, and reactance (including issue/message derogation and perceived manipulative 
intent)” (Witte et al., 1996, p. 320). In both theories, responses that lead individuals to act against the 
Threat by adopting the proposed behaviour (Problem-focused or Danger Control) can be achieved if 
the Threat Appraisal is sufficient and if the Efficacy Appraisal outweighs the Threat Appraisal, that is 
if the individuals believe that a) there is a significant Threat and b) there is something that can be done 
to mitigate that threat. This has been supported by a meta-analysis by Witte & Allen (2000), who found 
that the best results in terms of protective behaviours can be achieved through strong fear appeals 
combined with high-efficacy messages. Support for this has been provided in different context as well 
although the actual observed relationship varies between contexts and for different ranges of Threat and 
Efficacy values (Carcioppolo et al., 2013; Dias, Cruz, & Fonseca, 2012; Krieger & Sarge, 2013; 
Schneider & Kenny, 2000). There is however an agreement that increases in Threat Appraisals, when 
combined with low Efficacy (Response & Self-Efficacy) can actually weaken intention to adopt a 
behaviour  (the “boomerang” effect, see Sturges & Rogers, 1996).  
Mathematically, Witte initially proposed that the relationship between Threat and Efficacy is a 
multiplicative one (1994) and later went on to describe it as a subtraction of the Threat assessment from 
the Efficacy assessment (Witte, 1995; Witte et al., 1996). This relationship has been debated amongst 
Motivation 
(intention) 





1. Perceived Behavioral Control describes “beliefs concerning whether one has access to the necessary 
resources and opportunities to perform the behaviour successfully, weighted by the perceived power of each 
factor” (Mark Conner & Sparks, 2005, p. 175)  
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other researchers (for a brief review, see Cismaru & Lavack, 2007, pp. 259–261) and, here, instead of 
an additive or multiplicative relationship, we adopt a weighted average approach as proposed by 
N. Weinstein (1993). This weighted average is used to “combine” the effects of both Threat and 
Efficacy Appraisal in the Protection Motivation. We do however incorporate an additional mechanism 
(a “multiplier”) that aims to capture the region of “Emotion-Focused Response” or “Fear Control” 
which are not otherwise explicitly examined. This multiplier ensures that, if Threat outweighs Efficacy 
to a significant degree, Protection Motivation will diminish.  
 
The story so far: A top-level view of relationships 
Let us briefly reiterate the main relationships described above before continuing. 
Individuals, when confronted with a Threat  like COVID-19 engage firstly in an assessment of 
that Threat (Threat Appraisal). Threat Appraisal is hypothesised to have two components: the 
Susceptibility Assessment (the perceived probability of becoming infected with the virus) and the 
Severity Assessment (how severe the consequences of infection would be). Threat Appraisal alone is 
not enough to motivate action; they need to assess whether there is an effective response (Efficacy 
Appraisal). Those two elements, Perceived Threat and Perceived Efficacy are compared with each 
other to comprise the individual’s motivation to act against the Threat (Protection Motivation). If the 
individual is facing a severe Threat and has an Effective response against it, Protection Motivation will 
be high. If they do not believe that there is something they can do about the threat (low Perceived 
Efficacy) or that there is not, in fact, a significant threat (low Perceived Threat), their Protection 
Motivation will be low. 
Protection Motivation describes an “intention”, however whether an individual will actually 
engage in the behaviour depends on their evaluation of the Costs of the Prophylactic Behaviour. If 
the Costs are very high or their Protection Motivation very low, they will not adopt the behaviour, at 
least not with the same intensity that they would were they faced with lower costs of higher motivation.  
 In the case of an infectious disease like COVID-19, adoption of the behaviour has an effect on 
the actual environmental Threat: as people practice social isolation for example, fewer contacts between 
Infected and Not-Infected lead to fewer New Infections. Fewer Infections reduce the Perceived Threat 
in the environment, leading to reduced Protection Motivation and, thereby, lower adoption of the 
Prophylactic Behaviour the next time around. This relationship forms a Balancing Loop that acts to 




Figure 21: Top-Level View of Feedback between the Infection sub-Model and the Behavioural sub-Model 
 
Due to the significance of this loop for the spread of the epidemic, numerous questions arise:  
i. Are Threat Appraisals only grounded in the actual prevalence of the virus or is there some 
additional element that can be addressed by policies? 
ii. Is Efficacy Appraisal a static or a dynamic concept?  
iii. What can be considered the Costs of Prophylactic Behaviour? 
 
Drivers of Threat & Efficacy Appraisals  
Observations of the Environment  
Actors are expected to look directly at their environment to make estimations regarding the Threat as 
well as the Efficacy of the proposed response that can mitigate that Threat. In the case of Threat 
Appraisal, we have already described it as the compound Susceptibility and Severity Assessments 
(assessments regarding the probability of a COVID-19 infection and the consequences of infection 
respectively). Those assessments are expected to a large degree to come from observations regarding 
the spread of the virus, as those are disseminated by the country’s health authorities. 
In the case of Susceptibility Assessment, computational approaches conceptualise often the 
perceived risk of infection as coming from the disease prevalence, the infected fraction of the population 
(e.g. Poletti et al., 2011b; Toxvaerd, 2020). In the case of COVID-19, Glöckner, Dorrough, Wingen, & 
Dohle (2020) observed across three studies at different phases of the COVID-19 infection in Germany 
an inverse U-shaped pattern in the reported probability of infection and probability of hospitalisation 





























Figure 22: Risk Perception plotted against the development of COVID-19 cases in Germany. Figure by Glöckner et.al 
(2020, p. 40) 
 
This “inverted U-shaped pattern” seems to correspond well to the relative change in infections, the New 
Daily Cases. In our model, we use the Reported and Perceived New Cases per 10000 Susceptible (that 
is, the daily new confirmed through testing cases) as the input to the Observations Contribution to 
Susceptibility Assessment. 
 In the case of the Severity Assessment, the observational mechanism is quite similar but taking 
here as its input the number of Perceived Severe Cases: The Daily new Hospitalisations and Critical 
Care Admissions, as well as the Daily New Deaths as those are reported by authorities and perceived 
by an average individual. Unlike in the case of the Susceptibility Assessment, we view the Perceived 
Severe Cases as an explicit stock as so to capture a “fading-memory mechanism” like the one described 
by Poletti et al. (2011b).  We believe this is justified as the news of a more severe case or a death might 
persist longer in peoples’ memory – they are not "forgotten" as fast as a new case is expected to.  
Lastly, in the case of the Efficacy Appraisal, the picture is not as clear, especially since the 
actual efficacy of the response (the actual “success” of a proposed action) can only be assessed over 
much longer periods of time. Due to the need for an endogenous Efficacy Appraisal, we made here the 
assumption regarding environmental Efficacy cues as being grounded to the perception of the 
population’s compliance with the proposed response. This mechanism is describing a process whereby 
individuals’ perceptions of the population’s engagement with prophylactic behaviours (mobility 
reduction and level of adoption of other hygienic behaviour) inform their appraisals about the Efficacy 
of those proposed responses. This is perhaps not unreasonable since the actual efficacy of the proposed 
measures in the case of COVID-19 or other infectious diseases depends precisely on the level of their 
adoption by the population, however, the proposed mechanism implies that individuals are also aware 
of this fact. We have decided to also include some level of “optimism” in this perception for our case 
study as we believe that the Norwegian population in general tends to follow governmental advice and 
this is known amongst individuals (simply put, people expect that others will comply to a larger extent 
that we would perhaps observe in other countries). As such, people “overestimate” the compliance of 




Figure 23: The over-time development of the perceived average prophylactic response of the population and that of the 
"optimistic" expectation (expected average prophylactic response) 
 
The relationships are summarised in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Observations and their contribution the Threat- and Efficacy-Related Appraisals 
Model Variables & Connections 
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Top-Down Information distribution 
A second mechanism influencing Threat and Efficacy Appraisals is information distribution. We follow 
here a “double-avenue” proposed also by Kiss, Cassell, Recker, & Simon (2010) of both a Contact-
based and a Population-wide transmission of information. Public awareness is indeed influenced 
heavily by population-wide information provided by Health Authorities and governments through Top-
Down messages (for a brief review, see Dryhurst et al., 2020; Khosravi, 2020). Our assumption is that, 
at least in the case of COVID-19, Top-Down information are not only including data regarding the 
disease (as described in the previous section) but also efforts of authorities to explicitly address the 
population through communication messages aiming to raise awareness. Such messages are considered 
to emphasize both the Threat posed by the virus and how the proposed response can efficiently mitigate 
that Threat (Top-Down Threat-or Efficacy-Related communication message). Examples of such 
messages can be considered press conferences, explicit statements, etc. Some Health Behaviour models 
do include centrally distributed information and knowledge and, when they do, those tend to be 
considered as influencing Threat and Efficacy Assessments (see Table 10). Threat-Related messages 
emphasise the “seriousness” of COVID-19 both in terms of infection potential and consequences. 
Efficacy-Related messages can contain both scientific information about the efficiency of the proposed 
responses and "emotional" messages aiming to raise the population's perception that "we can fight the 
threat". 
 In our model, we represent the communication decision by the government as the Top Down 
Threat-Related Communication Message and the Top Down Efficacy-Related Communication 
Message. Those communication messages have direct positive effects on the Threat Appraisal  
(Susceptibility and Severity Assessments) and on the Efficacy Appraisal respectively, as well as an 
indirect effect through the Bottom-Up information diffusion mechanism that we will describe more 
detail in the next section. 
 
Model Variables & Connections 
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Table 10: Relationship between Top-Down Information & Threat and Efficacy Appraisals 
Y=Yes, N=No, N/E=Not Explicit. HBM: Health Belief Model, PMT: Protection Motivation Theory, TRA/TBA: Theory or 
Reasoned Action/Theory of Planned Behaviour, EPPM: Extended Parallel Process Model, CAT: Cognitive Appraisal 
Theory, TM: Transtheoretical Model; HAPA: Health Action Process Approach 
 
While this decision rule of Top Down message communication is of course influenced by many 
mechanisms, we ground both messages in the government’s response to New Reported Infections, the 
daily confirmed cases of COVID-19. Due to the global nature of the pandemic, we include an additional 
mechanism of “early” risk identification by the government which is more sensitive to the presence of 
new cases (the Additional Top-Down Communication mechanism which is effected by the Perceived 
by government trend of growth of new cases). In both cases, governments look at the confirmed new 
cases at hand and respond by sending out Threat and Efficacy-Related messages. 
Bottom-Up Information & Network effects  
The idea that ideas, information, trends, etc. spread in a way similar to a spread of an infectious disease 
is far from new (Bass, 1969; Goffman & Newill, 1964). Processes of social contagion (see Sterman, 
2000, Chapter 9) account for the diffusion of information (e.g. Liao & You, 2014), awareness (Funk, 
Gilad, & Jansen, 2010; Funk et al., 2009), as well as that of emotional responses to epidemics among 
the population such as fear (Epstein et al., 2008). Fear, while a distinct concept describing an emotional 
response to threat, can be considered to be strongly related to the dependent on the cognition of 
Perceived Threat (Witte & Allen, 2000). We have therefore decided to use diffusion processes for the 
spread of information and cognitions (Appraisals) related to both the Threat and the Efficacy of the 
response. While, in our model, individuals also look at their environment to make estimates regarding 
a) the efficacy of the behaviour due to the levels of adoption they observe in the population, and b) the 
social costs of the behaviour, we do not utilise diffusion processes per se for those environmental 
impacts.  
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 To describe information dissemination via a Bottom-Up mechanism, we develop a 
contagiousness structure where people who are Unaware of COVID-19 become Aware via information 
disseminated by Norwegian media and via their social networks. The Aware population can become 
Actively Aware, that is become actively concerned about COVID-19 and more likely to disseminate 
information. Our assumption is that this movement is controlled by the Susceptibility Assessment: the 
higher the perceived probability of infection, the more likely it becomes that the individual becomes 
alarmed and active. This state of being alarmed declines over time as the individual is expected to 
experience some fatigue from information. We believe this fatigue to be influenced by a person’s 
Severity Assessment: if the consequences of the virus are expected to be very high, people remain 
Actively Aware longer (they are more “immune” to fatigue because of their perception of the situation’s 
severity). Lastly, drawing from the literature on complex contagions (Centola, 2010; Sprague & House, 
2017), we have decided to include a state of Recovered individuals in line with hypotheses that people 
who are “new” in their concerns regarding the virus (Actively Aware) are sharing more instensly, while 
people who have gone through that state before (Recovered) are less active. With a high enough level 
of perceived probability of infection (Susceptibility Assessment), those individuals can enter again the 
state of being Actively Aware and thus “high spreaders” of information. Those states are summarised 
in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: States of Awareness of the Top-Down Information Dissemination mechanism and their relative contribution to 
information shared 
Category Description Information 
Dissemination  
Movement to the next stage due to 
Unaware  Population that is unaware of the 
existence of the disease 
none Media-shared information; person-
to-person shared information 
Aware People who are aware of the existence 
of the disease but do are not alarmed 
0,05  Susceptibility Assessment  
Actively 
Aware 
People who are aware and actively 
concerned. Assumed to actively 
interact and disseminate information 
0,80 Fatigue. People assumed to get tired 
but how fast this happens is 
controlled by Severity Assessment  
Fatigued People experiencing “information 
fatigue” after being Actively Aware.  
0,05 Recovery Rate over time 
Recovered People who are Aware after having 
“recovered” but are not currently 
Active  
0,10 Become Active after recovery due to 
Susceptibility Assessment. People 
here more “resistant” the first time 




Relative Contribution of each mechanism 
The relative contribution of each of the described mechanisms is challenging to assess. We have decided 
to prioritise Observations, followed by the Top Down message distributed by authorities, and lastly by 
the Bottom Up message disseminated directly between individuals (see Table 12). 
Moreover, this relative contribution might not be a static process, as the constant values here 
represent, but a dynamic one, especially in the relative contribution of Top-Down versus Bottom-Up 
messages. Trust in authorities might play a significant role (Siegrist & Zingg, 2014) and the Trust and 
Confidence model postulates that it has an important role in threat management as it “is believed as the 
main core of hearing, interpreting, and responding to public health messages” (Khosravi, 2020, p. 1). 
We have decided to exclude this possible influence of trust as, evidence suggest high levels of trust in 
authorities for the Norwegian population during the COVID-19 (Ivarsflaten et al., 2020). 
 
Table 12: Relative Contribution of drivers of Threat & Efficacy Appraisals 
Contributors Value (weight) 
Contribution of Observations on Threat Appraisals = 
Contribution of Observations on Efficacy Appraisals 
50% 
Contribution of Top Down message on Efficacy Appraisals = 
Contribution of Top Down message on Efficacy Appraisals 
30% 
Contribution of Bottom Up message on Efficacy Appraisals = 
Contribution of Bottom Up message on Efficacy Appraisals 
20% 
 
Drivers of Perceived Costs of the Prophylactic Behaviour 
Not least, the Perceived Costs of a Prophylactic behaviour are also conceptualised as emanating from 
three different mechanisms. Janis and Mann (1977) have suggested that gains or losses (costs) can be 
categorised into four major types: (a) utilitarian gains or losses for self, (b) utilitarian gains or losses for 
significant others, (c) approval or disapproval from significant others, and (d) self-approval or self-
disapproval (in Prochaska et al., 1994, p. 40). While, here, we do not differentiate between costs for the 
self and for others, we represent both utilitarian costs, and the suggested approval or disapproval from 
significant others (which we term the Social Costs). 
Livelihood Costs & Ease of Engagement Costs 
The first type of costs are “practical” costs. Livelihood Costs is a term here used to represent broadly 
costs of Social Isolation that can impact the livelihood of individuals as for example the loss of job and 
income, (especially if coupled with lack of financial support), need to leave the house for groceries or 
other obligations, unavailability of online or any other solutions that allow the individual to stay at home 
etc. Governments and other institutions are crucial in reducing those costs for the individuals. In the 
case of the Level of Adoption of Hygiene Behaviour, similarly significant costs are those of the Ease 
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of Engagement in Hygienic Behaviour. This ease can represent the availability and ease by which the 
individual can engage in relevant hygienic behaviour, from the broad availability of water and soap, 
disinfectants, masks, or any other solutions in place that can ensure that the individual can easily follow 
hygienic proposals4.  
Some evidence of such mechanisms for the case of Social Distancing during the COVID-19 
crisis come from a review of new evidence by Webster et al (2020) who found two of the reviewed 
studies explicitly reporting the loss of income and need to work as significant reasons to not comply 
with quarantine instructions (DiGiovanni, Conley, Chiu, & Zaborski, 2004; Teh et al., 2012). This is, 
of course, rather intuitive and is mirrored in studies that attempt to quantify effects of specific measures 
on the mobility of the population (e.g. Abouk & Heydari, 2020; Askitas, Tatsiramos, & Verheyden, 
2020): school and workplace closures, for example, can easily be considered as reducing the Livelihood 
Costs of “leaving the house”.  
Social Costs 
Decision making depends on our perceptions of how others might judge our behaviour (Milinski, 
Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002). Costs related to the behaviour of what others are expected to also have 
an influence on our own behaviour and imitation of others’ behaviour has been present in 
epidemiological models (Chang et al., 2020; Poletti et al., 2011b, 2009). Some of the Health Behaviour 
theories explicitly incorporate the notion of “(Social) Norms” existing in the person’s environment and 
influencing their behaviour. It is reasonable to assume that individuals do look around them to determine 
what the Social Costs of a behaviour are. The assumption we use here can be described as following: 
Individuals look at the average adoption of the proposed behaviour (mobility reduction or other hygiene 
behaviour). If others are adopting the behaviour, it is not “costly” for the individual to do so as well; 
rather it is costly socially to not do so. In the same way, when others do not adopt the behaviour: the 
person might also feel pressured to not adopt the behaviour either for fear of criticism or of simply 
“being different”.  
Fatigue 
Emotional reactions, particularly boredom and loneliness have also been reported as reasons to not 
adhere with quarantine (DiGiovanni et al., 2004). Individuals’ costs of maintaining the behaviour are 
expected to increase the more time of practicing the behaviour passes: people simply get tired to be at 
home or people get tired of extensively washing their hands. A similar mechanism of “isolation fatigue” 
 
4 The two mechanisms represent the same process, however we have decided to use different terms that lead to a 
different “directionality” of the costs and their relationship with the behaviour. We perceive the term Livelihood 
Costs to be a little more intuitive in terms of its real-world meaning that a term such as Ease of Engagement with 
Social Isolation. 
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was incorporated in the SD model developed by J. Homer (2020). We do not expect fatigue to have a 
one-on-one, linear relationship with the recent intensity of the prophylactic behaviour, however this is 
an assumption that should be further explored. In the case of Social Isolation, we expect this fatigue to 
be translated to a higher cost than in the case of hygienic behaviour as the former is a more “intense” 
behaviour that directly impacts important social interactions with others and as such can be expected to 
have higher costs (see Fig 24). 
 
Figure 24: the hypothesised relationship between recent intensity of prophylactic behaviour and costs of fatigue due to 
engagement with said behaviour 
 
Relative Contribution of each mechanism 
The relative contribution of the Cost mechanisms is also a rather challenging assessment. We have 
decided to prioritise the “practical” costs (Livelihood Costs or Ease of Engagement with Hygienic 
Behaviour), followed by Fatigue, and lastly by the Social Costs (see Table XXX). 
 
Table 13: Relative Contribution of drivers of Costs of Prophylactic Behaviour 
Contributors Value (weight) 
weight of livelihood costs = 
weight of ease of engagement with hygienic behaviour 
60% 
weight of fatigue from distancing = 
weight of fatigue from hygienic behaviour 
24% 
weight of social costs for mobility = 
weight of social costs for hygienic behaviour 
16% 
 
Partial Testing of Behaviour Model 
We will briefly perform a partial testing of the proposed structure to see how it fairs over the reference 
period (January 1st to June 1st). The model will run using data of reported Daily New Infections, New 
Hospitalisations and Critical Care admissions, as well as New Deaths. The main assumptions and data 
























Governmental Message & the Additional Top-Down Communication SWITCH 
As described above, we have endogenized (and grounded on the actual cases) the governmental decision 
regarding their communication of Threat and Efficacy.  COVID-19 is however not a local phenomenon 
and governments’ reactions were not only informed by local information. Norway had its first case later 
than other European countries and after evidence had accumulated regarding the seriousness of the 
disease, so Top-Down communication might have been initiated earlier. To investigate this, we can 
look at the timeline of some communication messages (Table 14) and present our assumption on how 
those messages translate to a value for the Top Down Threat Related communication message, which 
we will compare with the endogenous, model-produced message (Figures 25 and 26).  
 
Table 14: Timeline regarding Communication of Top-Down message by Norwegian authorities 






First case announced in 
Norway 
- 
FHI publishes Risk 
Assessment for Norway 
WHO characterises COVID-19  a pandemic 
- 
Norway announces measures 
- 






We hypothesise that each of the above messages translate to a Threat-Related communication increase. 
We do not operationalise those messages as “spikes” due to both the presence of many more messages 
and the, exogenous to our model, reproduction and amplification of governmental messages from news 
sources. Instead, we perceive them as raising the level of the overall communication message. The 
endogenous message, as guided by the non-linear effect of new cases on governments communication 
message magnitude is presented in Figure 25 together with our assumptions. 
 
 
Figure 25: Top-Down Threat Communication as assumed from communications Timeline and endogenous Top-Down 
Communication of Threat 
 
We do observe a significant delay which is to be expected due to a logical “sensitivity” of governmental 
decision-making to the possible threat posed by Covid-195. This delay in the governmental response 
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guides us to include an Additional Top-Down Communication mechanism that is very sensitive to 
information on first local cases. With this addition, the governmental communication message 
approaches better our timeline assumptions (Fig. 26). 
 
 
Figure 26: Top-Down Threat Communication as assumed from communications Timeline and endogenous Top-Down 
Communication of Threat with Additional Top-Down Communication mechanism 
 
We, moreover, hypothesise that the Efficacy-Related communication message has a higher intensity 
that the Threat-Related one, as we believe this to be true for the case of Norway: information and 
communication by governmental agencies did emphasise the measures and their efficiency in fighting 
the spread of Covid-19. We choose a 15% higher intensity of Efficacy relative to that of the Threat. 
However, we introduce a very small delay in the communication of Efficacy relative to that of 
the Threat to account for some “lag” between the two types of messages due to perhaps lack of 
knowledge or other uncertainties related to the response efficacy. To summarise, the baseline scenario 
has the following assumptions regarding the Top-Down communication message 
 
Table 15: Top-Down Communication message-related Assumptions for Baseline Scenario & Partial Model Testing 
Parameter Value 
ADDITIONAL TOP DOWN THREAT COMMUNICATION SWITCH 1 (ON) 
ADDITIONAL TOP DOWN EFFICACY COMMUNICATION SWITCH 1 (ON) 
intensity of Efficacy Related communication 1,15 
intensity of Threat Related communication 1 
Delay in Efficacy communication relative to Threat communication 4 days 
Costs 
We have also had to make some assumptions regarding “practical” costs of both prophylactic 
behaviours under consideration. Both Livelihood Costs (relevant for Social Isolation) and Ease of 















Figure 27: Livelihood Costs and Ease oh Engagement in Hygienic Behaviour – assumed 
 
In terms of the other two types of costs, our assumptions are that the time to perceive the behaviour of 
others which makes individuals evaluate the Social Costs is equal to 7 days, and the time to update the 
perception of recent isolation or recent hygienic behaviour intensity that allows people to evaluate how 
“tired” they might be from practicing the behaviour is equal to 30 days.  
Results 
The results of the partial testing of the behavioural model compare well with the data on mobility. We 
present, in Figure 26, both data from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME, 2020) and 
from Google (2020), although we have used the former to normalise our model. We do observe a slow 
initial response which is to be expected due to the absence of more “global” information that would be 
expected to have already been operating before the Norway-specific response (increasing the 
perceptions related to Threat and Efficacy, as well as the overall communication mechanisms both Top 
Down and Bottom Up).  
 
Figure 28: Partial Model Testing of Behavioural Model: Mobility Reduction Compared to data, Adoption of Hygienic 
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In terms of the fit with the data collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020) and reported by Sætrevik (2020) 
on the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 29 of March 2020, the model approaches 
quite well the observed values, although the introduction of some perception and communication delays 
in our model leads to the observed values being reaches a little later (see Figure 29) 
 
Figure 29: Partial Model Testing of Behavioural model: Blue lines indicate the value of the variable at the reference time, 
red lines the value at the reference time according the data, and green lines show the behaviour over time of the variable 
 
Some comments on the Theory & Assumptions 
Before continuing, we find important to answer some questions related to the assumptions of the model 
Is this really where Efficacy Appraisal comes from? 
We do not know for sure. Self-Efficacy has received a lot of attention in the psychological literature, 
however, Response Efficacy is not equally well-defined. We have presented our assumptions with 
Efficacy building up similarly to Threat, however, due to its significance, further iterations need to find 
better ways of establishing the drivers of Efficacy Appraisal through additional literature review or 
primary data collection. 
Is the Social Costs mechanism so weak in reality? 
Probably not. The relative contribution of the social costs on the total costs of a prophylactic behaviour 
(weight of social costs) is assumed to be 16%. The Social costs activate a “resistance” loop at the early 
stages of the epidemic (R5) slowing down prophylactic responses and are, as such, very significant. 
They might very well be stronger, but this is difficult to assess without introducing the effects of global 
information that would be expected to raise both governmental and local appraisals regarding Covid-
19. Hence, the data we have and the model-produced behaviour cannot help us clarify the strength of 


































Do people update their assessments / appraisals that quickly? 
Not likely. Perceptions do not, in reality update as quickly as represented here. We have chosen shorter 
delays or completely omitted a smoothing process on the updating of some perceptions due to two 
reasons: a) Government’s communication message is delayed in relation to observed data due to the 
need to endogenise this decision, b) the population themselves is expected to have already started 
updating relative perceptions due to the global situation and, even more, the situation in neighbouring 
countries (Engle, Stromme, & Zhou, 2020) which are not described in the model. For application in 
cases such as China, or Italy, much larger delays should be utilised. 
Are there more diffusion mechanisms? 
Most certainly yes. People do not have global information of the behaviour of others as easily available 





Chapter 4: Analysis of the Simulation Model  
“Modelling, as a part of the learning process, is iterative, a continual process of formulating 
hypotheses, testing, and revision, of both formal and mental models”  
(Sterman, 2000, p. 83) 
 
Validation 
The process of validating a SD model is both built into its development and an iterative, gradual process 
which aims to build confidence in the simulation model (Forrester & Senge, 1980). To build such a 
confidence, the modeler seeks to demonstrate that “both the structure and behavior of the model 
correspond to existing knowledge about the system under investigation” (Homer, 2012, p. 282). Yaman 
Barlas (1996) proposes a “logical order” of tests that can assist the modeler in their attempt to validate 
their model and this is the order that we will also follow here.  
 
Figure 30: Logical Sequence of Formal Steps or Model Validation (Barlas, 1996, p.194) 
 
1. Direct structure tests  
2. Structure-oriented behavior tests. 
3. Behavior pattern test 
 
Direct Structure Tests 
Examples of direct structure tests proposed by Forrester and Senge (1980) are structure and parameter 
verification tests, direct extreme-conditions test and dimensional consistency test.  
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Structure Verification Test 
Structure Verification test describes the process by which the model is compared with the structure of 
the system in question and “[t]o pass the structure-verification test, the model structure must not 
contradict knowledge about the structure of the real system” (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 212). 
Theoretical Structure Verification test, as compared to Empirical, involve the comparison of the model 
structure with knowledge about the system as it exists in the literature (Barlas, 1996), and it is this type 
of testing that we have performed throughout the development of the model. The grounding of the 
structural components to existing literature is presented in more detail under the relevant sections of 
this thesis, as well as further described in the model documentation.  
Parameter Verification Test 
Parameter Verification refers to the evaluation of constant parameters in relation to knowledge of the 
real systems. Forrester & Senge (1980) discuss both Conceptual Correspondence (whether parameters 
match elements of the structure of the system) and Numerical Verification (whether the value of the 
parameter “falls within a plausible range of values” for the actual parameter (p. 213)). In the case of the 
Infection Model, detailed conceptual and numerical verification are presented in the description of the 
model and in the documentation. Both empirical and modeling studies have been reviewed and values 
for parameters that corresponds to this range were chosen. It is very important to note however two 
elements: firstly, many of the parameter values identified in the literature come from modeling studies. 
Modeling studies make parameter estimates, to some extent at least, based on optimisation to match the 
behaviour of the real system. As such, parameter values are linked to the structural components of the 
system: a parameter value that “fits” the fundamental SEIR model would need to be adapted to fit our 
adopted SEIR model. That is of course not to say that this allows us to deviate very significantly from 
the range of values we see in the literature and especially through emperical studies, however, the 
described in the literature values need always to further tested through behaviour testing (see below). 
The second element regarding parameter verification of the infection model is, as expected, the high 
degree of uncertainty regarding numerical values of COVID-19 related parameters. As our knowledge 
grows, parameter verification tests will need to be performed again and eventual inconcistencies 
addressed in further iterations of the model.  
 With regards to the Behavioural model, Numerical Verification is particularly hard, especially 
since the specific case study is describing a phenomenon that cannot easily be compared to other 
experiences. As such, Structure-Oriented Behaviour tests, to be described in the next section, are 
necessary to assist us in understanding which parameters are “significant” enough to require further 
exploration. In terms of Conceptual Correspondance, we are confident, through our literature review, 
that the parameters described in the model match elements of the real system, as it is at least reflected 
in our understanding of it.  
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Direct Extreme Conditions Test 
The Direct Extreme Conditions Test is an assessment of all the equations of the model so that they are 
robust under extreme conditions. Each equation has been inspected to ensure it responds adequately to 
extreme inputs. Wherever appropriate, MIN or MAX functions have been employed to not allow the 
equations to take unreasonable values and the upper and lower bounds of table functions were estimated 
to ensure that values remain reasonable under extreme conditions. 
Dimensional Consistency Test 
All variables and parameters of a simulation model have assigned units of measurement and, for the 
model to be considered valid, those need to be consistent “without the inclusion of arbitrary scaling 
factors that have no real world meaning” (Sterman, 2000, p. 866, emphasis in original). The simulation 
software we used (Stella Architect 2.0) performs this test automatically and we have not included 
parameters with no real-world meaning (see Appendix 3) 
Boundary Adequacy Test 
This test “asks whether or not model aggregation is appropriate and if a model includes all relevant 
structure” (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 215). To determine this, in terms of the included structure, the 
purpose of the model is the most important question. We have already described that the purpose of this 
model is not to suggest policies for the management of Covid-19 but, rather to attempt to provide an 
endogenous view of the population’s response that might assist in the conversation around management 
of such environmental Threats. As such, the boundary for the main Infection model is determined to be 
adequate: this model acts as the “engine” on which to test the structural proposal of a modified SEIR 
model and, even more so, on which to ground the response of the population. The Behavioural model 
is here considered as a first iteration on the attempt to bring together theoretical models and knowledge 
of the population’s response to an environmental with a focus on communication messages that can 
help elicit a more favourable response. We are confident with the boundaries of the model in its first 
iteration, and the boundary test will need to be re-examined if the model is further developed to propose 
policies on communication strategies.  
 
Structure-Oriented Behaviour Tests (Indirect Structure Tests)  
Indirect Extreme Conditions Test 
This test is performed to evaluate whether the equations of our model give rise to plausible behaviour 
under extreme conditions.  Indirect Extreme Conditions test utilises simulation for this evaluation. A 
very fundamental test would be to see what would happen if no COVID-19 case was ever imported to 
Norway. The expected behaviour of the system would be that there are none infected and that there is 
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no response by the population. The fomer is true, as can be seen in in the graph of Daily New Cases 
which remains at 0 (Figure 31). 
 
Figure 31: Daily New Cases under testing with Zero Imported Cases 
 




Figure 32: Aware Population and Total Population of Norway under testing with Zero Imported Cases 
 
Those results are not surprising. In the case of the Awareness structure, the exogenous input COVID-
19 mentions in local news sources is still operating, raising awareness in the population: since the media 
still spread information about the (now non-existent) virus, people become aware of it. This is not 
unreasonable if we consider that the population has become aware of other instances or virus that never 
actually reached the country. We see however an additional important confirmation: the population 
remains in the Aware state and never becomes Actively Aware since the Susceptibility Assessment 
remains at 0 (there are no cases, hence there is no perception that one can become infected). By 
nullifying the exogenous mentions via media, we indeed see that no one ever becomes Aware of 
COVID-19 (Figure 33) 
 
 
Figure 33: Aware Population and Total Norwegian Population under testing with Zero Imported Cases and with Zero News 
Media Coverage of COVID-19 
 
There is another behaviour that might initially be seen as not reflecting how the population would 
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this case as well, an exogenous parameter that justifies a reduction in mobility even in the absence of 
the virus, namely the Livelihood Costs (see Figure 34) 
 
 
Figure 34: Mobility Reduction and Livelihood Costs under testing with Zero Imported Cases 
 
The exogenous decrease in Livelihood Costs, makes it so that the population, even with zero Protection 
Motivation against COVID-19, reduces their mobility (by a maximum of 22% reduction). It can be 
argued that this is rather reasonable: if the costs of staying home are reduced, people would choose to 
some extent to remain at home (if, for example, I can work from home and face no cost to not physically 
go to my workplace, I would chose to reduce my mobility to some degree). To test the model, we will 
set the Livelihood Costs equal to their initial value and, sure enough, we can observe no reduction in 
mobility (Figure 35) 
 
 
Figure 35: Mobility Reduction and Livelihood Costs under testing with Zero Imported Cases and Livelihood Costs equal to 
baseline 
 
Another significant extreme condition test we should perform would be the response of the system if 
no Testing Capacity was ever acquired. The system responds adequately, in that there are zero 
Cumulative Positive Tests (Figure 35).  
 
 
Figure 36: Cumulative Positive Tests and Testing Capacity under testing with Zero daily additions in Testing Capacity 
 
The behavioural structure responds in exactly the same way as in the previous test where there were 
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Behaviour Sensitivity Test 
This test “consists of determining those parameters to which the model is highly sensitive, and asking 
if the real system would exhibit similar high sensitivity to the corresponding parameters” (Barlas, 1996, 
p. 191). As such, parameters in this model are expected to largely fall under three categories: those that 
are expected to be sensitive, those that represent leverage points for policy suggestions and, as such, 
should be sensitive, and those that should not be sensitive. The focus of the sensitivity test is, of course, 
the latter category. Sensitivity testing in this case aims to assist us not only in the validation of this 
iteration of the model but to also provide us valuable insights on which parameters we need to look 
further into through further data collection for their quantification. 
Very briefly, parameters of the main infection model are all expected to be sensitive to a smaller 
or larger extent (e.g. duration of infection or of residence in each of the severity stocks, fractions of 
infected at each of the severity categories and, of course, absolute and relative infectivity). The 
tremendous focus of research efforts to quantify such parameters can convince one of their significance, 
and further versions of this model should be in line with state-of-the-art information on the range of 
such parameters. 
The parameters of the Testing module represent decision rules of the government: how much 
testing do we perform and who do we test? Those decisions interact with the direct mobility reduction 
due to infection that we have explored in the Infectivity sector of the Main Infection model so as, the 
more people we test, the more people are quarantined. Since we already consider that Hospitalised and 
Critical Care infected will have much lower contacts anyway (tested or no tested), and since the 
numbers of those patients are in any case low, the Target Test rates for the two severe categories are 
rather insensitive to changes. The Target Test Rate for the Tested and for Symptomatic Infected 
however is, as expected, sensitive and this sensitivity is higher when the Contact Tracing Mechanism 
is active, as well as when the behaviour is endogenised (more tests lead to more response by the 
population). The intensity of the Contact Tracing Mechanism as well as the overall Testing Capacity 
are, as expected, very sensitive to changes.  
In terms of the direct contacts reduction as a result of quarantine, we experiment with a 
relatively wide range of values for the fractional contacts adjustment for the symptomatic population 
and see that, in fact, it does lead to a higher first wave. Interestingly, the second wave is better managed 



























Figure 37: Daily New Cases for different values of the fractional contacts adjustment for the symptomatic population 
 
 The main focus of the Sensitivity analysis is the Behavioural model due to the very large 
uncertainty of the parameters and that fact that it represents the main focus of our work. We have 
performed a detailed sensitivity analysis (see APPENDIX 2) and, as expected, have identified a number 
of parameters that are sensitive. Our model is very clearly a first iteration in the representation of the 
theoretical constructs discussed above, and as such, this test aims mainly to direct us in which 
parameters and relationships we will need to be focused due to the large impact of their system. One 
such very interesting parameter is on the effect of the intensity by which we isolate on the costs of 
isolation (represented in the non-linear effect costs due to fatigue from social isolation, see Fig 38) 
 
 
Figure 38: costs due to fatigue from social isolation: the assumed nonlinear relationship between the recent intensity of 
social isolation and the costs of this behaviour 
 
We have experimented with both a linear relationship and a “slower” response, and we see that it does 
effect both the magnitude of the infection waves and the speed at which the second wave is observed. 
As such, it would be very beneficial to estimate how fatigue might translate to costs, as well as what 
we can do to reach a more favourable shape. The behavioural pattern in the same and this applies for 
all the sensitive parameters in the Behavioural Model, except the practical costs of the behaviour 
(livelihood costs and ease of engagement with prophylactic behaviour) that are expected to have a very 






























Figure 39: Daily New Cases & Mobility Reduction for different shapes of the effect of fatigue on costs of Social Isolation 
 
Behaviour Pattern Tests 
This category of tests aims to compare the behaviour of the model with a reference model of behaviour, 
when available.  
Partial Model Testing 
Partial Model Testing “involves simulating the behavior of a functional component of the model, which 
may be as small as a single equation, in response to empirical input data for comparison with empirical 
output data” (Homer, 2012, p. 282). In this type of testing, a part of the model is being isolated (the 
loops that connect it with the rest of the model are “cut”) and an exogenous input takes the place of the 
cut-off structure. We have presented the results of Partial Model Testing for both the Main Infection 
and the Behavioural model and are rather confident in their fit well with the available data. We would 
like however to test a structure for which we don have available data for and that is the Top-Down 
information dissemination structure. We do not have a measure of the actual rate of information sharing 
for the case of Norway however since we have normalised this mechanism and assumed its contribution 
to be given as relative to the reference period, the values are not important. What is important is the 
behavioural pattern and evidence suggests that information sharing precedes spikes on infections (Singh 
et al., 2020). According to data provided by Alshaabi et al. (2020),  the first peak of the information 
curves occurred in most countries before the observed 10th infection in the country (see Fig 40). 
Moreover, a second wave of information has been observed and is very closely related to the 10th 
























Figure 40: Time series for caseloads and death counts for the United States, and 1-grams for ‘Coronavirus’ & ‘quarantine’ 
in English. Figure 4 in Alshaabi et al. (2020). Blue lines represent the 10th case and red the 10th death for US 
 
Due to the lack of global information, our model's behaviour is somewhat slower than what is indicated 
from such data and we either underestimate the second peak or overestimate the first one (see Fig 41). 
The uncertainty around this mechanism we perceive to be somewhat tolerated due to its assumed low 
contribution on both Threat and Efficacy Appraisals (20% of the total 100 %), however additional data 
and structural information can help us reach better estimates at further iterations of the model. 
 
 
Figure 41: Model Produced total sharing via the Bottom Up mechanism compared to the 10th case and 10th death in 
Norway 
Full Model Behaviour Tests 
Such tests aim to measure whether and with what accuracy the model can reproduce the reference model 
of behaviour. The emphasis of such tests are in predicting the major patterns of the behaviour exhibited 
in the real system and not to produce a “point-by-point” prediction (Barlas, 1996, pp. 192–193). We 
will present in more detail the results of such tests in the following section. 
 
Validation Overview 
The validation process makes us relatively confident in our model. We perceive the structural validity 
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parameterisation and behavioural validation, we observe a lack of sensitivity for many parameters. 
Most, importantly, the validation process has been crucial in our understanding of which values and 
mechanisms we need to focus our efforts on for further iterations of the model.  
 
Results of the Full-Model 
Baseline Scenario 
For the full model results, we run our model for 365, from January 1st, 2020 to January 1st, 2021. The 
values for the parameters are those presented so far and the values for sensitive parameters can be found 
in Appendix 1. 
Results 
The full model seems to match the behavioural pattern of the observed data, however there is a relative 
overestimation of tests and deaths for the reference period (see Figure 42). Despite contact tracing, the 
model produces an additional, second infection spike that is supposedly currently underway (July 2010). 
This is not very worrisome in terms of our model as we are aware of its limitations both in information 
regarding the testing and contact tracing mechanism as well as the uncertainty around the actual risk 
reduction effects of hygienic measures, and, of course, the level of aggregation (every person in Norway 
has exactly the same probability to come to contact with an infected). What is worrisome, in terms of 
Covid-19, is that there is a second spike and our model predicts what is termed the “Hammer and the 
Dance” (Pueyo, 2020): large infection wave(s) followed by smaller waves until vaccines are developed. 
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Figure 42: Full Model, Baseline Scenario: Daily New Covid-19 Cases, Cumulative Tested Infected, and Cumulative Deaths 
 
This overestimation of deaths and tests emanates from an overestimation of the Hospitalised and 
Critical Care Infected (see Figure 43). Those are the two severity categories that we perform prioritised 
testing on and the two categories from which people can die due to Covid-19 infection. Why this 
overestimation then? 
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Looking at the behavioural model for the source of the overestimation, we do observe that the response 
of the population, as produced by the model, is less steep than the one observed in the data for mobility 
over the reference period. Specifically, our model produces a slower response until the beginning of 
April, when it “catches up” with the data and, thereof, the mobility of the population recovers almost 
equally delayed relative to the actual observations. A delay is to be expected; we have discussed already 
that perceptions of Threat and Efficacy and relative Top Down and Bottom Up communications are 
expected to have begun to build up earlier that what we here represent due to globally available 
information and prevalence of the virus. As one could predict from the infection data above, a “return 
to normality” is not feasible according to our model: the response of the population (as mobility 
reduction and engagement with hygienic behaviour) will need to be employed time and time again to 
combat subsequent waves and, if we don’t want results that are worse than the presented above, it seems 
we cannot fully return to our prior-to-Covid-19 behavioural patterns. 
 
 
Figure 44: : Full Model, Baseline Scenario: Population Mobility, Engagement with hygienic Behaviour, and Threat and 
Efficacy Appraisals and Protection Motivation 
 
To understand better where those dynamics come from, we will look at the feedback loops that guide 
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The Feedback Story 
 
Figure 45: Causal Loop Diagram of the main feedback loops of the full model 
 
As imported cases of Covid-19 enter the country, those Infected people come in contact with 
Susceptible and Infect them with some probability equal to the infectivity of the virus. New Infections 
lead to more and more New Infections (R1). The government starts implementing the Testing & 
Quarantine of infected policies and the balancing loops B2, and B3 start working to slow down New 
Infections (with B2 being the strongest and, as testing capacity builds, B3 slowly gaining more 
strength). As the government perceives the New Infections due to testing, they communicate their 
Threat message activating the response of the population via the balancing loop B4 through the Threat 
Appraisal. This message is further diffused by the Bottom-Up mechanism (B8) and, together with B5 
and B6 which are becoming stronger as Infected people get tested and reported, all loops synergise in 
increasing the Threat Appraisal and thus the population’s Protection Motivation and Prophylactic 
Behaviour. The Bottom Up mechanism, more slowly, amplifies this effect through the dissemination of 
the Threat Appraisal (R3) as this is being built through the above-mentioned loops. Parallel to this 
process, Efficacy-Related information are spread by the government (B5) and the Bottom-Up 
mechanism (B9 and R3), all acting in the same way as the Threat-Related loops. The balance between 














































































































R2), Protection Motivation will not be as strong and the same applies for the Prophylactic behaviour. 
Since it is the latter that leads to fewer Infections the next time around, the Reinforcing loop R4 from 
observations of the response of the population to peoples’ Efficacy Appraisal is very significant to 
ensure that balance between Efficacy and Threat is optimal. The strength of this loop (as well as the 
main balancing loops through the populations’ response, B4 to B9) depend on the Cost mechanisms. 
The exogenous ease of engagement with prophylactic behaviour is activated first and is the most crucial 
mechanism: more ease (represented by a reduction in the Livelihood costs for the case of mobility), 
makes the comparison between Protection Motivation and Costs favourable, leading to increases in 
Prophylactic Behaviour which, in turn, strengthens the loops that act to slow down infections (B4-B9). 
Those loops are however counteracted by the Social Costs (R5) that act to maintain the previous levels 
of prophylactic behaviour: at the early stages those “previous levels” mean no engagement with this 
type of behaviour. The other type of costs, those due to fatigue (B10) are very weak initially but begin 
to gain more and more strength over time as the population response loops increase their strength. As 
B10 becomes stronger, it starts counteracting B4 to B9 loops, as well as the favourable R4 loop6.  In 
the meanwhile, B1 gains more and more strength and now all balancing loops passing through New 
Infections (B1 to B9 since B11 is thankfully very weak) work very well together to slow down the 
epidemic by weakening R1. This is great news to begin with but a weaker R1 weakens the balancing 
loops that, now, start working to bring back the system to its previous state: fewer infections lead to 
lower Protection Motivation, lower Prophylactic Behaviour and hence, more probable contacts between 
Infected and Susceptible. Simply put, people “relax” and try to return to normality and this might lead 
R1 to gain momentum once again leading to a second wave (and, not surprisingly, it does). The game 
is now played in the strength of the balancing loops B1 to B3: if all the time elapsed has been used to 
build enough testing capacity, those loops will be able to counteract to a large extend the very strong 
R1 allowing the population response loops to take less load this time around. Of the three, B1 is the 
optimal as it operates faster and can potentially have the largest balancing capabilities (contact tracing 
it identifies people at earlier stages thus reducing contacts more quickly). So, how confident are we to 
put all our bets on B1? 
 
 
6 Luckily, B10 and R5 engage in a little «fight» on their own: Fatigue costs increase over time due to the intensity 
of the Prophylactic behaviour but, at the same time, this intensity decreases the Social costs. The person then, 
despite being tired from isolation for example, does not see much use in leaving the house when no one else is 
out 
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Experimentation with Policies 
Scenario No1: Bring back my people 
Confidence in testing capacity already in place, worries about the economy, and perhaps even an 
attitude of “nothing bad happened” lead many governments eager to return to some normality. We will 
test this option by looking into how the infection rate develops if we return the Costs related to how 
easy it to practice the prophylactic behaviour (Ease of Engagement in Hygienic behaviour & Livelihood 
Costs associated with Social Distancing). The assumptions (see Fig 46) represent a return to more usual 
levels of the variables: for Livelihood Costs, people are needed back to their workplaces, students return 
to schools, and generally, over time, the consequences of not leaving one’s house become the same as 
they were before Covid-19. For Hygienic Behaviour, restrictions in how many people can, for example, 
sit together or be in the same bus start disappearing, and disinfectants go back in cupboards (we do 
assume that the experience has had an impact and that people do not return exactly at the same levels 
as before Covid-19).  
 
 
Figure 46: Scenario No1: Ease of Engagement with Hygienic Behaviour & Livelihood Costs. Scenario & Baseline 
Assumptions 
 
We also strengthen contact tracing to 40 tests performed per positive test and an effectiveness of 
identification at 20%. To ensure the mechanism works we allow the Testing Capacity to increase with 
200 tests/day for the entire year (see figure 47) 
 
Figure 47: Scenario No1: Testing Capacity and Contacts traced per Positive Test 
 
It is very likely that the 20% effectiveness might not be unrealistically low as it only allows us to identify 
a maximum of of 20% of the Asymptomatic Infected. We do not know what the actual potential of 
Contact Tracing might be and which targeted policies can push this effectiveness higher up. However, 
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if the population is faced with costs that do not allow for practicing of Social Isolation and Other 
Hygienic Measures and thus returns to normal behaviour (as the one we saw at Figure 46), we might be 
facing very strong waves later on, assuming no vaccine becomes available. 
 
 
Figure 48: Scenario No1: Results of Daily New Cases, Cumulative Tested, and Cumulative Deaths 
 
It is significant to remember of course that, in our model, we do not quarantine close contacts of 
confirmed Infected. This additional mechanism might also be strong enough to allow for the reopening 
policy described here. Moreover, we have not made additional assumptions on how high a fraction of 
Infected in other categories we can identify (although we can note that the behavioural pattern does not 





















Figure 49: Scenario No1: Mobility, Adoption of Hygienic Behaviour, and Threat & Efficacy Appraisals, and Protection 
Motivation 
 
What is interesting is that, not only do the actual behaviours return to normal because of the increased 
costs, but the Protection Motivation seems to suffer as well towards the end of the year (see Fig 49). 
This is due to the effect of the Efficacy Appraisal and its significance for Protection Motivation. As 
people do not practice the Prophylactic Behaviours, the effect of observations on one’s Efficacy 
Appraisals make them somewhat “pessimistic” about the efficiency of the proposed response to battle 
the epidemic this time (others are not practicing it so it will not work). If we had also made the (logical) 
assumption that the direct Efficacy communication by the government would not be of the same 
intensity as in the baseline scenario, the picture would be worse.  
 The purpose of our model is not to make “strong” policy recommendations as we believe that 
the model’s assumptions and the mechanisms that have been excluded might not allow us the most 
accurate predictions. We do however, feel comfortable to caution, with the evidence we have, against 
a quick returning to “business-as-usual”, until we at least have sufficient evidence of the effectiveness 
of such policies. Interestingly, we observe what seems the be the “Fear-Control” response (Witte, 1992, 
1994): people losing trust in the efficiency of the response and thus stop adopting it. To convince 
ourselves of the above, we run the simulation a little further: Protection Motivation does never again 

































Figure 50: Scenario No1: Threat & Efficacy Appraisal, and Protection Motivation with a longer simulation time 
 
Scenario No2: A little more conversation, a little less action 
Utilising only policies that directly target the virus might not be enough. But what about only focusing 
on communication associated with the behaviour? In this scenario, we will deactivate the contact tracing 
mechanism in order to see what the effect of communication strategies on the spread of infection might 
be. We will also not manipulate the costs associated with Social Isolation and Other Hygienic Measures 
(see Figure 46 above for the graph with the baseline assumptions). For this scenario, we will not look 
at one decision rule but rather at a range of possibilities regarding the intensity of the Top-Down 
Efficacy-Related communication message by allowing the parameter intensity of Efficacy Related 
communication to take values between 1 and 2. As a reminder, the Efficacy-Related communication 
message by the government is controlled by the effect of new reported cases on the government’s 
communication message: the government is thought to perceive the risk posed by Covid-19 and respond 
with a Threat-related and an Efficacy-related communication message with an intensity controlled by 
the intensity of Threat-and intensity of Efficacy-Related communication message which are, at baseline, 
at the values of 1 and 1,15 respectively.  
As can be seen in Figure 51, stronger Efficacy-Related messages do have an impact as they 
lead to fewer infections, however communication tactics are not sufficient without targeted testing of 
contacts (results of the baseline scenario with an intensity of Efficacy-Related communication equal to 
1,15 and contact tracing ON are shown in the pink, thicker line). Besides a larger second wave, the 
infections do not “die out”, or oscillate as we have seen before but approximate an equilibrium that is 
dependant largely on a new model-produced “normality” of reduced mobility and high adoption of 














Figure 51: Scenario No2: Daily New Cases, Cumulative Infected Tested & Cumulative Deaths for various values of intensity 
of Top-Down Efficacy-Related communication message 
 
 
Figure 52: Scenario No2: Mobility Reduction and Adoption of Hygienic Behaviour for various values of intensity of Top-
Down Efficacy-Related communication message 
 
The effect of Efficacy communication is not in the absolute Efficacy Appraisal of the population but 
mainly on the speed of increase (Figure 53). An emphasis, by the government, on the efficiency of the 
Social Isolation and Hygienic response, or perhaps an even more general focus on messages that 
emphasize that there are ways to mitigate the Threat is exhibited here, in line with the descriptions of 
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Figure 53: Scenario 2: Efficacy Appraisal for various values of intensity of Top-Down Efficacy-Related communication 
message 
 
But what about Threat-Related messages? Witte & Allen (2000), among others, have proposed that best 
results are observed under strong Threat-Related and strong Efficacy-Related messages. We test values 
between 1 and 2 (normal and double intensity) for each of the messages and the results are presented in 
Figure 54. Again, the absence of the contact tracing mechanism leads to a worse picture no matter the 
communication intensity. However, manipulation of the content of the messages does lead to 
differences in the overall behaviour with the worse policies combining strong Threat messages with 
low Efficacy messages (Run 5, in light blue gives the most unfavourable development with intensities 
of Efficacy message = 1, and Threat message =2) 
 
 
Figure 54: Scenario 2: New Cases, Cumulative Tested and Death for various values of Top-Down Efficacy and Threat 
Related communication message 
 
Not surprisingly, the best results, coming somewhat close to the Baseline-with Tracing policy are 
observed under strong Threat and Efficacy messages combined, with the magnitude of the Efficacy 
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the normal intensity). Is there any however that high Efficacy messages can “backfire”? There is a 
possibility that we can imagine through the costs of fatigue. Communication messages that are very 
efficient in eliciting the response of the population, could lead to more fatigue of the population that 
eventually counteracts this response (the small B10 loop from Fig. 40). Strengthening the loop by 
reducing the time to update perception of recent distancing intensity and of recent hygienic behaviour 
intensity to 1/3 of its original value (hence, to 10 days), slightly changes the picture. Higher intensity 
of Threat and Efficacy still give the optimal results, but, in this case, the difference with more moderate 
values is disappearing. Moreover, due to the effect of fatigue, the difference in effectiveness between 
the Tracing Policy and the Communication optimal policy is much lower (see Run 2 and Run 11). This 
is an interesting behaviour that should be further explored as, if it does represent the real system, it 
might indicate that “rationing” or “saving” some communication for later could be beneficial. While 




Figure 55: Scenario 2: New Cases, Cumulative Tested and Death for various values of Top-Down Efficacy and Threat 
Related communication message with faster Fatigue 
 
The above results are, as expected, in line with the theoretical and empirical assumptions that were built 
into the model. While we believe those to be reasonable and in line with current understanding of the 
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So, what about you and me? 
To conclude the experimentation with communication messages, we should make one final test to 
examine whether the Bottom-Up communication choices can have any impact in COVID-19. We will 
here only manipulate the Intensity of the Efficacy-Related communication message and do so only for 
the Bottom-Up mechanism. This intensity is a “multiplier” of our own Efficacy beliefs; a choice 
representing how much we amplify in our message our own perception of how effective a response 
might be. We will again test with values between 1 and 2 (normal and double intensity). Figure 56 
suggests that such a decision might indeed make some difference, even in the presence of stronger 
policies such as the contact tracing one. The only effect we manipulate here is that of the communication 
message; all other behavioural choices that might influence perceptions and costs associated with the 




Figure 56: Scenario No2: Daily new cases for values of the Bottom-Up Efficacy-Related communication message with no 
contact tracing (top) and with contact tracing (bottom) 
 
“Scenario” No3: Experimentation with Communication messages 
In this “scenario”, we will try to look closer in some sensitive values and what can we potentially derive 
from them. We will run some experiments and present their results and whether those can tell us 
anything about communication decisions under uncertainty of parameters.  
Is Proactive Communication beneficial? 
The decision rule, by the government, on when to start communicating Threat and Efficacy messages 
related to COVID-19 has been endogenised in our model with the use of an Additional Top-Down 
Threat and Additional Top-Down Efficacy Communication mechanisms. This mechanism is more 
sensitive to first observed cases of COVID-19, leading the government to start sharing communication 











Jan	1 Apr	1 Jul	1 Oct	1 Jan	1
1 2 3 4 5
1





1 2 3 4 5




























2 3 4 5











Jan	1 Apr	1 Jul	1 Oct	1 Jan	1









1 2 3 4
5











Jan	1 Apr	1 Jul	1 Oct	1 Jan	1






1 2 3 4 5








































Jan	1 Apr	1 Jul	1 Oct	1 Jan	1








1 2 3 4 5
=	11 =	1,252 =	1,53 =	1,754 =	25
 82 
While the mechanism is not perfect, it does lead to an earlier communication spike and that is sufficient 
for our exploration. 
 
Figure 57: Threat & Efficacy-Related Top-Down communication messages with Proactive and Reactive decisions 
 
We do observe that proactive communication has a significant impact on the first wave of infection 
with optimal results obtained when both messages are emphasised early on (Proactive Eff; Proactive 
Threat). We also see that Proactive Threat messages that are not accompanied by Efficacy messages 
(Reactive Eff; Proactive Threat) are not advised under our assumptions regarding the “Fear-Control” 
response: early Threat-focused messages without information about whether the proposed behavioural 
response “works”, are not expected to lead people to follow the responses, thus increasing the observed 
number of infections. 
 
Figure 58: Development of Daily New Infections under with Proactive and Reactive decisions of Top-Down Threat and 
Efficacy-Related communication messages 
 
It is important to note that, in the second wave, the proactive mechanism is not active, and the faster 
spikes are the result of the better management of the first wave. A faster declining first wave leads 
people to return towards their baseline mobility faster, thus bringing forth a speedier second wave. 
What if Threat Appraisal is more Important? 
In this test, we will look at the relative contribution of Threat Appraisal on Protection Motivation. The 
Baseline value we have used is 60% but it is possible that Threat has a higher effect. We look at the 
overall fraction of population that becomes infected with COVID-19 in order to view the results of this 
experimentation in a more easily visible way. What we observe is that, even if Threat is more important 
for peoples’ Protection Motivation, higher and faster Efficacy messages still have a positive influence 
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Run 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
relative contribution of Threat Appraisal on 
Protection Motivation 
0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
Delay in Efficacy communication relative to 
Threat communication 
0,5 0,5 7 7 0,5 0,5 7 7 
intensity of Efficacy Related communication 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Figure 59: Testing with different contribution of Threat on Protection Motivation, and intensity and delay of Efficacy 
Communication 
 
What if building one’s Efficacy Appraisal is a slower process? 
It is plausible that people react faster to Threat-Related information than to Efficacy-Related 
information due to risk aversion or even trust in governmental or scientific suggestions. What if this is 
true? In our baseline scenario, we have assumed that both Threat and Efficacy Appraisals update rather 
fast (3 days delay). We will look here at a scenario where Efficacy updates three times slower than 
Threat does (so, with a 9-days delay). For brevity, we will present here the development of the fraction 
of the population that is infected and will focus on what strategies we could use if Efficacy is indeed a 
slower process.  
 The first strategy is to decrease the delay by which we present Efficacy-Related information 
relative to Threat-Related information. The more delayed the information, as expected, the worse the 
results (Fig. 60) 
 
 
Figure 60: Testing the prevalence of the virus under different values of delay in the communication of Efficacy 
 
Does this still hold if the effect of Efficacy on Protection Motivation is lower? We experiment here with 
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significance of Threat Appraisal for peoples’ intention to act against the Threat. Higher delays in 
Efficacy communication are not beneficial, even if the Threat is much more significant for people’s 
motivation (see Run 8 in Fig. 61 with an 8-days delay and a contribution of Threat on Protection 
Motivation accounting for 80%). 
 
 
Figure 61: Testing the prevalence of the virus for slower updating of Efficacy Appraisal 
 
Let’s perform a final test: if indeed Efficacy is not as significant for intention, can we then just increase 
the Threat message and get similar results? Well, this might be risky: we can see a not optimal 
development even with a high contribution of Threat on Protection Motivation and a high Threat-
Related messages (Run 8 in Figure 62). Similar results are observed if Efficacy updates equally fast as 
the Threat, but if the former is indeed slower, those effects are amplified.  
 
 
Run 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
relative contribution of Threat 
Appraisal on Protection Motivation 
0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
intensity of Efficacy Related 
communication 
1 1 1,5 1,5 1 1 1,5 1,5 
intensity of Threat Related 
communication 
1 1,5 1 1,5 1 1,5 1 1,5 
Figure 62: Testing the prevalence of the virus for slower updating of Efficacy Appraisal and different Threat communication 
intensity 
 
To summarise, if we consider that the relationship between Efficacy and Threat indeed plays a role in 
making people engage in “Fear Control” reponses (that is, deny or discount the threat due to the lack of 
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So, what if there is no such thing as Fear Control? 
All our analyses so far were assuming the Fear Control zone. What if they got it wrong and this response 
is not there? The optimal results are still indisputable: high Threat and high Efficacy messages still 
produce the best results 
 
 
Run 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
relative contribution of Threat 
Appraisal on Protection Motivation 
0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
intensity of Efficacy Related 
communication 
1 1 1,5 1,5 1 1 1,5 1,5 
intensity of Threat Related 
communication 
1 1,5 1 1,5 1 1,5 1 1,5 
Figure 63: Prevalence of the virus with manipulations of Threat and Efficacy communication intensity in the absence of 
"Fear Control" mechanism 
 
This short experimentation has made clear that strong Efficacy messages are beneficial under all 
circumstances, even more so when they are coupled with strong Threat messages. This is supported by 
the literature, however, we need to be very careful with such an assertion: if there is any evidence that 
the relationship between Threat and Efficacy is different at different regions (or ranges) of these values, 
then there might be a chance that strong Efficacy messages do not work in the way we have seen here 
and might instead impede our ability to combat the environmental threat. The questions becomes: is 
there any region of Threat where, if we believe in the Efficacy of the response, we might discount the 
Threat instead of be motivated to act against it? This experimentation opens up an interesting direction 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
[S]ince behaviour is the central issue, we must be careful about how we model it and strive to 
incorporate behavioural considerations more fully into our analysis of disease control. We cannot 
simply rely on traditional analyses that do not model behaviour but augment these with ad-hoc 
interventions that rely on guesses about compliance rates. The standard epidemiological models are an 
excellent starting point for analysis but must be made complete by fully integrating them with more 
sophisticated models of human decision-making and behaviour.”  
(Toxvaerd, 2020, p. 2) 
 
Overview 
This thesis has attempted to contribute to the understanding of the COVID-19 crisis through a 
simulation model that focuses on the coupling of the dynamics of infection and those of the behavioural 
response of the population. We have used Norway as a case study to test the validity of the proposed 
structure. Mainly, this work has been a first attempt to combine and translate Health Behaviour theories 
in a formal System Dynamics simulation model and our main emphasis has been on the communication 
messages that governments can utilise to mobilise the population. To our knowledge, this is the first 
modeling study that focuses on communication messages, at least for the case of COVID-19, and we 
hope it can assist in the conversation around how to elicit an adaptive response of the population.  
 
To summarise, our goals for this thesis were:  
I. Main Infection Model: Modification of classic SEIR model to: 
a. Account for a gradual progression across severity stages of a disease & one that breaks 
“perfect-mixing” rules. 
b. Offer a more  “individual-level” view through following an infected persons’ journey over 
the infection duration and at different severity stages 
c. Allow for association of different characteristics according to the day of infection and 
severity stage (e.g. viral load, relative infectivity, etc.)  
II. Behavioural Structure:  Develop a model that can provide: 
a. Endogenous view of behavioural response of the population to COVID-19, and one that is 
not only anchored only on virus prevalence or mortality. 
b. An attempt to represent psychological theories of response to environmental threat to one’s 
wellbeing in a formal, computational model that can be tested 
c. A structure that allows testing of policies targeting directly peoples’ response instead of 
only policies that focus on management of the virus. Such policies are related to 
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i. The drivers and the communication of Threat & Efficacy, as well as  Proactive vs 
Reactive communication strategies   
ii. The costs that might influence peoples’ decision to comply with the proposed 
measures 
 
Limitations & Further Directions 
J. W. Forrester said: “The beginner is more conspicuously vulnerable to including too much than he 
will be after some experience in building models and after the discovery of how much simplification is 
possible” (1961, p. 453). Not surprisingly, we have experienced this vulnerability rather heavily in the 
development of this work. Further iterations could benefit from some simplifications, however, an 
assessment of the communicability of the model is very significant to inform further steps 
Main Infection Model 
As we have mentioned, there are many limitations regarding our current knowledge of the virus and, as 
such, the model needs to be updated as new evidence emerge. Importantly, our representation of the 
testing mechanisms is underdeveloped and while this was not the main purpose of our model, future 
iterations can benefit greatly from better representations of testing mechanisms, especially regarding 
the possible effectiveness of contact tracing. Moreover, our model is a high-aggregation one, looking 
at the entire population without consideration of geographic information and age cohorts. Networks 
dynamics are significant for the spread of an infectious disease (see, for example Isham et al., 2011; M. 
J. Keeling & Eames, 2005) and, as such, our model could greatly benefit from those. Despite those 
limitations, it is a priority to apply the structure to other countries, especially more data-rich, to further 
assess its validity. 
 An interesting area in which to expand would be the effectiveness of contact tracing. Its 
effectiveness has been emphasised and proven, and there is an area that fits very well with our 
explorations of the population’s responses; that of the adoption of contact-tracing apps. In Norway, the 
application “Smittestop” from the Norwegian Institute of public health had, as per May 19, 641824 
active users and a total of 1554620 downloads (Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2020). These apps 
can be effective as long as a sufficient number of people adopt them. Adopting such an app might rely 
on Threat-Related perceptions (as well as app-specific Efficacy appraisals) but might also feed back to 
them: the might lead to a sense of “false safety” – a perceived reduction of the risk of the virus that can 
have opposite to the desired effects. There is a possibility that tipping points exist and a model exploring 
those while also taking into consideration decision making at the individual level could assist in the 
strategy going forward. 
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Behavioural Model 
The behavioural model has many limitations. There is of course a very high uncertainty of parameters 
and non-linear relationships, and evidence of evaluations of the population’s perceptions can greatly 
enhance its ability to discuss the response of the population to COVID-19. Very importantly, the main 
assumptions regarding the relationship between Threat and Efficacy need to be further evaluated: if 
there is any evidence that the relationship is not in the same direction or intensity at different regions, 
the main assumptions need to be adjusted accordingly, as they might produce results opposite to those 
we have seen here. The drivers of Efficacy need also additional support and evaluation. We hope that 
the very intensive research efforts focusing on the response of the population to COVID-19 can provide 
us with further data of peoples’ perceptions at different stages of the pandemic that can assist us in 
clarifying the described mechanisms. Very importantly, evaluations of the effect of different costs on 
peoples’ decisions, especially those related to fatigue, are very crucial and we might have presented a 
much more optimistic picture than the real one. Besides better clarifying the relationships between 
variables, we believe that further iterations can benefit from translating some of the variables to 
accumulative mechanisms as well as further explicit diffusion processes in the population (“trends” & 
social costs, Efficacy-Related information, etc). These will be a better representation of reality and will 
increase the applicability of the theory / model to other Threats. As with the main infection model, 
applying the model to other case studies is a good way forward. 
 If additional support can convince us that the model’s assumptions are valid and the structure 
has been updated accordingly, then we should definitely look more closely into the spread of 
misinformation, as well as further diffusion processes between the population. The element of trust in 
the government and the information provided by the government is expected to have a very significant 
contribution (Khosravi, 2020; Siegrist & Zingg, 2014). For the Norwegian population, trust was 
reported to be rather high, however, there have been evidence that it increased during the COVID-19 
crisis . Trust might alter the relative contribution of messages disseminated by the Top-Down and by 
the Bottom-Up mechanisms (we don’t trust the government so we turn to other ways of receiving 
information) which might produce interesting dynamics and, combined with spread of misinformation 
or other non-beneficial person-to-person communications, can have a very significant impact on the 
observed behaviour.  
 
Research Questions 
Can well-known models of infectious disease be adopted for the case of COVID-19? 
Yes. The model of gradual progression that was proposed by Pål I. Davidsen and developed as part of 
this thesis does replicate rather well the reference model of behaviour. While there is need to apply the 
model in other case studies, as well as compare it with the standard SEIR model or other known 
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modifications of it, we are confident that the behaviour it produces is within reasonable ranges. Updates 
with more recent information regarding the virus are of course crucial, not only for this model but all 
COVID-19 simulation models.  
Could accounting for gradual progression among stages of the disease accurately describe the reality 
of Covid-19? 
It does seem so, yes. The growth patterns of the more severe stages are represented quite well through 
our model. There are of course limitations due to lack of knowledge of the growth patterns of less severe 
infections, however the overall rational behaviour makes as optimistic as to the realism of this structure. 
Again, further validation can make us answer more confidently. 
Can such a model offer us additional information? 
Yes. Being able to see individuals’ progression across stages of their infection and days since infection 
is a very good addition to standard epidemiological models. It makes the association of characteristics 
easier and allows us somewhat of “individual-view” of the journey of an infected person. Tracking 
individuals, we believe, can also increase communicability of the model’s results. We would find a very 
interesting addition the association of common symptoms or experiences that can easily be tracked 
based on the structure 
Could such a model be utilised for other viruses or diseases?  
Yes. Gradual progression is more common than not. It would be interesting to apply this model to 
diseases with longer duration and track individuals’ symptomatology over time. The clearer separation 
of various stages of the infection duration can perhaps provide valuable information on necessary health 
care capacities, medication, or other resources in cases of epidemics with long-term effects. 
 
Is the behavioural response of the population, in terms of compliance with proposed behavioural 
measures, significant for the prevalence of Covid-19 in the population? 
Most certainly yes. This is of course already a known fact both to the scientific community and, due to 
the recent experiences, to policy makers7 and the general public. There might however not be a similar 
level of agreement on whether it is still significant. With more and more capacity put in place and 
perhaps an acquired optimism after the first wave, there is an eagerness to return to life-as-usual. We 
need to be very cautious with such an approach. Despite significant limitations in our assumptions 
regarding the testing policies and capacities, our model suggests that should avoid “putting all our eggs 
in one basket”. As countries start reopening, we need to be careful with making the practical costs of 
prophylactic behaviour as high as they were before COVID-19. Motivation to protect ourselves against 
 
7 Well... Rather, “to most policy makers”. 
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the virus does decline over time and as infections remain low, and since our engagement with 
prophylactic behaviours depends on a balance between motivation and costs, we need to at least keep 
the latter at manageable levels to be able to maintain some degree of mobility reduction and other 
hygienic measures that can help us avoid new waves. We have already built some institutional capacity 
that reduces the cost of a person’s decision to “stay at home today” and it seems a very good strategy 
to maintain it, at least for the fraction of population that we can.  
If so, is it sufficient that this response is grounded in the prevalence of the disease? 
It depends on the purpose of the model. If one wants to test policies targeting the virus directly (e.g. 
contact tracing), then grounding the population’s response on the prevalence might be sufficient. 
However, one must be very careful: Threat-Related perceptions fade over time and fatigue of the 
population practicing the response or even talking about it are very important. If we do not account for 
them, prevalence-elastic response assumptions can make us underestimate significantly the necessary 
intensity of policies targeting the virus. More importantly, we have seen first-hand in the case of 
COVID-19 how capacity constraints and delays in the development or increase of, for example, testing 
equipment can really slow down our efforts to directly address the virus. In such cases, the population’s 
response becomes our main weapon, and prevalence-elastic response approaches do not allow much 
space for understanding and testing poliies on how to best mobilise it. 
Incorporating the element of Efficacy, in particular can be very valuable. We perceive the 
efficacy contribution to extend beyond health-related behavioural intentions in times of crisis to other 
responses to Threats as, for example, related to sustainable usage of resources (Lam, 2006) or climate 
change action (Doherty & Webler, 2016). Especially for the latter, there has been research suggesting 
that strong threat focused messages do not work and might even have counteracting effects (O’Neill, 
Boykoff, Niemeyer, & Day, 2013; Wibeck, 2014). Efficacy might very well be a missing link that can 
allow us to understand how to best communicate information about the significant Threats we are 
collectively facing. 
Are there additional mechanisms that can be utilised to enhance compliance with proposed behavioural 
measures? More specifically, are communication messages important in helping generate the desired 
response? 
Absolutely. Communication messages are very important in building Protection Motivation against the 
virus. This Motivation is a significant predecessor to action and needs to be built and sustained to 
improve the management of the virus. We have already seen that communication and information 
campaigns have proven on many occasions a very valuable tool for the control of COVID-19 in reality, 
and our model supports this observation. The decisions we make, at the top level, on when to start 
communicating and how much to communicate are very important. The absence of clear, efficient, top-
down information has a strong impact on the population’s response as it slows down and reduces their 
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perceptions of the environmental Threat as well as the Efficacy of the response. Additionally, it could 
potentially leave space to the spread of misinformation which, while not present in our model, would 
act to slow down the development of the assessments leading up to Motivation to act.  
 It is also important to note that communication messages directly between people are also 
valuable. What we share matters. We have indeed observed in reality an enormous response, especially 
by the scientific community, to spread information directly, via social and traditional media, both 
regarding the Threat of COVID-19 and the Efficacy of the response. Our model supports that this indeed 
works, even with significant limitations in quantifying “how much” it works. It is, we believe, important 
to remember this and not underestimate the contribution of our own communication messages. 
Can targeted information regarding the effectiveness of the proposed measures have a significant 
impact? 
Yes. There is both theoretical and observational support that the Efficacy of a behaviour is very 
significant for us practicing the response (for a review see Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). The 
model was able to showcase insights from behavioural theory stating that communication of Threat, if 
not accompanied by communication of the Efficacy of the response can lead to “fear control” strategies 
such as defensive avoidance of the threat,  rather than adoption of the proposed measures. There is need 
for more research on this mechanism, as well as further exploration of the main drivers of both 
Appraisals and the delays in their increase, however, the point holds even if the effects of Efficacy are 
not very strong, they still can have an impact on our behaviour.  
It is therefore advised to communicate messages focusing on solutions and emphasizing the 
effectiveness of responses to a threat in order to mobilise people to act. This, as well, applies not only 
for centrally distributed messages but for our individual communication as well. Emphasizing Efficacy-
Related messages, whether those contain practical information and scientific facts, or more “emotional” 
content can help. If images of successfully baking sourdough bread and making the perfect Dalgona 
coffee8 get the message across that “we can fight the pandemic” because we are collectively practicing 
an efficient response to it, then we should absolutely utilise them.  
Can existing theoretical frameworks of decision making in response to environmental threats to our 
wellbeing be combined in a unified framework? 
This has been our attempt. Our review of main Health Behaviour Theories, as well as relevant 
computational models, has convinced us that there is more that is common than different. We strongly 
believe that combining theoretical frameworks is important for scientific production and for policy 
recommendations. Regarding the former, we see science as benefiting from both convergent and 
divergent knowledge activities, but it is our belief that, at this point in time and after a long history of 
 
8 Just a few of the “food trends” of the pandemic (Liaw, 2020)  
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divergence, we need to converge to remain relevant. Bringing established knowledge together is 
happening but more is needed if our goal is to assist with the big problems of our time. Policy makers 
are in need of clear, combined frameworks that can help them understand and better utilise decision-
making processes of the population, and the need for convergence is more significant than ever. We see 
computational approaches are the most suitable to facilitate convergence in science and, perhaps most 
specifically, in social and psychological science.  
 In our own model, we have attempted and, to a hopefully reasonable degree, managed to bring 
together elements of most of the main Health Behaviour Theories in a unified framework that is 
reasonable. Our work has led us to believe that there is not much more that needs to be incorporated, 
although there is a need for better representation of the mechanisms (either by better quantification of 
relationships or by utilizing more diffusion components or representing some mechanisms of perception 
updating or change in general as accumulations). Additional experimentation is necessary but a such a 
framework for response to threats can be very valuable. 
Can they be translated and represented in a dynamic, computational model and, if so is System 
Dynamics an appropriate method? 
Absolutely. This is of course no news, but we hope our initial exploration further supports this fact. 
Simulations can be an extremely useful tool to translate theoretical constructs, incorporate evidence that 
have been acquired through studies of established theories, and experiment in a safe space. 
Experimentation via simulation can provide validation of or help further develop such constructs and, 
equally or even more so importantly, can assist in communicating their insights in a way that might be 
more engaging both for policy makers and the general public.  
We see many opportunities for psychological insights in their translation in System Dynamics 
models and even more so in the ways they can be used as artifacts to help facilitate change. Theoretical 
knowledge can and should be represented in such models, despite the challenges in quantification. This 
work has been a first attempt in this representation and there is much more to be done for the specific 
area of threat management and processes of behavioural change.  
Is such a framework relevant only for the COVID-19 pandemic? 
No. Looking at public response to an environmental threat utilising behavioural theories (and with 
explicit inclusion of message communication components) has possible applications beyond the 
management of COVID-19 and other threats directly related to Public Health. Protection Motivation 
Theory for example, offers support for this statement as the framework has been utilised to explore, 
among others, adoption of sustainable agricultural behaviours (Keshavarz & Karami, 2016) particularly 
as related to climate change (Luu et al., 2019), organizational threats for Cyber Security (Bauer & 
Bernroider, 2015; Herath & Rao, 2009), as well as general change in mental models through methods 
such as Group Model Building (Rouwette, Korzilius, Vennix, & Jacobsa, 2011). Processes of change 
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and our responses to the environment and the threats around us are very significant. We hope that this 
first iteration of combining behavioural insights and describing them in a System Dynamics can 
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Appendix I: BaseRun Parameters 
 
Parameter Value 
ADDITIONAL TOP DOWN THREAT COMMUNICATION SWITCH 1 (ON) 
ADDITIONAL TOP DOWN EFFICACY COMMUNICATION SWITCH 1 (ON) 
intensity of Efficacy Related communication 1,15 
intensity of Efficacy Related communication Bottom Up 1 
intensity of Threat Related communication 1 
Delay in Efficacy communication relative to Threat communication 4 days 
Livelihood Costs  As in Fig. 25  
Ease of engagement in hygienic behaviour  As in Fig. 25 
time to update Efficacy Appraisal = time to update Threat Appraisal 3 days 
time to discount a severe case 7 days 
relative contribution of Threat Appraisal on Protection Motivation 0,6 
weight of livelihood costs = weight of ease of engagement with hygienic behaviour ,6 
Relative weight of fatigue ,6 
maximum effect of hygiene on risk reduction ,13 
SWITCH Contact Tracing Activated 1 (ON) 
over time contacts tested per tested positive baseline 
effectiveness of identification (contact tracing) ,10 
Testing Capacity daily addition 200 (tests per day) 
Testing smooth time  7 days 
Tested fractional contacts adjustment = Hospitalised fractional contacts adjustment ,0145 
Symptomatic fractional contacts adjustment ,5 




APPENDIX 2: Results of Sensitivity Analysis 
Testing and Infectivity Modules 
Variable Value Range Sensitive Comments? 
     
Severe fractional 
contacts 
,0145 ,007-,5 N  
Tested fractional 
contacts 




,1 ,05-,5 YES 
 
Higher fraction of contacts leads to higher overall 
infections 
Maximum test rate SI ,45 ,25-,85 YES Higher first peak, however not much difference at the 
second peak 
Maximum test rate 
CCI 
,85 ,6-1 N This is however a “bold” insensitivity – patients in Critical 
Care, tested or not, are reducing their contacts to a very 
large degree (they are directly assumed to be positive & 
enter quarantine).  
Maximum test rate 
HI 
,65 ,35-,9 N The same point as above holds here as well. However, we 
do see some further sensitivity in this parameter when 
Contact Tracing is activated. In this case, the more we test, 
the more contacts we can trace & isolate & thus New 
Infections are reduced. By deactivating Contact Tracing, 
this parameter is largely insensitive 
 
Behavioural Module 
Variable Value Range Sensitive Comments? 
Governmental Response     
Time to perceive changes in 
trend 
14 7-21 N  
Averaging time for perception 
of trend 
14 7-21 N  
Delay in Efficacy 
communication 
relative to Threat 
comminication 
4 0,5-7 YES  
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time to get and report test results 3 1-7 N  
Population Perceptions of Top-Down Message and Observations 
Time to perceive reported cases 2 1-7 N  
Time to report and perceive 
deaths and hospitalisations 
3 1-7 N  
time to discount a case facing 
severe consequences 
7 3,5-21 YES 
 
Only at lower region: from 7 days up no 
difference 
time to perceive Top Down 
message 
2 1-7 VL  
Bottom-Up Structure     
Avg people reached by one news 
article 
125 60-250 N  
fraction of connections that 
interact with shared information 
,2 ,1-,4 YES Effect of changes most significant in the 
response of the initial wave (higher 
interactions lead to faster response) 
Avg connections information is 
shared with 
125 60-250 YES As above. 
probability of sharing 
information per person 
,15 ,05-,4 YES As above 
Max fraction of Aware that can 
become Active 
,9 ,5-1 N  
normal information infection 
duration 
7 3,5-14 VL  
normal information fatigue 
duration 
14 7-31 N  
fraction of TopDown Threat 
Related message replicated in 
BottomUp Communications 
,5 ,25-,85 N  
fraction of TopDown Efficacy 
Related message replicated in 
BottomUp Communications 
,5 ,25-,85 N  
Time to communicate own 
Appraisals 
7 3,5-14 N  
Threat Appraisals     
Contribution of Observations in 
Threat Assessments 
,5 ,25 - ,8 L (higher values lead to more delayed 
response & faster “return to normal”) 
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relative contribution bottom up 
msg in Threat Assessments 
,4 ,2-,8 N  
Weight on severity for Threat 
Appraisal 
,5 ,25-,75 L Higher values sustain Protection Motivation 
longer but, at second wave, higher values 
lead to slower response 






Slower and Lower Protection Motivation 
resulting in slower and lower behavioural 
responses (and thus higher Infected fraction 
of the population)  
time to discount Threat 
Appraisal 
31 14-62 (VL)  
Efficacy Appraisal     
Contribution of Observations in 
Efficacy Assessments 
,5 ,25 - ,8 N (VVL)  
relative contribution bottom up 
msg in Efficacy Assessment 
,4 ,2-,8 N  






Slower and Lower Protection Motivation 
resulting in slower and lower behavioural 
responses (and thus higher Infected fraction 
of the population)  
time to discount Efficacy 
Appraisal 
42 21-84 Y 
 
(only at lowest region) 
time to perceive avg 
prophylactic 
response of the population 
7 3,5-14 N  
Protection Motivation & 
relationship with Costs 
    
relative contribution of Threat 
Appraisal on Protection 
Motivation 
,6 ,3-,8 YES Slower response and, more importantly, 
faster recovery. 
effect of relative Efficacy levels 
on Protection Motivation 
table More and 
Less steep 
YES  
effect of the difference between 
Protection Motivation & Costs 
on mobility reduction 




Effect of difference between 
Protection Motivation & Costs 
on level of adoption of 
hygienic behaviour 
table More and 
Less steep 
YES  
Costs     
weight of livelihood costs ,6 ,3-,8 YES Faster response since those costs are 
hypothesised to decrease fast – effect is 
diminished for subsequent waves as costs 
remain at average – average to low levels 
weight of ease of engagement 
with other hygienic behaviour 
,6 ,3-,8 YES As above, however here effect not 
diminished over time since ease of 
engagement with other hygiene behaviour 
is assumed to remain high 
Relative weight of fatigue ,6 ,3-,8 YES Higher relative weight of fatigue increases 
intensity of mobility reduction and other 
hygienic measures but, as fatigue “sets in”, 
higher weight leads to lower engagement 
(the sensitivity is amplified because of the 
effects of imitation)  
costs due to fatigue from social 
isolation 
table Linear and 
slower 
YES Higher costs lead to lower adoption of the 
behaviour 
costs due to fatigue from 
hygienic behaviour 
table faster and 
Linear 
YES Higher costs lead to lower adoption of the 
behaviour 
Time to perceive behaviour of 
others 
7 3,5-14 N (VVL)  
time to perceive changes in 
livelihood costs 
3 1-7 L  
time to perceive changes in ease 
of other hygienic behaviour 
3 1-7 N  
time to update perception of 
recent hygienic behaviour 
intensity 
30 14-60 N  
time to update perception of 
recent distancing intensity 
30 14-60 N  
expected average prophylactic 
response of the population 
table linear YES  
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Behavioural_Model.Actively_Aware(t) = Actively_Aware(t - dt) + (becoming_actively_aware_1 + 
becoming_actively_aware_after_recovery - rate_of_fatigue) * dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Actively_Aware = 0 
    UNITS: Persons 
    DOCUMENT: The population that is Aware and Active. Aims to represent people that actively interact with 
and disseminate information and opinions about the virus. This stock increases as people become actively 
aware and dicreases through a recovering rate as novelty of the situation is lost and people get tired of actively 
interacting with information.  
    INFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.becoming_actively_aware_1 = 
(Aware*Max_fraction_of_Aware_that_can_become_Active)*effect_of_Susceptibility_Assessment_on_fracti
on_becoming_actively_aware 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: the rate at which people become actively aware. The people that can become Actively 
Aware are the product of those who are Aware and the maximum possible daily fraction of people becoming 
Actively Aware. The movement of this population is then controlled by the effect of the Risk Perception on 
their movement to Active Aware state 
        Behavioural_Model.becoming_actively_aware_after_recovery = 
(Recovered*Max_fraction_of_Aware_that_can_become_Active)* 
effect_of_Susceptibility_Assessment_on_fraction_becoming_actively_aware_reinfection 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which people become actively aware after having been in the second stage 
of awareness. The people that can become Actively Aware are the product of those who are Aware at Stage 2 
and the maximum possible daily fraction of people becoming Actively Aware. The movement of this 
population is then controlled by the effect of the Risk Perception on their movement to Active Aware state 
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    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.rate_of_fatigue = Actively_Aware/Information_Infection_Duration 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of recovering from the stage of Active Awareness. People are expected to lose 
interest over some time or simply get tired of interacting with information. The rate is controlled by the number 
of people who are Actively Aware and the information infection duration 
Behavioural_Model.avg_connections_information_is_shared_with = 125 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: The average number of connections one person shares the information with. It is assumed to 
be 125 people per person that view the shared information (without considering here whether they interact with 
it or not) 
Behavioural_Model.avg_people_reached_by_one_news_article = 125 
    UNITS: people/mentions 
    DOCUMENT: The average number of people that can be reached by one mention of COVID-19 by media. 
Assumed to be 125 people 
Behavioural_Model.Aware(t) = Aware(t - dt) + (Information_infection_rate - becoming_actively_aware_1) * 
dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Aware = 0 
    UNITS: Persons 
    DOCUMENT: The people who are Aware of COVID-19. It represents people who have received and 
interacted with information about the virus, without consideration of what their opinions are about it.  
    INFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.Information_infection_rate = MAX(0; Fraction_Unaware_1* 
(Initial_Information_rate_through_media+ (rate_of_interaction_with_shared_information*(1-
overlap_in_sharing_1)))) 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which individuals become "infected" with information regarding COVID-
19. Both the initial information rate through media & the information from active sharing by the population 
contribute so that the fraction of population that remains unaware becomes "infected" with information. As the 
same people can be reached by both information mechanisms, an overlap in sharing is utilised to account for 
people that are exposed to both (formulation described in Jalali, Ashouri, Herrera-Restrepo, & Zhang, 2016). 
A MAX function is used to ensure that this flow cannot go negative (Aware people cannot return back to an 
"Unaware" state) 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.becoming_actively_aware_1 = 
(Aware*Max_fraction_of_Aware_that_can_become_Active)*effect_of_Susceptibility_Assessment_on_fracti
on_becoming_actively_aware 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: the rate at which people become actively aware. The people that can become Actively 
Aware are the product of those who are Aware and the maximum possible daily fraction of people becoming 
Actively Aware. The movement of this population is then controlled by the effect of the Risk Perception on 
their movement to Active Aware state 
Behavioural_Model."COVID-19_mentions_in_local_news_sources" = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(145): (0,0, 1), (1,0, 0), (2,0, 0), (3,0, 0), (4,0, 0), (5,0, 0), ... 
    UNITS: mentions 




Points(11): (0,000, 1,01338570185), (0,100, 1,03597241992), (0,200, 1,09485174636), (0,300, 
1,23840584404), (0,400, 1,53788284274), (0,500, 2,000), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The effect that the Perceived Severity has on how long an average individual will remain 
actively aware. At very low levels of Severity, this effect is assumed to be 1 so the individual "recovers" at the 
normal time. At higher levels of Perceived Severity, a person is assumed to recover at slower rates (a duration 
that increases above the normal value) as the information is more engaging or perceived as more significant. 
The maximum possible effect expected at the highest levels of Perceived Severity is 3 times the normal 
infection duration: even if the Severity is very high, people will still become fatigued and will start avoiding 
information albeit at a slower rate 
Behavioural_Model.effect_of_Susceptibility_Assessment_on_fraction_becoming_actively_aware = 
GRAPH(Susceptibility_Assessment) 
Points(11): (0,000, 0,0000), (0,100, 0,395317488847), (0,200, 0,617542228657), (0,300, 0,742464187276), 
(0,400, 0,812688122554), (0,500, 0,852163977242), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The effect of the Susceptibility Assessment on peoples' movement to an Active Awareness 
state. The effect is expected to be non-linear and increasing more steeply in the lower regions and saturate in 
the higher regions. At low levels of perceived Susceptibility to the virus, very few people become Active Aware 
but as the Susceptibility Assessment increases, it leads to higher increases in the fraction of people that are 
expected to move to the next stage. The upper bounds of the distribution are lower than 1 to capture that, even 
if the Susceptibility Assessment is at the highest possible level, a small fraction of the population will still resist 
the information. 
Behavioural_Model.effect_of_Susceptibility_Assessment_on_fraction_becoming_actively_aware_reinfectio
n = GRAPH(Susceptibility_Assessment) 
Points(11): (0,000, 0,0000), (0,100, 0,0000), (0,200, 0,0096), (0,300, 0,0574), (0,400, 0,1676), (0,500, 0,3351), 
... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
 115 
    DOCUMENT: The effect of the Susceptibility Assessment on peoples' movement to an Active Awareness 
state. This effect is non-linear and represented by an S-Shaped curve. At low levels of perceived Susceptibility 
to the virus, very few people become Active Aware but as the Susceptibility Assessment increases, a higher 
fraction is expected to move. The upper bounds of the distribution are lower than 1 to capture that, even if the 
Susceptibility Assessment is at the highest possible level, a small fraction of the population will still resist the 
information. Compared to the similar effect of Susceptibility Assessment on fraction becoming actively aware, 
here, we hypothesise that population that has been in the past Active Aware and has Recovered is has a higher 
threshold or becoming again Active and is more "slow" to reinfection at the lower ranges or Susceptibility 
Assessment 
Behavioural_Model.Fatigued(t) = Fatigued(t - dt) + (rate_of_fatigue - becoming_aware_stage_3) * dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Fatigued = 0 
    UNITS: Persons 
    DOCUMENT: The people that experience Information Fatigue after having been Actively Aware. These 
people are still expected to somewhat interact and share information but at a much lower rate at this stage. 
People are expected to recover from this information fatigueness after some time and become again Aware but 
on the "second stage" of awareness 
    INFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.rate_of_fatigue = Actively_Aware/Information_Infection_Duration 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of recovering from the stage of Active Awareness. People are expected to lose 
interest over some time or simply get tired of interacting with information. The rate is controlled by the number 
of people who are Actively Aware and the information infection duration 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.becoming_aware_stage_3 = Fatigued/normal_information_fatigue_duration 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: the rate at which people that have been fatigued from information return to a second 
stage of awareness. Given by the number of fatigued people over a duration of "immunity", the average time 
that they will remain fatigued. 
Behavioural_Model.fraction_of_connections_that_interact_with_shared_information = ,2 
    UNITS: dmnl/day 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of connections or people exposed to a media circulated mention that actually 
engage with the presented information. It is assumed to be 20%.  
Behavioural_Model.Fraction_Unaware_1 = Unaware/(NORWAY_Population) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Fraction of initial population remaining susceptible to information acquisition. 
Behavioural_Model.information_dissemination_weight_of_Active_Aware = ,8 
    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: The weight, or contribution, that an Active Aware person has on information dissemination. 
Active Aware individuals are the main content creators and distributors with an assumed 80% contribution in 
content. 
Behavioural_Model.information_dissemination_weight_of_Aware = ,05 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight, or contribution, that an Aware person has on information dissemination. Aware 
people are not considered to create and share much content but mainly see the information and only very 
occasionally contribute themselves. This contribution is assumed here to be 5%. 
    ++++ 
Behavioural_Model.information_dissemination_weight_of_Fatigued = ,05 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight, or contribution, that an information Fatigued person has on information 
dissemination. Fatigued people are not considered to create and share much content. We hypothesise that their 
contribution is the same as that of the Aware at a 5%. 
Behavioural_Model.information_dissemination_weight_of_Recovered = ,1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight, or contribution, that a person in the second stage of being Active Aware has on 
information dissemination. An average Recovered individual is expected to contribute somewhat to 




    UNITS: Days 
    DOCUMENT: Duration of information infection. This duration is not considered fixed but the normal 




    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The rate at which individuals receive information due to mass media communications. It is 
the product of the actual mentions in local news sources, the number of people that can be reached per mention, 
and the fraction of those people that are assumed to actually interact with this information. 
Behavioural_Model.Max_fraction_of_Aware_that_can_become_Active = ,9 
    UNITS: Per Day 
    DOCUMENT: the maximum fraction of people who are aware that can become actively aware per day. We 
exclude a 10% of the Aware population to capture people who are either resistant of cannot access the 
information. 
Behavioural_Model.normal_information_fatigue_duration = 31 
    UNITS: days 
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    DOCUMENT: The normal duration of fatigue is assumed to be 1 month. After this average period, 
individuals can recover from the "information overload". 
Behavioural_Model.normal_information_infection_duration = 7 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The normal duration of infection by an information before a person becomes fatigued. It is 
assumed to be one week.  
Behavioural_Model.NORWAY_Population = 5367580 
    UNITS: Persons 
    DOCUMENT: As of February 27th 2020. Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB) 
https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/folkemengde 
Behavioural_Model.overlap_in_sharing_1 = ,5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.probability_of_sharing_information_per_person = ,15 
    UNITS: dmnl/person 





    UNITS: Persons/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The rate of peoples' interactions with shared information. The product of the total sharing 
and the average connections shared with gives us the "spread" of the information: how many people it can 
potentially reach. This number is adjusted by the fraction of connections that interact with information to give 
us the actual number of people per day that have access to and interact with the information.  
Behavioural_Model.rate_of_interaction_with_shared_information_reference_time = 6360000*0 + 7450000*1 
+ 6850000*0 
    UNITS: Persons/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The rate of peoples' interactions with shared information at the reference time. The value has 
been determined from the partial model testing of the behavioural model (that is, based on the behaviour of the 
model when infection-related data are used).  
Behavioural_Model.Recovered(t) = Recovered(t - dt) + (becoming_aware_stage_3 - 
becoming_actively_aware_after_recovery) * dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: Persons 
    DOCUMENT: The people who are Aware of COVID-19 but have been previously Actively Aware. It 
represents people who have gone through a stage of Active "alertness", have "taken a break", and are now again 
aware of the situation. Those people can again become once again Active Aware from this stage. 
    INFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.becoming_aware_stage_3 = Fatigued/normal_information_fatigue_duration 
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            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: the rate at which people that have been fatigued from information return to a second 
stage of awareness. Given by the number of fatigued people over a duration of "immunity", the average time 
that they will remain fatigued. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.becoming_actively_aware_after_recovery = 
(Recovered*Max_fraction_of_Aware_that_can_become_Active)* 
effect_of_Susceptibility_Assessment_on_fraction_becoming_actively_aware_reinfection 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which people become actively aware after having been in the second stage 
of awareness. The people that can become Actively Aware are the product of those who are Aware at Stage 2 
and the maximum possible daily fraction of people becoming Actively Aware. The movement of this 
population is then controlled by the effect of the Risk Perception on their movement to Active Aware state 
Behavioural_Model.relative_to_time_of_survey_rate_of_interaction_with_shared_information = 
rate_of_interaction_with_shared_information/rate_of_interaction_with_shared_information_reference_time 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The, relative to the reference time, rate of interaction with shared information via the Bottom 
Up mechanism is given as the ratio of the current rate of interaction over the rate of interaction at the reference 
time. 
Behavioural_Model.total_sharing_1 = Weighted_Aware*probability_of_sharing_information_per_person 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Total expected sharing behaviour of the aware population. Given by the weighted population 
and the average probability per person to create or share information.  
Behavioural_Model.Unaware(t) = Unaware(t - dt) + ( - Information_infection_rate) * dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Unaware = NORWAY_Population 
    UNITS: Persons 
    DOCUMENT: Population that is unaware of COVID-19 and thus Susceptible to receive relevant 
information. It decreases as indicviduals become aware of the virus (or "infected" with information).  
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.Information_infection_rate = MAX(0; Fraction_Unaware_1* 
(Initial_Information_rate_through_media+ (rate_of_interaction_with_shared_information*(1-
overlap_in_sharing_1)))) 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which individuals become "infected" with information regarding COVID-
19. Both the initial information rate through media & the information from active sharing by the population 
contribute so that the fraction of population that remains unaware becomes "infected" with information. As the 
same people can be reached by both information mechanisms, an overlap in sharing is utilised to account for 
people that are exposed to both (formulation described in Jalali, Ashouri, Herrera-Restrepo, & Zhang, 2016). 
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A MAX function is used to ensure that this flow cannot go negative (Aware people cannot return back to an 
"Unaware" state) 




    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: The number of people who are aware of COVID-19, weighted according to their expected 








    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The average assessment of the efficacy of the proposed measures at the reference time 
captures peoples' evaluations of how much the proposed measures would reduce the risk of infection. It is given 




    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Optimism bias is “the belief that bad things are less likely to befall oneself than others” (van 
Bavel et al., 2020, p. 461) that can make people underestimate the probability of a negative outcome such as 
becoming infected for themselves (Sharot, 2011). Optimism bias has been reported in the COVID-19 response 
in both USA (Wise, Zbozinek, Michelini, Hagan, & Mobbs, 2020) and Norway (Sætrevik, 2020). We use the 
average relative difference in risk and efficacy cognitions for others and for the self to get an estimate of the 
average magnitude of the optimism bias.  
Behavioural_Model.average_Severity_Assessment_time_of_survey = 
(severity_OTHERS_time_of_Survey+avg_severity_of_consequences_of_infection_SELF_reference)/2 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The average Severity assessment at the reference time represents the severity of 
consequences if one gets infected with COVID-19. It is given as the average severity perception for the self 
and that for others, as captured during the reference time. 
Behavioural_Model.average_Susceptibility_Assessment_reference_time = 
(avg_risk_of_infection_SELF_reference+avg_risk_of_infection_OTHERS_reference)/2 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: The average Susceptibility assessment at the reference time, representing the assessment of 
the risk of contracting COVID-19, is given as the average risk of infection for the self and that for others, as 
captured during the reference time. 
Behavioural_Model.average_Threat_Appraisal_reference_time = 
(avg_worry_of_getting_infected_SELF_reference+avg_worry_of_family_getting_infected_reference)/2 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The average reported "worry" that oneself or one's family member will contract COVID-19 
is considered as a proxy for the individual's Threat Appraisal; their perception of how threatening the virus is 










    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution of the Bottom-Up message to Severity Perceptions at the reference time is 
the product of the value of the Severity Assessment at the reference time and the relative contribution of 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution of the Bottom-Up message to Susceptibility Perceptions at the reference 
time is the product of the value of the Susceptibility Assessment at the reference time and the relative 




    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.cases_contribution_Severity_reference_time = 
Contribution_of_Observations_on_Threat_Appraisals*average_Severity_Assessment_time_of_survey 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution of information about the actual number of severe cases to Severity 
Perceptions at the reference time is the product of the value of the Severity Assessment at the reference time 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution of information about the actual number of cases to Susceptibility 
Perceptions at the reference time is the product of the value of the Susceptibility Assessment at the reference 
time and the relative contribution of Actual cases on Threat-Related Assessments 
Behavioural_Model.Contribution_of_Bottom_Up_message_on_Efficacy_Appraisals = (1-
Contribution_of_Observations_on_Efficacy_Appraisals)*relative_contribution_bottom_up_msg_in_Efficacy
_Appraisals  {well..  a) some proportion of msgs are misinformation or in oposite direction b) again, some 
relative value?} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The degree to which peoples' Efficacy assessments are influenced by Bottom-Up messages. 
It is given as the product of the inverse of the contribution of observations and the relative contribution of the 
bottom-up message. The relationship between those weight variables is multiplicative as whatever fraction 
remains from the contribution of observations is split between top-and bottom-up message and the bottom-up 
message receives a fraction of this remainder equal to its relative contribution.  
Behavioural_Model.Contribution_of_Bottom_Up_message_on_Threat_Appraisals = (1-
Contribution_of_Observations_on_Threat_Appraisals)*relative_contribution_bottom_up_msg_in_Threat_Ap
praisals  {well..  a) some proportion of msgs are misinformation or in oposite direction b) again, some relative 
value?} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The degree to which peoples' Threat-Related perceptions are influenced by Bottom-Up 
messages. It is given as the inverse of the contribution of actual cases and the relative contribution of the 
bottom-up message. The relationship between those weight variables is multiplicative as whatever fraction 
remains from the contribution of the actual cases is split between top-and bottom-up message and the bottom-
up message receives a fraction of this remainder equal to its relative contribution.  
Behavioural_Model.Contribution_of_Observations_on_Efficacy_Appraisals = ,5 {Not sure if this should be 
constant here - perhaps more focus on projections at some stages} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution, or weight that observations related to the efficacy of the response have to 
an individual's Efficacy Appraisal (their perception of the overall efficiency of the proposed response to 
mitigate the risk). It is hypothesised to be 40%, somewhat lower than the similar mechanism for the case of 
Threat-Related Assessment (see variable "Contribution of ACTUAL CASES on Threat-Related 
Assessments"). While observations are important, we generally expect that people might not perceive 
themselves as knowledgeable enough to rely as heavily on their own perceptions of the response's efficacy but, 
rather, would place more weight on information dissemination from Top-Down, as well as Bottom-Up 
mechanisms.  
Behavioural_Model.Contribution_of_Observations_on_Threat_Appraisals = ,5  {Not sure if this should be 
constant here - perhaps more focus on projections at some stages} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: The contribution, or weight of the Actual cases to the Threat-Related assessments is 
hypothesised to be rather high, taking 50% - Practically, this means that 50% of peoples' Threat-Related 
assessments are influenced by information regarding the actual cases.  
Behavioural_Model.Contribution_of_Top_Down_message_on_Efficacy_Appraisals = (1-
Contribution_of_Observations_on_Efficacy_Appraisals)*(1-
relative_contribution_bottom_up_msg_in_Efficacy_Appraisals) {SOME connection here with trust in 
government I would imagine} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The degree to which peoples' Efficacy assessments are influenced by Top-Down messages. 
The fractional contribution of the Top-Down message is given as the inverse of the contribution of actual 
observations and that of the relative contribution of the bottom-up message. The relationship between those 
weight variables is multiplicative as whatever fraction remains from the contribution of observations is split 
between top-and bottom-up message and the top-down message receives the inverse fraction (whatever 
"remains") of that of the bottom-up message. 
Behavioural_Model.Contribution_of_Top_Down_message_on_Threat_Appraisals = (1-
Contribution_of_Observations_on_Threat_Appraisals)*(1-
relative_contribution_bottom_up_msg_in_Threat_Appraisals) {SOME connection here with trust in 
government I would imagine} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The degree to which peoples' Threat-related assessments are influenced by Top-Down 
messages. The fractional contribution of the Top-Down message is given as the inverse of the contribution of 
actual cases and that of the relative contribution of the bottom-up message. The relationship between those 
weight variables is multiplicative as whatever fraction remains from the contribution of the actual cases is split 
between top-and bottom-up message and the top-down message receives the inverse fraction (whatever 
"remains") of that of the bottom-up message. 
Behavioural_Model.max_multiplier_Efficacy_Related_Assessments = 
Contribution_of_Observations_on_Efficacy_Appraisals/cases_contribution_EFFICACY_reference_time 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This variable represents a calculation of the maximum possible multiplier for Efficacy 
assessment. Its use is to help us determine the maximum effects of the different contributors to Efficacy 
Appraisals to ensure robustness of the model.   
Behavioural_Model.max_multiplier_Threat_Related_Assessments = 
Contribution_of_Observations_on_Threat_Appraisals/cases_contribution_Severity_reference_time 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This variable represents a calculation of the maximum possible multiplier for Threat-Related 
assessment. Its use is to help us determine the maximum effects of the different contributors to the Threat 





    UNITS: Dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.optimism_bias_for_risk_survey_data = 
avg_risk_of_infection_OTHERS_reference/avg_risk_of_infection_SELF_reference 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: For a definition of "optimism bias", see the documentation of the variable "average optimism 
bias". This variable calculates the relative magnitute of the perceived probability that an average person would 
get infected relative to that of oneself getting infected. 
Behavioural_Model.optimism_bias_for_worry_survey_data = 
avg_worry_of_family_getting_infected_reference/avg_worry_of_getting_infected_SELF_reference 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: For a definition of "optimism bias", see the documentation of the variable "average optimism 
bias". This variable calculates the relative magnitute of the perceived worry that a family member will contract 
the disease relative to that for the self. 
Behavioural_Model.relative_contribution_bottom_up_msg_in_Efficacy_Appraisals = ,4 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This parameter represents the fractional weight, the fractional significance of the bottom-up 
message relative to the top-down message. Is is hypothesised that the bottom-up message has 40% of 
contribution (thus leaving the remaining 60% to the top-down message).  
Behavioural_Model.relative_contribution_bottom_up_msg_in_Threat_Appraisals = ,4 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This parameter represents the fractional weight, the fractional significance of the bottom-up 
message relative to the top-down message. Is is hypothesised that the bottom-up message has 40% of 
contribution (thus leaving the remaining 60% to the top-down message).  
Behavioural_Model.severity_OTHERS_time_of_Survey = 
average_optimism_bias*avg_severity_of_consequences_of_infection_SELF_reference 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: There are no explicit data for perceptions of how severe the consequences of infection would 
be for an average person in the datareported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020).  We 
multiply the average optimism bias with the perceptions of how severe the consequences of COVID-19 would 









    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: The contribution of the Top-Down message to Severity Perceptions at the reference time is 
the product of the value of the Severity Assessment at the reference time and the relative contribution of Top-





    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution of the Top-Down message to Susceptibility Perceptions at the reference 
time is the product of the value of the Susceptibility Assessment at the reference time and the relative 
contribution of Top-Down messages on Threat-Related Assessments 
Behavioural_Model.weight_on_severity_for_threat_Appraisal = ,5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Severity and Risk might not contribute equally to the assessment of the Threat. Without 









Behavioural_Model."10th_case" = IF Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests > 9,5 AND 
Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests < 10,5 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: day 
Behavioural_Model."10th_death" = IF Main_Infection_Model.ALL_DEAD > 9,5 AND 
Main_Infection_Model.ALL_DEAD <10,5 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: day 
Behavioural_Model."1st_case" = IF Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests > 0,7 AND 
Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests < 1,3 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: day 
Behavioural_Model."1st_Death" = IF Main_Infection_Model.ALL_DEAD > 0,7 AND 
Main_Infection_Model.ALL_DEAD < 1,3 THEN 1 ELSE 0 








Delay_in_Efficacy_communication_relative_to_Threat_comminication; 0)   {IF Converter_198> 0 THEN 
MIN(1; SMTH1(Converter_198; delay_in_efficacy_communication_relative_to_that_of_risk_2; 0)) ELSE 0} 
{DELAY CONVERTER} 
    INIT Behavioural_Model."Actual_SharedTotal_Top-Down_Efficacy_Related_communication_message" 
= 0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.ADDITIONAL_TOP_DOWN_EFFICACY_COMMUNICATION_SWITCH = 1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This is a Switch that activates a mechanism of additional (or more "sensitive") decision 
mechanism for the communication of efficacy. This mechanism is ON, when the Switch takes the value of 1 
and OFF at the value of 0 
Behavioural_Model.ADDITIONAL_TOP_DOWN_THREAT_COMMUNICATION_SWITCH = 1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This is a Switch that activates a mechanism of additional (or more "sensitive") decision 
mechanism for the communication of Threat-Related information. This mechanism is ON, when the Switch 
takes the value of 1 and OFF at the value of 0 
Behavioural_Model.averaging_time_for_perception_of_trend = 14 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The averaging time during which the government looks at the development of new cases in 
order to establish the pattern, or trend, of growth in the new cases. It is assumed to be 7 days 
Behavioural_Model.DATA_New_Reported_Cases_per_10000_SUSC_Time_of_Survey = ,475*0 + ,453 
    UNITS: People/ten thousand people/Day 
    DOCUMENT: Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI (2020) 
Behavioural_Model.Delay_in_Efficacy_communication_relative_to_Threat_comminication = 4 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The government might strive to provide information of Risk and Efficacy at the same 
time/message, or there might be some delay between the two types of messages (represented here simply as an 
information delay). The strength of the Efficacy message is controlled by the Risk Message & its relative 
increase.  
    +++++ 
Behavioural_Model.effect_of_new_cases_on_governments_communication_message_magnitude = 
GRAPH(Reported_New_cases_relative_to_reference_time) 
Points(13): (0,000, 0,000), (0,250, 0,303), (0,500, 0,582), (0,750, 0,814), (1,000, 1,000), (1,250, 1,157), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The effect of the, relative to the reference time, new cases on the government's 
communication message magnitude. This can be considered as representing a "risk perception" that emerges 
from the number of new cases. This effect ranges from 0 to 1,55. 0 indicates no communication due to New 
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Cases and 1,55 is the maximum value this effect can take. The effect is expected to be non-linear and can be 
read as: If the new daily cases are 0, government's will not communicate any message (value of 0), while if the 
new cases are 3 times as many as they were over the reference period, the communication is assumed to take 
its maximum value of 1,55. The shape of the effect indicates that small increases in the number of new cases 
when those are relative low elicit a larger increase in communication. At higher values of new cases relative to 
the reference period value, the effect saturates: small changes do not increase the communication decision as 
much as in the "lower" region. The steepness of the "lower" region we believe is justified due to an already 
alerted government, expected to be ready to update their communication steeply due to observations. 
Behavioural_Model.effect_of_perceived_trend_of_new_cases_growth_on_Top_Down_communication_mes
sage = GRAPH(Perceived_by_government_trend_of_growth_of_new_cases) 
Points(11): (0,000, 0,000), (0,200, 0,419282164307), (0,400, 0,762561366441), (0,600, 1,04361460612), 
(0,800, 1,2737215367), (1,000, 1,46211715726), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The Perceived growth in new cases impacts government's decision regarding how strong of 
a communication message on Threat and/or Efficacy they are to share with the population. This shape of this 
effect describes a steep increase at increases in the perceived tend of new cases growth and a saturation at 
higher levels.  
Behavioural_Model.intensity_of_Efficacy_Related_communication = 1,15 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The intensity of Efficacy-Related communication is a parameter to facilitate testing of 
different policies. In the case of Efficacy communication, our baseline assumption is that governmental agents 
already place more focus on efficacy communication in their public message (30% more than in Threat-Related 
communication). A value of 1 would represent equal focus to Threat- and Efficacy-Related messages 
Behavioural_Model.intensity_of_Threat_Related_communication = 1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The intensity of Threat-Related communication is a parameter to facilitate testing of different 
policies. When this parameter has a value of 1, the system operates under the baseline assumptions. Lower or 
higher values of this parameter aim to represent lower or higher intensity of Threat-Related communication 
respectively  
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_by_government_trend_of_growth_of_new_cases = SMTH1(MIN(1; 
TREND(Reported_New_Cases_2; averaging_time_for_perception_of_trend)); 
time_to_perceive_changes_in_trend) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: Per Day 
    DOCUMENT: The Perceived growth in new cases by governmental authorities. It is described as a 




    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: The number of new cases that have been tested and reported to the government per 10000 
susceptible are compared here to the number of such cases at the reference period, as given by data from the  
Behavioural_Model.time_to_perceive_changes_in_trend = 14 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time for the government to update their perceptions regarding an observed growth in 




    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The Top-Down Efficacy-Related communication message represents efforts of authorities to 
explicitly address the population through communication messages aiming to raise awareness (e.g. press 
conferences, pubic addresses, etc.). The Efficacy-Related communication message emphasises what can be 
done to successfully mitigate the threat posed by COVID-19 and can contain both information about the 
efficiency of the proposed responses and "emotional" messages aiming to raise the population's perception that 
"we can fight it". To endogenise this message, we have grounded it on the, perceived by the government, 
confirmed COVID-19 cases. The contribution of the new cases on government's communication is here 
modified by a parameter that can allow easier testing of governmental decision rules regarding communication 
of Efficacy-Related messages. The product of the two gives the government's decision on the magnitude of 
their Efficacy-Related communication message. The value of this parameter is given relative to the reference 
time. 
Behavioural_Model.Top_Down_Threat_Related_communication_message_due_to_new_cases =  
effect_of_new_cases_on_governments_communication_message_magnitude*intensity_of_Threat_Related_c
ommunication 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The Top-Down Threat-Related communication message represents efforts of authorities to 
explicitly address the population through communication messages aiming to raise awareness (e.g. press 
conferences, pubic addresses, etc.). The Threat-Related communication message is that which emphasises how 
threatening (or "serious") COVID-19 is for peoples' wellbeing. To endogenise this message, we have grounded 
it on the, perceived by the government, confirmed COVID-19 cases. The contribution of the new cases on 
government's communication is here modified by a parameter that can allow easier testing of governmental 
decision rules regarding communication of Threat-Related messages. The product of the two gives the 
government's decision on the magnitude of their Threat-Related communication message. The value of this 






mmunication_message_due_to_new_cases  {ADDITIONAL_TOPDOWN_COM_SWITCH* 
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MAX(TD_message_contribution_of_New_Cases_OMIT; trend_of_growth_of_new_cases*WHATEVER) + 
(1-ADDITIONAL_TOPDOWN_COM_SWITCH)*TD_message_contribution_of_New_Cases_OMIT 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This variable aims to utilise an additional mechanism for the government's decision for 
sharing a Threat-Related communication message. The formulation allows this variable to take a value equal 
to: (MAX(Top_Down_Threat_Related_communication_message_due_to_new_cases; 
effect_of_perceived_trend_of_new_cases_growth_on_Top_Down_communication_message)) when the 
Additional Top Down Communication SWITCH is ON (=1). In this case, the Total Threat-Related 
communication message will be equal to whichever value is higher (MAX function): that of the Top Down 
Threat Related communication message due to new cases, or that of the  effect of perceived trend of new cases 
growth on Top Down communication message. If the SWITCH is OFF (=0) then the total message will be 






_communication_message_due_to_new_cases  {ADDITIONAL_TOPDOWN_COM_SWITCH* 
MAX(TD_message_contribution_of_New_Cases_OMIT; trend_of_growth_of_new_cases*WHATEVER) + 
(1-ADDITIONAL_TOPDOWN_COM_SWITCH)*TD_message_contribution_of_New_Cases_OMIT 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This variable aims to utilise an additional mechanism for the government's decision for 
sharing an Efficacy-Related communication message. The formulation allows this variable to take a value equal 
to ((MAX(Top_Down_Efficacy_Related_communication_message_due_to_new_cases; 
effect_of_perceived_trend_of_new_cases_growth_on_Top_Down_communication_message)) when the 
Additional Top Down Efficacy Communication SWITCH is ON (=1). In this case, the Total Efficacy-Related 
communication message will be equal to whichever value is higher (MAX function): that of the Top Down 
Efficacy Related communication message due to new cases, or that of the effect of perceived trend of new 
cases growth on Top Down communication message. If the SWITCH is OFF (=0) then the total message will 








    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The Susceptible population according to the data is given as the total population of Norway 









    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: We assume a quite rough average of all the mobility indicators. 
Behavioural_Model.DATA_overall_mobility_fractional_decrease_IHME = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(112): (41,0, 0,0), (42,0, -1,0), (43,0, -1,0), (44,0, -2,0), (45,0, -2,0), (46,0, -3,0), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Data on the fraction decrease of the population's mobility from COVID-19 Projections: 
Social Distancing (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), 2020) 
Behavioural_Model.DATA_overall_mobility_IHME = 
(DATA_overall_mobility_fractional_decrease_IHME+100)/100 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fractional decrease of mobility is here adjusted to a scale ranging from 1 to 0, where 1 
is equal to normal mobility, that is, no decrease in the population's mobility and would correspond to a value 
of 0 in the scale of the input variable (DATA overall mobility fractional decrease variable). 0 would here 
represent a mobility of 0 (-100 mobility in the input). For this transformation, we add 100 to the input variable 
to convert it from 0 to -100 to 0 to 100 and then divide by 100 to get a scale ranging from 1 to 0.  
Behavioural_Model.grocery_and_pharmacy_fractional_change = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(101): (45,0, 1,0), (46,0, 3,0), (47,0, 0,0), (48,0, -1,0), (49,0, 4,0), (50,0, -2,0), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Data from COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports by Google. Described as being based 
on "aggregated, anonymized sets of data from users who have turned on the Location History setting, which is 
off by default" 
    Google (2020) 
     
    https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/ 
Behavioural_Model.mobility_avg_IHME_time_of_survey = HISTORY(DATA_overall_mobility_IHME; 
average_time_of_survey) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The reduction in mobility according to data at the time of survey. The HISTORY function 
here gives the value of the input (DATA overall mobility) at the specified time (average time of survey).  
Behavioural_Model.retail_and_recreation_fractional_change = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(101): (45,0, 7,0), (46,0, -5,0), (47,0, -5,0), (48,0, -5,0), (49,0, -1,0), (50,0, -9,0), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: Data from COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports by Google. Described as being based 
on "aggregated, anonymized sets of data from users who have turned on the Location History setting, which is 
off by default" Google (2020) 
Behavioural_Model.transit_stations_fractional_change = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(101): (45,0, 7,0), (46,0, -5,0), (47,0, -5,0), (48,0, -5,0), (49,0, -1,0), (50,0, -9,0), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Data from COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports by Google. Described as being based 
on "aggregated, anonymized sets of data from users who have turned on the Location History setting, which is 
off by default" Google (2020) 
Behavioural_Model.workplaces_fractional_change = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(101): (45,0, -1,0), (46,0, -3,0), (47,0, -12,0), (48,0, -11,0), (49,0, -12,0), (50,0, -14,0), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Data from COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports by Google. Described as being based 
on "aggregated, anonymized sets of data from users who have turned on the Location History setting, which is 







Points(11): (0,000, 0,0000), (0,100, 0,00427542373191), (0,200, 0,0108807954591), (0,300, 
0,0210858507682), (0,400, 0,0368522842353), (0,500, 0,0612108415135), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Fatigue from engagement with hygienic behaviour is expected to produce some costs for the 
individual (they are expected to get tired or bored of engaging to the behaviour). This effect, for the case of 
hygienic behaviour is expected to be relatively "slow": the individual might be practicing the behaviour for 
some time and with a high intensity but continuing to do so is not expected to be equally costly. 
Behavioural_Model.costs_due_to_fatigue_from_hygienic_behaviour_1 = 
GRAPH(recent_intensity_of_adoption_of_hygienic_behaviour) 
Points(11): (0,000, 0,000), (0,100, 0,100), (0,200, 0,200), (0,300, 0,300), (0,400, 0,400), (0,500, 0,500), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Fatigue from engagement with hygienic behaviour is expected to produce some costs for the 
individual (they are expected to get tired or bored of engaging to the behaviour). This effect, for the case of 
hygienic behaviour is expected to be relatively "slow": the individual might be practicing the behaviour for 




Points(11): (0,000, 0,0000), (0,100, 0,0193054347518), (0,200, 0,0442932083614), (0,300, 
0,0766358537353), (0,400, 0,11849819514), (0,500, 0,172682248658), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.Difference_between_Protection_Motivation_and_Perceived_Costs_of_Hygienic_Behavi
our = (Protection_Motivation-Perceived_Costs_of_Hygienic_behaviour_relative_to_reference_time) 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.Ease_of_engagement_in_hygienic_behavior = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points: (0,0, 0,300), (45,0, 0,750), (55,0, 0,900), (130,0, 0,900) {GF DISCRETE} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This variable aims to describe how easy it is for an individual to engage in prophylactic 
behaviours (availability of sanitizers, masks, and even sanitation equipment in general). Over time, this easy is 
expected to increase due to governmental instructions or private business initiatives 
Behavioural_Model.Ease_of_engagement_in_hygienic_behavior_Scenario_No1 = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(8): (0,0, 0,300), (45,0, 0,750), (55,0, 0,900), (130,0, 0,900), (155,0, 0,900), (200,0, 0,750), ... {GF 
DISCRETE} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This variable is adjusted to test the policy scenario No1. It represents an ease of engagement 
that returns close to the normal levels over time. 
Behavioural_Model.level_of_adoption_of_hygienic_behaviour = 
GRAPH(Difference_between_Protection_Motivation_and_Perceived_Costs_of_Hygienic_Behaviour) 
Points(11): (-1,000, 0,000), (-0,850, 0,0265969935769), (-0,700, 0,062973356057), (-0,550, 0,1418510649), 
(-0,400, 0,289050497375), (-0,250, 0,500), ... 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The difference between Protection Motivation and costs of hygienic behaviour is expected 
to have a non-linear effect on the adoption of such behaviour.  
    At the reference time, the relationship between the two considerations is 0, hence the point 0,1 allows us to 
achieve the reference mobility reduction at the reference time. When Costs are much higher that Motivation 
(with a maximum difference of -2), the population is expected to have regular mobility. When the Motivation 
is much higher than the costs (with the maximum difference being 2), the population is expected to reach the 
minimum mobility (1/2 of that observed at the reference period). The shape is attempting to capture a risk-
aversion, as changes in the lower region (difference between Motivation and Costs lower than 0) lead to more 
steep responses than changes at the higher region (Motivation and Costs higher than 0) 
Behavioural_Model.maximum_effect_of_hygiene_on_risk_reduction = ,13 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The maximum possible risk reduction due to adoption of hygiene measures. It is hypothesised 




behavior) +(weight_of_social_costs_for_hygienic_behaviour*Social_Costs_of_hygienic_behaviour))) + 
weight_of_fatigue_from_hygienic_behaviour*costs_due_to_fatigue_from_hygienic_behaviour 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The costs of prophylactic behaviour come from three sources, the perceived ease of engaging 
in this behaviour, a mechanism of Social Costs assosiated with practicing the behaviour (social norms based 
on the behaviour of others), and the costs due to fatigue from practicing the behaviour. Each of those 
mechanisms is multiplied by their associated weight to give its total contribution to the overall costs of hygienic 
behaviour. 
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_costs_of_hygienic_behaviour_at_reference_time = ,41 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The Perceived costs of hygienic behaviour at the reference time are estimated from running 
the behavioural model with data (partial model testing) 
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Costs_of_Hygienic_behaviour_relative_to_reference_time = 
Perceived_Costs_of_HYGIENIC_BEHAVIOUR/Perceived_costs_of_hygienic_behaviour_at_reference_time 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Ease_of_engagement_in_hygienic_behavior = 
SMTH1(Ease_of_engagement_in_hygienic_behavior; 
time_to_perceive_changes_in_ease_of_other_hygienic_behaviour) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The perception of the livelihood costs follows a first order information delay with an delay 
time of 5 days.  
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Others_adoption_of_hygienic_behaviour = 
SMTH1(level_of_adoption_of_hygienic_behaviour; time_to_perceive_behaviour_of_others; 0) {DELAY 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: dmnl 




time_to_update_perception_of_recent_hygienic_behaviour_intensity; 0) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The level of adoption of hygienic behaviour is perceived as a first order smoothing to form 
a person perception of the recent intensity of adoption of such behaviour over the time to update their perception 
Behavioural_Model.Social_Costs_of_hygienic_behaviour = 
Perceived_Others_adoption_of_hygienic_behaviour 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The mechanism of Social Costs associated with the behaviour. It aims to capture costs of not 
complying with the "norm" around the individual and is assumed to be linear and equal to the Perceived 
adoption of hygienic behaviour of the population. 
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Behavioural_Model.time_to_perceive_changes_in_ease_of_other_hygienic_behaviour = 3 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time to perceive changes in how easy it is for an individual to engage in hygienic 
behaviour. It is considered to be 3 days. 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_update_perception_of_recent_hygienic_behaviour_intensity = 30 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time to update one's perception about the intensity of adoption of the hygienic behaviour. 
It is assumed to be one month 
Behavioural_Model.total_effect_of_hygienic_behaviour_on_risk_reduction = 
maximum_effect_of_hygiene_on_risk_reduction*level_of_adoption_of_hygienic_behaviour 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total effect of Hygienic Behaviour on the reduction of the risk for a "hot contact" is given 
as the product of the level of adoption of the hygienic behaviour of the population and the hypothesised 
maximum effect of hygienic behaviour on risk reduction. 
Behavioural_Model.weight_of_ease_of_engagement_with_hygienic_behaviour = ,6 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight, or relative significance of the ease of engagement with hygienic behaviour on 
the total perception of costs of hygienic behaviour for an average individual. The weight is assumed to be 60% 
reflecting that, if an individual does not have easy access to hygienic measures, this will have a high 
significance in their evaluation of the costs of such measures 
Behavioural_Model.weight_of_fatigue_from_hygienic_behaviour = (1-
weight_of_ease_of_engagement_with_hygienic_behaviour)*relative_weight_of_fatigue 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total weight of fatigue is given as the difference of the total weight of all costs (1) and 
the weight of ease of engagement with hygienic behaviour, multiplied by the relative weight of fatigue. 
Behavioural_Model.weight_of_social_costs_for_hygienic_behaviour = (1-
weight_of_ease_of_engagement_with_hygienic_behaviour)*(1-relative_weight_of_fatigue) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight of social costs is equal to whatever of the total weight remains after the weight 




Behavioural_Model.Efficacy_Appraisal(t) = Efficacy_Appraisal(t - dt) + (rate_of_increase_of_Efficacy - 
fading_rate_of_Efficacy) * dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Efficacy_Appraisal = 0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The subjective perception of how efficient the proposed response is to mitigate the Threat 
posed by COVID-19. It has been desribed as the evaluation of ‘‘...the effectiveness, feasibility, and ease with 
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which a recommended response impedes or averts a threat.’’ (Witte, Cameron, McKeon, & Berkowitz, 1996, 
p. 320). It is represented as a stock as it is expected to have some "memory", and it increases through the rate 
of increase and decreases through the fading rate. The range of this stock is in "absolute terms": an Efficacy 
Appraisal equal to 1 is the maximum Efficacy Appraisal than we can observe, and one equal to 0 is the 
minimum (response is perceived as having no Efficacy whatsoever) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.rate_of_increase_of_Efficacy = (Indicated_Efficacy_Appraisal-
Efficacy_Appraisal)/time_to_update_Efficacy_Appraisal 
            UNITS: Per Day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which the Efficacy Appraisal increases. It is described as a goal/gap 
formulation where the Indicated Efficacy Appraisal as its explicit goal and the adjustment to this goal 
happening over the time to update the Efficacy Appraisal 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.fading_rate_of_Efficacy = 
(Efficacy_Appraisal/time_to_discount_Efficacy_Appraisal) 
            UNITS: Per Day 
            DOCUMENT: The Efficacy Appraisal fades, or gets discounted over some time equal to the time to 
discount Efficacy Appraisal.  
Behavioural_Model.Efficacy_Appraisal_relative_to_to_reference_time = 
(Efficacy_Appraisal/average_Efficacy_Apprasail_reference_time)*1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The, relative to the reference time, value of the Efficacy Appraisal. It is given as the ratio of 
the level of Efficacy Appraisal and the value of the Efficacy Appraisal at the reference time 
Behavioural_Model.Indicated_Efficacy_Appraisal = MIN(1; 
(Total_Bottom_Up_communication_Contribution_to_Efficacy_Appraisal+Total_Observations_Contribution
_to_Efficacy_Appraisal+Total_Top_Down_Contribution_to_Efficacy_Appraisal)) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The indicated, by the contributions of the Efficacy-Related mechanism, value for the Efficacy 
Appraisal. It is given as the sum of the weighted contributions of the Bottom Up, Top Down, and Observation 
mechanisms and their contributions to the Efficacy Appraisal. 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_discount_Efficacy_Appraisal = 21*2 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time over which the Efficacy Appraisal fades. It is considered to be a constant and equal 
to 42 days. The value is here higher than in the Threat Appraisal fading mechanism as Efficacy is expected to 
not get discounted equally fast as the Threat. 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_update_Efficacy_Appraisal = 3 
    UNITS: day 
    DOCUMENT: The time for a person to update their Threat Assessment. This is considered to be a rather 








Points(11): (0,2000, 0,2000), (0,2800, 0,229617697545), (0,3600, 0,265397089097), (0,4400, 
0,308620059346), (0,5200, 0,360835177496), (0,6000, 0,42391317856), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The perceived average prophylactic response of the population is perceived as being 
translated to somewhat more optimistic expectations in one's evaluations of how effective the response might 
be due to how intensively people are practicing it. Our assumption is that the Norwegian population in general 
tends to follow governmental advice and this is known amongst individuals (people expect that others will 
comply to a larger extent that we would perhaps observe in other countries). 
Behavioural_Model.perceived_average_prophylactic_response_of_the_population = 
SMTH1((mobility_reduction-total_effect_of_hygienic_behaviour_on_risk_reduction); 
time_to_perceive_avg_prophylactic_response_of_the_population; 1) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.perceived_average_prophylactic_response_of_the_population = 1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The perceived average prophylactic response of the population is based on observations 
regarding the extend to which the population is practing them. It is expected to be a first order smoothing 
process over some time to perceive this response. It is important to note that this is a "perfect information" 
mechanism: our assumption is that an average person observes the average intensity of prophylactic response 
at the population. 
Behavioural_Model.reference_response_reference_time = (reference_mobility_reduction_at_reference_time-
-maximum_effect_of_hygiene_on_risk_reduction) + 0*(1-,385) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The perceived average prophylactic response of the population at the reference time  
Behavioural_Model.time_to_perceive_avg_prophylactic_response_of_the_population = 7 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time to perceive the average prophylactic response of the population. It is assumed to be 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total contribution of observations on the Efficacy Appraisal describes how people's 
observations regarding how intensely the population follows the proposed measures impact their beliefs that 
the response can efficiently mitigate the environmental threat. While this is perhaps a simplified picture of how 
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people evaluate Efficacy based on observations, looking at the average adoption of prophylactic behaviour in 
the population might not be unreasonable for the case of COVID-19 where the actual efficacy does depend on 







SMTH1(Efficacy_Appraisal_relative_to_to_reference_time; time_to_communicate_own_Appraisals; 0) 
{DELAY CONVERTER} 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.BU_Efficacy_Related_communication_due_to_own_Efficacy_Appraisal = 0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Represents the intensity of Efficacy Related communication due a person's own appraisal of 
the Efficacy of the proposed responses against Covid-19. This is expected to be smoothed over the time to 
communicate own appraisals. The intensity of the Bottom Up Efficacy-Related communication acts as a 
multiplier to explore whether a decision to amplify one's own Efficacy Appraisal in their communication with 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution of own Efficacy Appraisals on the communication message individuals 
share through the bottom-up mechanism (person-to-person communication). This mechanism represents the 
diffusion amongst the population of personal cognitions regarding the virus. It is the product of the, relative to 
the reference time, Bottom Up Efficacy Related communication due to a person's own Efficacy Appraisal and 
the inverse of the fraction in which Bottom Up communications replicate the Top Down distrubuted Efficacy 
Related communication. 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total contribution of the Top Down message on the Bottom Up Efficacy Related 
Communications is given as the product of the intensity of the Perceived Top-Down Efficacy-Related message 
and the fraction of this message that is expected to be replicated in person-to-person communications (Bottom-
Up mechanism) 
Behavioural_Model.fraction_of_TopDown_Efficacy_Related_message_replicated_in_BottomUp_Communic
ations = ,5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: The message by the government is considered to be modified by a likelihood that individuals 
will follow & replicate in their own communications this message. The assumption here is that 50% of the 
intensity of the message by the government will be translated to intensity of the bottom-up message.  
Behavioural_Model.intensity_of_Efficacy_Related_communication_Bottom_Up = 1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The intensity of Efficacy-Related communication is a parameter to facilitate testing of 
different policies. In the case of Efficacy communication, our baseline assumption is that individuals 
communicate their Efficacy Appraisal as is, without amplification  
Behavioural_Model."Perceived_Top-Down_Efficacy_Related_communication_Message" = 
SMTH1("Actual_SharedTotal_Top-Down_Efficacy_Related_communication_message"; 
time_to_perceive_Top_Down_message; 0)  {IF TOP_DOWN_EFFICACY_COMMUNICATION_2> 0 
THEN SMTH1(TOP_DOWN_EFFICACY_COMMUNICATION_2; time_to_perceive_top_down_message; 
0) ELSE  0} {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    INIT Behavioural_Model."Perceived_Top-Down_Efficacy_Related_communication_Message" = 0 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The actual contribution of the Bottom Up Efficacy-Related message is given as the the 






    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total, relative to the reference time, intensity of the Efficacy Related communication 
message that is distributed via the Bottom-Up mechanism is given as the sum of the contributions of the Top 
Down message as it is replicated amongst people and that of their distributed own Efficacy-Related cognitions. 
This intensity is multiplied by the, relative to the reference time, rate of interaction with shared information to 
give the actual value of the shared Efficacy-Related Information. To ensure that this value remains within 




    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: The total contribution of the Top Down message to the Efficacy Appraisal is given as the 
product of the Top Down Efficacy-Related communication message as it is perceived by the population and 





Behavioural_Model.costs_due_to_fatigue_from_social_isolation = GRAPH(recent_isolation_intensity) 
Points(11): (0,000, 0,0000), (0,100, 0,0489656196481), (0,200, 0,103080998469), (0,300, 0,162887741362), 
(0,400, 0,228984414312), (0,500, 0,302032535039), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Fatigue from social isolation can represent a serious cost for an individual (they are expected 
to miss being out, get tired, or bored of staying home). The effect of the recent isolation intensity on the costs 
of fatigue is not expected to be exactly linear: people can "withstand" some fatigue without it being very equally 
costly 
Behavioural_Model.costs_due_to_fatigue_from_social_isolation_1 = GRAPH(recent_isolation_intensity) 
Points(11): (0,000, 0,000), (0,100, 0,100), (0,200, 0,200), (0,300, 0,300), (0,400, 0,400), (0,500, 0,500), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Fatigue from social isolation can represent a serious cost for an individual (they are expected 
to miss being out, get tired, or bored of staying home). The effect of the recent isolation intensity on the costs 
of fatigue is not expected to be exactly linear: people can "withstand" some fatigue without it being very equally 
costly 
Behavioural_Model.costs_due_to_fatigue_from_social_isolation_reference_time = ,075 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The costs due to fatigue from social isolation at the reference time.This is the model-produced 
value from running the model with exogenous data (DATA ON SWITCH =1) 
Behavioural_Model.Difference_between_Protection_Motivation_and_Perceived_Costs_of_Social_Isolation 
= Protection_Motivation-Perceived_Costs_of_Social_Isolation_relative_to_reference_time 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.effect_of_the_difference_between_Protection_Motivation_&_Costs_on_mobility_reduct
ion = GRAPH(Difference_between_Protection_Motivation_and_Perceived_Costs_of_Social_Isolation) 
Points(13): (-2,000, 2,23828751088), (-1,66666666667, 2,176), (-1,33333333333, 2,017), (-1,000, 1,794), (-
0,666666666667, 1,515), (-0,333333333333, 1,217), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The difference between Protection Motivation and costs of social isolation is expected to 
have a non-linear effect on mobility reduction. At the reference time, the relationship between the two 
considerations is 0, hence the point 0,1 allows us to achieve the reference mobility reduction at the reference 
time. When Costs are much higher that Motivation (with a maximum difference of -2), the population is 
expected to have regular mobility. When the Motivation is much higher than the costs (with the maximum 
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difference being 2), the population is expected to reach the minimum mobility (1/2 of that observed at the 
reference period). The shape is attempting to capture a risk-aversion, as changes in the lower region (difference 
between Motivation and Costs lower than 0) lead to more steep responses than changes at the higher region 
(Motivation and Costs higher than 0) 
Behavioural_Model.Livelihood_Costs = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points: (0,0, 0,793), (55,0, 0,624), (66,0, 0,300), (130,0, 0,400), (155,0, 0,500) {GF DISCRETE} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Costs associated with the individual's livelihood are considered here. These costs might be 
loss of job and income, lack of financial support, unavailability of online or any other solutions that allow the 
individual to stay at home etc. Governments and other institutions are crucial in reducing those costs for the 
individuals. The steps that are tested here are related to decisions by the Norwegian Government.  
Behavioural_Model.livelihood_costs_reference_time = ,3 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The livelihood costs at the reference time. Based on the assumptions used in this model 
(Livelihood Costs Variable). 
Behavioural_Model.Livelihood_Costs_Scenario_No1 = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(8): (0,0, 0,795), (55,0, 0,624), (66,0, 0,300), (130,0, 0,400), (155,0, 0,500), (200,0, 0,650), ... {GF 
DISCRETE} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This variable is adjusted to test the policy scenario No1. It represents livelihood costs that 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The reduction in mobility for an average individual as a response to COVID-19. It is the 
product of the effect of the difference between Protection Motivation & Costs on mobility reduction (given in 





    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The Costs associated with practicing Social Isolation. The costs are assumed to be the 
weighted average of three mechanisms: Livelihood Costs, Social Costs, and Costs due to fatigue from Recent 
Social Isolation. Each of these factors is multiplied with the relevant weight (or relative significance) to give 









    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Livelihood_Costs = SMTH1(Livelihood_Costs; 
time_to_perceive_changes_in_livelihood_costs) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The livelihood costs that relate to social isolation are here perceived by the population 
following a first order information delay. 
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Mobility_of_Population = SMTH1(mobility_reduction; 
time_to_perceive_behaviour_of_others; 1) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The perceived by an average individual mobility of the rest of the population.  
Behavioural_Model.recent_isolation_intensity = SMTH1((1-mobility_reduction); 
time_to_update_perception_of_recent_distancing_intensity; 0) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Social Isolation, represented by the level of mobility reduction, is perceived as a first order 
smoothing to form a person perception of the intensity of recent distancing over the time to update this 
perception. The smoothing takes as an input the inverse of the mobility reduction, representing the "strenght" 
of social isolation. 
Behavioural_Model.reference_mobility_reduction_at_reference_time = ,445 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on mobility data from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) (2020). 
Behavioural_Model.relative_weight_of_fatigue = ,6 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The relative weight, or significance of fatigue for evaluations of the costs of prophylactic 
behaviour. This weight represents the weight of fatigue after the weight of livelihood costs have been removed. 
60% of the remaining weight is considered to be assigned to fatigue and the remaining 40% to social costs. 
Behavioural_Model.Social_Costs_of_isolation = Perceived_Mobility_of_Population 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The mechanism of Social Costs associated with the behaviour. It aims to capture costs of not 
complying with the "norm" around the individual and is assumed to be linear and equal to the Perceived 
Mobility of the population. 
Behavioural_Model.Social_Costs_reference_time = ,6 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The social costs at the reference time.This is the model-produced value from running the 
model with exogenous data (DATA ON SWITCH =1) 
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Behavioural_Model.time_to_perceive_behaviour_of_others = 7 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The average time to perceive the behaviour of others is assumed equal to 7 days 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_perceive_changes_in_livelihood_costs = 3 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time to perceive changes in livelihood costs. It is assumed to be rather fast for this case 
and equal to 3 days. 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_update_perception_of_recent_distancing_intensity = 30 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time to update one's perception about the intensity of social isolation. It is assumed to 
be one month 
Behavioural_Model.weight_of_fatigue_from_distancing = (1-
weight_of_livelihood_costs)*relative_weight_of_fatigue 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total weight of fatigue is given as the difference of the total weight of all costs (1) and 
the weight of livelihood costs, multiplied by the relative weight of fatigue. 
Behavioural_Model.weight_of_livelihood_costs = ,55*0+,6 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight, or relative significance of livelihood costs on the total perception of costs of 
social isolation for an average individual. Livelihood costs are assumed to have the highest importance and 
factors like "need to work" or "fear of loss of income" have been reported as significant reasons for non-
compliance with quarantine instructions (DiGiovanni, Conley, Chiu, & Zaborski, 2004; Teh et al., 2012) 
Behavioural_Model.weight_of_social_costs_for_mobility = (1-weight_of_livelihood_costs)*(1-
relative_weight_of_fatigue) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight of social costs is equal to whatever of the total weight remains after the weight 







Points(11): (0,000, 0,000), (0,100, 0,027), (0,200, 0,0953494648991), (0,300, 0,182425523806), (0,400, 
0,320821300825), (0,500, 0,500), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The effect of relative Efficacy on Protection Motivation aims to capture elements of the 
interaction between Threat and Efficacy Appraisal that have been described in the literature. Specifically, both 
Cognitive Appraisal Theory (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986; Lazarus & 
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Folkman, 1984)  and the Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1992, 1994, 1995; Witte & Allen, 2000) 
describe maladaptive responses when Threat significantly outweighs Efficacy beliefs (termed emotion-focused 
coping or Fear control responses respectively). This relationship is expected to be non-linear and is here 
hypothesised to look as an S-shaped curve. This curve indicates that, if Efficacy is equal to Threat (Efficacy 
Relative to Threat = 1), then this effect will be equal to 1. If Efficacy is very low (Efficacy Relative to Threat 
<< 1), this effect will take a very small value. In middle ranges, small increases in relative Efficacy lead to 






    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The effect of both Threat and Efficacy Appraisals on Protection Motivation is given as a 
weighted average of both appraisals (in relative terms) as also proposed by N. Weinstein (1993). The 
contribution of each Appraisal is controlled by the relative contribution of Threat Apprasail on Protection 
Motivation. The formulation ensures that the total contribution of both Appraisals is equal to 1 as Threat 
Appraisal is multiplied by its contribution and Efficacy Appraisal is multiplied by whatever remains (1-relative 
contribution of Threat). 
Behavioural_Model.Efficacy_Relative_to_Threat = MIN(2; 
(Efficacy_Appraisal_relative_to_to_reference_time//Threat_Appraisal_relative_to_reference_time)) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The relationship between Efficacy and Threat is given as the ratio of Efficacy relative to 
Threat. The ratio describes that, if Efficacy is very low and Threat very high, this variable will return a very 
low value, while if efficacy is higher than the Threat, the value will be higher than 1. In the case where Efficacy 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The motivation to act to mitigate an environmental Threat. The term Protection Motivation 
comes from the theory with the same name (Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), see Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, 
& Rogers, 2000; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975; Rogers & Mewborn, 1976) and is also used in the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992, 1994, 1995; Witte & Allen, 2000). Protection 
Motivation is considered, in these approaches to come from the evaluations of Threat and Efficacy (effect of 
Threat and Efficacy Appraisals on Protection Motivation). The relationship between those two Appraisals is 
also significant according to these theories. For this, the effect of relative Efficacy levels on Protection 
Motivation acts as a multiplier. If any of those effects become 0, Protection Motivation is expected to be 0.  
Behavioural_Model.relative_contribution_of_Threat_Appraisal_on_Protection_Motivation = ,6 












Points(13): (0,000, 0,000), (0,250, 0,303), (0,500, 0,582), (0,750, 0,814), (1,000, 1,000), (1,250, 1,157), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The effect of the, relative to the reference time, new cases on a person's Susceptibility 
Assessment. This effect ranges from 0 to 1,55. 0 indicates no risk perceived due to New Cases and 1,55 is the 
maximum value this effect can take to ensure that Susceptibility Assessment remain within reasonable bounds 
(see "max multiplier Threat-Related Assessments). The effect is expected to be non-linear and can be read as: 
If the new daily cases are 0, the risk is expected to be 0, while if the new cases are 3 times the threshold value, 
the risk is assumed to take its maximum value of 1. The shape of the effect indicates that small increases in the 
number of new cases when those are relative low elicit a larger increase in the perception of risk (1 additional 
new case if there were 2 cases the previous day makes people very **risk-responsive**). At higher values of 
new cases relative to the reference period value, the effect saturates: small changes do not increase the risk 
perception as much as in the "lower" region. The steepness of the "lower" region we believe is justified due to 
the already alerted population before and around the introduction of the virus to Norway as a result of the global 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total Susceptibility Assessment represents how large an average individual perceives the 
risk to become infected with COVID-19 to be. The Susceptibility Assessment is conseptualised as the addition 






    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The actual contribution of the Bottom Up Threat-Related message on the Susceptibility 
Assessment is given as the the product of the distributed message (in relative terms) and the value of the Top 
Down contribution in the overall Susceptibility Assessment 
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    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The final value of the contribution of observations on Susceptibility Assessment. The new 
reported cases are expected to be the main input on observations, in accordance with comparison between the 
development of cases and of susceptibility perceptions by Dohle (2020). The value of this contribution It is the 
product of the effect of new cases, given as relative to the reference time, and the value of the contribution of 






    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total contribution of the Top Down message to Susceptibility Assessments is given as 
the product of the Top Down Threat-Related communication message as it is perceived by the population and 









    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The indicated, by the contributions of the Threat-Related mechanisms, value for the Threat 
Appraisal. It is given as the sum of the weighted contributions of the Bottom Up, Top Down, and Observation 
mechanisms and their contributions to the Threat Appraisal. 
Behavioural_Model.Threat_Appraisal(t) = Threat_Appraisal(t - dt) + (rate_of_increase_of_Threat - 
fading_rate_of_Threat) * dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Threat_Appraisal = 0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The aggregated Threat Assessments of individuals in the population. Threat is sometimes 
distinguished between a cognitive and an emotional component however, here, we do not differentiate between 
the two. It represents a person's worry regarding the environmental health, their evaluation that there is 
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something that can be harmful to the person & lead to significant consequences. Threat is perceived as a "fading 
memory" mechanism declining over time based on the fading rate and building up through the rate of increase. 
The range of this stock is in "absolute terms": a Threat Appraisal equal to 1 is the maximum Threat Appraisal 
than we can observe, and one equal to 0 is the minimum (no Threat perceived) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.rate_of_increase_of_Threat = (Indicated_Threat_Appraisal-
Threat_Appraisal)/time_to_update_Threat_Appraisal 
            UNITS: Per Day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Threat Appraisal increases. It is described as a goal/gap formulation 
where the Indicated Threat Appraisal as its explicit goal and the adjustment to this goal happening over the 
time to update the Threat Appraisal 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.fading_rate_of_Threat = (Threat_Appraisal/time_to_discount_Threat_Appraisal) 
            UNITS: Per Day 
            DOCUMENT: The Threat Appraisal fades, or gets discounted over some time equal to the time to 
discount Threat Appraisal.  
Behavioural_Model.Threat_Appraisal_relative_to_reference_time = 
(Threat_Appraisal/average_Threat_Appraisal_reference_time) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The, relative to the reference time, value of the Threat Appraisal. It is given as the ratio of 
the level of Threat Appraisal and the value of the Threat Appraisal at the reference time 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_discount_Threat_Appraisal = 31 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time over which the Threat Appraisal fades. It is considered to be a constant and equal 
to 1 month 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_update_Threat_Appraisal = 3 
    UNITS: day 
    DOCUMENT: The time for a person to update their Threat Assessment. This is considered to be a rather 






SMTH1(Threat_Appraisal_relative_to_reference_time; time_to_communicate_own_Appraisals; 0) {DELAY 
CONVERTER} 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.BU_Threat_Related_communication_due_to_own_Threat_Appraisal = 0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
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    DOCUMENT: It represents the intensity of Threat Related communication due a person's own appraisal of 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contribution of own Threat Appraisals on the communication message individuals share 
through the bottom-up mechanism (person-to-person communication). This mechanism represents the 
diffusion amongst the population of personal cognitions regarding the virus. It is the product of the, relative to 
the reference time, Bottom Up Threat Related communication due to a person's own Threat Appraisal and the 





    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total contribution of the Top Down message on the Bottom Up Threat Related 
Communications is given as the product of the intensity of the Perceived Top-Down Threat-Related message 
and the fraction of this message that is expected to be replicated in person-to-person communications (Bottom-
Up mechanism) 
Behavioural_Model.fraction_of_TopDown_Threat_Related_message_replicated_in_BottomUp_Communicat
ions = ,5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The message by the government is considered to be modified by a likelihood that individuals 
will follow & replicate in their own communications this message. The assumption here is that 65% of the 
intensity of the message by the government will be translated to intensity of the bottom-up message.  
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Top_Down_Threat_Related_communication_Message = 
SMTH1(Total_Top_Down_Threat_Related_communication_message; 
time_to_perceive_Top_Down_message) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The Total Top Down Threat Related communication is expected to be perceived by the 
population over some time equal to time to perceive Top Down message through a first order smoothing process 
(SMTH function). The value of this parameter is given relative to the reference time. 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_communicate_own_Appraisals = 7 
    UNITS: Days 
    DOCUMENT: The average time for a person to communicate their own Appraisals with their network via 
the Bottom Up information dissemination mechanism. It is assumed to be equal to 7 days 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_perceive_Top_Down_message = 2 
    UNITS: Days 
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    DOCUMENT: The time for an average person to interact and perceive a top-down message is assumed to 
be 2 days. This is a rather short time period, however, we believe it is justified due to the high levels of alertness, 





    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total, relative to the reference time, intensity of the Threat Related communication 
message that is distributed via the Bottom-Up mechanism is given as the sum of the contributions of the Top 
Down message as it is replicated amongst people and that of their distributed own Threat-Related cognitions. 
This intensity is multiplied by the, relative to the reference time, rate of interaction with shared information to 







Points(13): (0,000, 0,000), (0,250, 0,303), (0,500, 0,582), (0,750, 0,814), (1,000, 1,000), (1,250, 1,157), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The effect on the Severity Assessments of the Perceived number of people that face severe 
consequences due to COVID-19 relative to the number of such cases at the reference period. The values and 
shape of the effect are the same as those described for the "effect of relative new cases on Susceptibility 
Assessments", as we expect those two evaluations to be rather similar. 
Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Severe_Cases(t) = Perceived_Severe_Cases(t - dt) + 
(updating_rate_of_severe_cases - discounting_rate_of_severe_cases) * dt 
    INIT Behavioural_Model.Perceived_Severe_Cases = 0 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: The Perception of how many people are facing severe consequences (death or 
hospitalization/intensive care) due to an infection. It is perceived to be a stock as so to capture a memory 
mechanism (the news of a death for example, are not "forgotten" immediately), in accordance with Poletti et 
al. (2011b). The stock increases through the updating rate and decreases through the discounting rate 
    INFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.updating_rate_of_severe_cases = 
(Reported_and_Perceived_daily_deaths*weight_of_deaths) + (1-
weight_of_deaths)*Reported_and_Perceived_New_Hospital_and_Intensive_Care_Admissions 
            UNITS: Person/Day 
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            DOCUMENT: The increase in the perception of how many people are facing severe consequences due 
to the infection comes from the reported and perceived number of new deaths and hospitalizations/intensive 
care admissions. Those two elements are weighted by the value of the weight of death as it as assumed that 
they do not contribute equally to the perception of severe cases. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Behavioural_Model.discounting_rate_of_severe_cases = 
(Perceived_Severe_Cases/time_to_discount_a_severe_case) 
            UNITS: Person/Day 




    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.PPeople_facing_severe_conseq_reference_period_from_DATA_1 = 63,8*0 + 59,1 
    UNITS: people 
Behavioural_Model.Reported_and_Perceived_daily_deaths = DATA_ON_SWITCH* 
(SMTH3(Main_Infection_Model.New_Deaths_DATA; 
time_to_report_&_perceive_deaths_&_hospitalisations)) + (1-DATA_ON_SWITCH)* 
(SMTH3(Main_Infection_Model.Total_Dying_Tested*GOV_DECISION_Degree_of_presenting_virus_prev
alence_&_severity_info; time_to_report_&_perceive_deaths_&_hospitalisations)) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People/day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of daily new deaths that is reported by the authorities and perceived by an 
average individual. We perceive this to be best represented by a third order information delay as there are 
distinct processes in place - a process by which the hospital reports a death, the government reports the death, 








time_to_report_&_perceive_deaths_&_hospitalisations))  {ok, the decision rule is not considered in the data 
option - we know for a fact that this is what they have reported} {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of daily new hospitalisations and critical care admissions that is reported by the 
authorities and perceived by an average individual. We take as an input the hospitalisations & admissions that 
have been identified or get identified while hospitalised through testing. We assume both factors to contribute 
equally and we perceive the process to be best represented by a third order information delay due to the 
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existence of distinct processes in place - reporting by the hospital, reporting by the government, and peoples' 
receiving and perceiving of this information.  
Behavioural_Model.time_to_discount_a_severe_case = 7 
    UNITS: days 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_report_&_perceive_deaths_&_hospitalisations = 3  
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time to perceive a new death or hospital/intensive care admission. The value might be 
considered quite low but it aims to represent a high responsive by both the authorities and the population, as 
we believe has been the case with COVID-19. The value has been estimated to account for 1-1,5 days where 
the hospital offers and the government receives and publishes the information (through daily reports accounting 







    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The actual contribution of the Bottom Up Threat-Related message on the Severity 
Assessment is given as the the product of the distributed message (in relative terms) and the value of the Top 
Down contribution in the overall Severity Assessment 
Behavioural_Model.Total_Observations_Contribution_to_Severity_Assessment = 
effect_of_relative_Severe_cases_on_Severity_Assessments*cases_contribution_Severity_reference_time 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The final value of the contribution of observations on Severity Assessment. The Perceived 
Severe cases expected to be the main input on observations The value of this contribution It is the product of 
the effect of severe cases cases, given as relative to the reference time, and the value of the contribution of 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total Severity Assessment represents how severe an average individual perceives the 
consequences of becoming infected with COVID-19 to be. The Severity Assessment is conseptualised as the 








    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total contribution of the Top Down message to Severity Assessments is given as the 
product of the Top Down Threat-Related communication message as it is perceived by the population and the 
relative contribution that such a message has for assessments regarding one's perceived consequences of a 
COVID-19 infection. 
Behavioural_Model.weight_of_deaths = ,70 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The weight people place on the number of people dying relative to the number of people 
being hospitalised or admitted to critical care when evaluating how many people are facing severe 
consequences due to an infection by COVID-19. A death is perceived to have a higher significance in this 






Behavioural_Model.avg_reported_following_of_advice_reference = 4,655487053/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "I do my best to follow the various advice 
from health authorities to limit the risk of infection (wash hands frequently, avoiding travel and social 
situations, keeping distance and avoiding touching surfaces)" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_reported_information_gathering_from_health_authorities_reference = 
3,724022346/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "I pay attention to advice from the health 
authorities". In norwegian, the verb "følger med" is used that tends to denote an active attention ..... 
Behavioural_Model.avg_reported_risk_reduction_OTHERS_by_following_advice_reference = 
4,430932412/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
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29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "By following the infection prevention 
advice, I will avoid making others sick" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_reported_risk_reduction_SELF_by_following_advice_reference = 4,045140602/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "By following the infection prevention 
advice, I will avoid getting sick" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_reported_significance_of_source_credibility_reference = 4,180629001/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "It is important to me that information about 
the disease comes from a credible source" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_reported_trust_in_health_authorities_reference = 4,184015787/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "To what extent do you trust the advice of 
the health authorities?" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_risk_of_infection_OTHERS_reference = 3,434966426*0 + 3,434966426/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). This 
value represents participants' average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being lowest and 5 
highest agreement). The question item was: "How large do you consider the risk to be that in 2020... an average 
adult will be infected". The values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of 
Norwegian citizens between 20 and 29 of March 2020. 
Behavioural_Model.avg_risk_of_infection_SELF_reference = 2,946148093*0 + 2,946148093/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
value here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being lowest and 5 highest 
agreement). The question item was: "How high or low do you think the risk is that you will be infected by the 
coronavirus in 2020?" The values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian 
citizens between 20 and 29 of March 2020. 
Behavioural_Model.avg_risk_of_serious_changes_in_everyday_life_reference = 3,586258033/5 
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    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "How large do you consider the risk to be 
that during 2020... your everyday life will be much changed" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_risk_of_serious_illness_reference = 2,156605641/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "How large do you consider the risk to be 
that in 2020... you will become seriously ill" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_severity_of_consequences_of_infection_SELF_reference = 2,958508274/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
value here reflects participants' average agreement with the statement on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being lowest and 
5 highest agreement). The question item was: "It would be very serious for me if I got infected by the virus". 
The values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 
and 29 of March 2020. 
Behavioural_Model.avg_trust_that_info_is_presented_reference = 4,074882222/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: This is the reverted scale of answers to the 
question "Information about the coronavirus is deliberately concealed from us" such that a high value indicates 
the perception that information is not concealed. 
Behavioural_Model.avg_worry_of_family_getting_infected_reference = 3,451316595/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "I worry someone in my family is going to 
be infected by the coronavirus" 
Behavioural_Model.avg_worry_of_getting_infected_SELF_reference = 2,739065975/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Based on data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. (2020). The 
values reported here represent the weighted average of the perceptions of Norwegian citizens between 20 and 
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29 of March 2020. The value presented here represents average agreement with statement on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1 being lowest and 5 highest agreement). The question item was: "I worry that I'm going to be infected by the 
coronavirus" 
Behavioural_Model.TopDown_Threat_Communication_Assumed_from_Timeline = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(7): (35,0, 0,000), (42,0, 0,200), (51,0, 0,400), (66,0, 0,800), (90,0, 0,850), (122,0, 0,450), ... {GF 
DISCRETE} 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Significant days under consideration (note that in our time label, February has 31 days. We 
follow this restriction & move March events 2 days earlier (e.g. 12.03 becomes 10.03, or, model time 74)): 
11.02 - FHI publishes Facts about COVID (model time 42); 26.02 - FHI publishes a risk assessment specific 
for Norway (model time 51); 12.03 - Norway enters lock-down (model time 66); 07.05 - Norway announces 





Behavioural_Model.average_time_of_survey = (80+81+82+83+84+85+86+87+88+89)/10  {between 20-29 
March} 
    UNITS: day 
    DOCUMENT: Time of collection of the data reported by Sætrevik (2020) and collected by Ivarsflaten et al. 
(2020). The survey was performed between 20-29 March 2020 in the Norwegian Population. For clarity, we 
represent the model time corresponding to each of the data collection days and divide by the total number of 
days to find the average time.  
Behavioural_Model.Costs_os_Social_Isolation_at_reference_time = 
HISTORY(Perceived_Costs_of_SOCIAL_ISOLATION;  average_time_of_survey) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.Efficacy_Appraisal_at_reference_time = HISTORY(Efficacy_Appraisal;  
average_time_of_survey) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.reference_time_spike = IF TIME =average_time_of_survey THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: day 
Behavioural_Model.Severity_Assessment_at_reference_time = HISTORY(Total_Severity_Assessment; 
average_time_of_survey) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.Susceptibility_Assessment_at_reference_time = HISTORY(Susceptibility_Assessment;  
average_time_of_survey) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.Threat_Appraisal_at_reference_time = HISTORY(Threat_Appraisal; 
average_time_of_survey) 
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Behavioural_Model.DATA_ON_SWITCH = 0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: This Switch controls the input to the Susceptibility and Severity Assessments. When it is ON 
(1), the behavioural response structure takes as input the real-world data on the number of cases & 
hospitalisations. When it is OFF (0), the behavioural response structure takes input from the infection model.  
Behavioural_Model.GOV_DECISION_Degree_of_presenting_virus_prevalence_&_severity_info = 1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Behavioural_Model.People_per_10000_people = 10000 
    UNITS: people/ten thousand people 
    DOCUMENT: The number of people per ten thousand people (10000).  
Behavioural_Model.Reported_&_Perceived_New_Cases_2 = 
SMTH1(Reported_New_Cases_2*GOV_DECISION_Degree_of_presenting_virus_prevalence_&_severity_i
nfo; time_to_perceive_reported_cases) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of new daily cases as they are perceived by an average individual, represented 
by a first order information delay with the reported new cases as its input. 
Behavioural_Model.Reported_and_Perceived_New_Cases_per_10000_Susceptible = 
Reported_&_Perceived_New_Cases_2//Susc_10000_people_1 
    UNITS: People/ten thousand people/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of new cases per ten thousand susceptible people. It is the ratio of daily perceived 
cases to 10000 susceptible people. 
Behavioural_Model.Reported_New_Cases_2 = (1-DATA_ON_SWITCH)* 
(SMTH3(Main_Infection_Model.Testing_rates_SUM; time_to_get_and_report_test_results)) + 
DATA_ON_SWITCH*(SMTH3(Main_Infection_Model.Confirmed_Daily_New_Cases_DATA; 
time_to_get_and_report_test_results))    {Could be a higher order} {ok, note that the decision rule is not 
considered in the data option - we know for a fact that this is what they have reported} {DELAY 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of new daily cases that are confirmed via testing AND REPORTED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT. We take as an input the testing rate of infected across all severity categories. We perceive 
the process to be best represented by a third order information delay due to the existence of distinct processes 
in place - taking, processing and reporting the results of the actual test,  





    UNITS: ten thousand people 
    DOCUMENT: The Susceptible population measured in ten thousand people.  
Behavioural_Model.time_to_get_and_report_test_results = 3  
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time for a sample to be tested and reported. We estimate and average of TWO TO 
THREE days delay from specimen collection to confirmation based on discrepancies observed in the published 
data of the daily reports and those of the cases by specimen collection. 
    [[and one additional day of reporting new confirmed cases by the government in the daily reports]] 
Behavioural_Model.time_to_perceive_reported_cases = 2  
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The time it takes for an average person to access information and perceive a new case of 
COVID-19.The choice of TWO days might be considered quite fast but it aims to represent the high 
responsiveness to information by the media/GOVER?. and the public.  
{ The model has 252 (252) variables (array expansion in parens). 
  In this module and 0 additional modules with 19 sectors. 
  Stocks: 8 (8) Flows: 11 (11) Converters: 233 (233) 
  Constants: 78 (78) Equations: 166 (166) Graphicals: 35 (35) 
  There are also 141 expanded macro variables. 








Infectivity_Calc.Asym_NOT_Testted[Infection_Day] = Main_Infection_Model.AI_per_day_of_infection 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: The Asymptomatic Infected population, arrayed per day of infection.  
Infectivity_Calc.Hospitalised_NOT_Tested[Infection_Day] = 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_per_day_of_infection+Main_Infection_Model.CCI_per_day_of_infection 
    UNITS: People 





    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: The Symptomatic Infected population, arrayed per day of infection.  
Infectivity_Calc.TESTED_hospitalised[Infection_Day] = 
Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_per_day_of_infection+Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_per_day_of_infection 
    UNITS: people 




    UNITS: people 






Infectivity_Calc.baseline_contact_rate = 10 
    UNITS: Per Day 
    DOCUMENT: The baseline contact rate represents the average number of people one person contacts per 
day. The value used is of 10 people per person per day.  




    UNITS: Per Day 
    DOCUMENT: The global contact rate is equal to the product of the baseline contact rate assumed for the 
population and the total reduction in global contact rate due to behavioural measures. When the partial testing 
for the infection model is ON (=1), this variable uses the reduction in contacts from data. When it is off (=0), 
it uses the one coming from the behavioural model 
Infectivity_Calc.PARTIAL_TESTING_INFECTION_MODEL_ON_SWITCH = 0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: When this Switch is ON (=1), then the global contact rate is controlled by the data 
Infectivity_Calc.risk_reduction_due_to_hygienic_behaviour_Assumption = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points: (31,0, 0,0300), (50,0, 0,0600), (60,0, 0,1300), (155,0, 0,1044), (250,0, 0,1044) {GF DISCRETE} 
















    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contacts of Asymptomatic, Not Tested, Infected as expected to be equal to those of the 
general population. Here, the global contact rate is multiplied by the number of Asymptomatic individuals 
(arrayed according to the day of infection they are at) to give us the total number of encounters per day that an 
average Asymptomatic Infected is expected to have.  
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_between_Susceptible_and_infected_Asymptomatic[Infection_Day] = 
contacts_Asymptomatic_not_tested*fraction_of_population_susceptible 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of contacts that an Asymptomatic Infected has is here multiplied by the 
probability that a person they contact is Susceptible (as given by the fraction on population susceptible) to give 
the total number of contacts between a Susceptible person and an Asymptomatic Infected person, arrayed by 
the day of infection they are at. 
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_between_Susceptible_and_infected_Hospitalised_Not_Tested[Infection_Day] = 
contacts_Hospitalised_not_tested*fraction_of_population_susceptible 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of contacts that an Infected Hospitalised (not-tested) has is here multiplied by 
the probability that a person they contact is Susceptible (as given by the fraction on population susceptible) to 
give the total number of contacts between a Susceptible person and an Infected Hospitalised person, arrayed 
by the day of infection they are at. 
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_between_Susceptible_and_infected_Symptomatic_Not_Tested[Infection_Day] = 
contacts_Symptomatic_not_tested*fraction_of_population_susceptible 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of contacts that a Symptomatic Infected has is here multiplied by the probability 
that a person they contact is Susceptible (as given by the fraction on population susceptible) to give the total 
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number of contacts between a Susceptible person and a Symptomatic Infected person, arrayed by the day of 
infection they are at. 
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_between_Susceptible_and_infected_Tested_Hospitalised[Infection_Day] = 
contacts_tested_in_hospital*fraction_of_population_susceptible 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of contacts that an Infected Tested and Hospitalised has is here multiplied by 
the probability that a person they contact is Susceptible (as given by the fraction on population susceptible) to 
give the total number of contacts between a Susceptible person and an Infected Tested and Hospitalised person, 
arrayed by the day of infection they are at. 
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_between_Susceptible_and_infected_Tested_Out_of_Hospital[Infection_Day] = 
contacts_tested_out_of_hospital*fraction_of_population_susceptible 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of contacts that an Infected Tested and not Hospitalised has is here multiplied 
by the probability that a person they contact is Susceptible (as given by the fraction on population susceptible) 
to give the total number of contacts between a Susceptible person and an nfected Tested and not Hospitalised 
person, arrayed by the day of infection they are at. 
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_Hospitalised_not_tested[Infection_Day] = 
Hospitalised_NOT_Tested*Hospitalised_contact_rate 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contacts of the Hospitalised Infected are the product of the Severe contact rate and the 
number of Hospitalised Infected (arrayed according to the day of infection they are at) to give us the total 
number of encounters per day that an average Hospitalised Infected is expected to have.  
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_Symptomatic_not_tested[Infection_Day] = 
Symptomatic_contact_rate*(Symptomatic_NOT_Testted) 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contacts of the Symptomatic Infected are the product of the Symptomatic contact rate 
and the number of Symptomatic Infected (arrayed according to the day of infection they are at) to give us the 
total number of encounters per day that an average Symptomatic Infected is expected to have.  
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_tested_in_hospital[Infection_Day] = TESTED_hospitalised*tested_contact_rate 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contacts of Tested and Hospitalised Infected are the product of the tested contact rate 
and the number of Tested Hospitalised Infected (arrayed according to the day of infection they are at) to give 
us the total number of encounters per day that an average Tested Hospitalised Infected is expected to have.  
Infectivity_Calc.contacts_tested_out_of_hospital[Infection_Day] = 
TESTED_outside_of_hospital*tested_contact_rate 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contacts of Tested, non-Hospitalised Infected are the product of the tested contact rate 
and the number of Tested non-Hospitalised Infected (arrayed according to the day of infection they are at) to 
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give us the total number of encounters per day that an average Tested non-Hospitalised Infected is expected to 
have. 
Infectivity_Calc.days_for_1_contact_Hospitalised = 1//Hospitalised_contact_rate[1] 
    UNITS: Day 
    DOCUMENT: The per day Contact rate for a Hospitalised Infected is converted here in days for 1 contact 
for an average Hospitalised Infected. 
Infectivity_Calc.Days_for_1_contact_Symptomatic = 1//Symptomatic_contact_rate[1] 
    UNITS: Day 
    DOCUMENT: The per day Symptomatic Contact rate is converted here in days for 1 contact for an average 
Symptomatic Infected. 
Infectivity_Calc.Days_for_1_contact_tested = 1//tested_contact_rate[1] 
    UNITS: Day 
    DOCUMENT: The per day Contact rate of a Tested Infected is converted here in days for 1 contact for an 




    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of the population that is Susceptible is given as the ration of the Susceptible 
stock to the Population of the country (the initial population minus the dead by the infection population). This 
calculation gives us the probability that a person is Susceptible.  
Infectivity_Calc.Hospitalised_contact_rate[Infection_Day] = MIN(global_contact_rate;  
baseline_contact_rate * Hospitalised_fractional_contacts_adjustment) 
    UNITS: Per Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contact rate per Hospitalised Infected (Hospitalised and Critical Care) is given as the 
product of the baseline contact rate and fractional contacts adjustment for this population. A MIN function is 
used here so that, if the adjusted contact rate for the Hospitalised population is higher than the average contact 
rate for the entire population (the global contact rate), the Hospitalised contact rate will take the value of the 
global contact rate (since it is not reasonable that Hospitalised cases will have more contacts that the average 
population). This variable is arrayed so as to produce the contact rate of Hospitalised Infected for individuals 
at each day of infection. Structure initially developed by ISEE Systems (2020). 
Infectivity_Calc.Hospitalised_fractional_contacts_adjustment = tested_fractional_contacts_adjustment 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Individuals who are hospitalized (or in Critical Care) do not have many chances of coming 
in unprotected contact with individuals around them and are, moreover, expected to comply with quarantine 
protocols. The fractional adjustment of contacts for this category is assumed to be equal to that of tested infected 
(0,0145 accounting for 1 contact per 7 days) 
Infectivity_Calc.Symptomatic_contact_rate[Infection_Day] = MIN(global_contact_rate; 
baseline_contact_rate * Symptomatic_fractional_contacts_adjustment ) 
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    UNITS: Per Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contact rate per Symptomatic Infected is given as the product of the baseline contact rate 
and fractional contacts adjustment for this population. A MIN function is used here so that, if the adjusted 
contact rate for the Symptomatic population is higher than the average contact rate for the entire population 
(the global contact rate), the Symptomatic contact rate will take the value of the global contact rate (since it is 
not reasonable that Symptomatic cases will have more contacts that the average population). This variable is 
arrayed so as to produce the contact rate of Symptomatic Infected for individuals at each day of infection. 
Structure initially developed by ISEE Systems (2020). 
Infectivity_Calc.Symptomatic_fractional_contacts_adjustment = ,1*1 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Symptomatic Infected are assumed to reduce their contacts from the time they start 
experiencing symptoms & to generally comply with governmental instructions to “stay home” under suspicion 
of infection. We assume the adjustment to be equal to 10%, accounting for 1 contact daily. 
Infectivity_Calc.tested_contact_rate[Infection_Day] = MIN(global_contact_rate;  baseline_contact_rate * 
tested_fractional_contacts_adjustment) 
    UNITS: Per Day 
    DOCUMENT: The contact rate per Tested Infected is given as the product of the baseline contact rate and 
fractional contacts adjustment for this population. A MIN function is used here so that, if the adjusted contact 
rate for the Tested population is higher than the average contact rate for the entire population (the global contact 
rate), the Tested contact rate will take the value of the global contact rate (since it is not reasonable that Tested 
cases will have more contacts that the average population). This variable is arrayed so as to produce the contact 
rate of Tested Infected for individuals at each day of infection. Structure initially developed by ISEE Systems 
(2020). 
Infectivity_Calc.tested_fractional_contacts_adjustment = 0,0145 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Individuals who are tested positive for COVID-19 are assumed to comply with self-isolation 
protocols. The fractional adjustment of contacts for this category is assumed to be 0,0145 accounting for 1 








    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The infection rate from Infected Asymptomatic persons is the product of the contacts between 
Susceptible and Asymptomatic infected (arrayed per day of infection) and the infectivity per day of infection 




    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The infection rate from Infected Hospitalised persons is the product of the contacts between 
Susceptible and infected Hospitalised Not Tested (arrayed per day of infection) and the infectivity per day of 
infection. 
Infectivity_Calc.Infection_Rate_SUM = SUM(infection_rate_Hospitalised_Not_Tested) + 
SUM(infection_rate_Symptomatic_Not_Tested) + SUM(infection_rate_Asymptomatic) + 
SUM(infection_rate_Tested_Hospitalised) + SUM(infection_rate_Tested_Out_of_Hospital) 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The sum of the infection rates from all severity categories and across all days of infection 
Infectivity_Calc.infection_rate_Symptomatic_Not_Tested[Infection_Day] = 
contacts_between_Susceptible_and_infected_Symptomatic_Not_Tested*infectivity_per_day_of_infection 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The infection rate from Infected Symptomatic persons is the product of the contacts between 




    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The infection rate from Infected Hospitalised and Tested persons is the product of the 
contacts between Susceptible and infected Hospitalised Tested (arrayed per day of infection) and the infectivity 
per day of infection. 
Infectivity_Calc.infection_rate_Tested_Out_of_Hospital[Infection_Day] = 
contacts_between_Susceptible_and_infected_Tested_Out_of_Hospital*infectivity_per_day_of_infection 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The infection rate from Infected Tested persons is the product of the contacts between 
Susceptible and infected Tested (arrayed per day of infection) and the infectivity per day of infection. 
Infectivity_Calc.infectivity_per_day_of_infection[Infection_Day] = 
Normalised_relative_infectivity_per_day_of_infection*NORMAL_MAX_INFECTIVITY 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The Infectivity arrayed per day of infection. The normalised relative infectivity is multiplied 
by the maximum infectivity to produce the value of the infectivity for each different day of infection. This 
mechanism produced the following result: if the arrayed element "Infection day" is equal to 1 (e.g. this 
parameter is multiplied with the contacts of an Infected person at their 1st day of infection), it will select the 
point x=1 from the distribution in the "Normalised relative infectivity per day of infection" variable. This point, 
which is normalised, will then by multiplied by the Normal Max Infectivity to produce the actual infectivity 
potential for a person according to the day of Infection they are.  
Infectivity_Calc.NORMAL_MAX_INFECTIVITY = ,14 
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    UNITS: dmnl 
Infectivity_Calc.Normalised_relative_infectivity_per_day_of_infection[Infection_Day] = 
GRAPH(Transit_Day_TEST_INPUT) 
Points(30): (0,00, 0,000), (0,62, 0,000), (0,78, 0,244), (1,04, 0,499), (1,20, 0,699), (1,27, 0,748), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The curve was estimated from the study by He et al. (2020; Figure 1c, middle) and was 
adjusted to account for the 2-day latency period that was included in the model and normalised on a scale from 
0 to 1 to allow easy experimentation with the infectivity parameter. The Input "Transit Day" is only used in 
this case to allow the simulation to run and has no impact on the calculation.  
Infectivity_Calc.relative_infectiousness_of_Asymptomatic = ,5*1 + ,7*0 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The relative infectioussness of the Asymptomatic Infected describes the fraction of viral load 
or, more generally, infection potential that an asymptomatic person exhibits relative to all other severity 
categories. The model used by the Norwegian health authorities uses an estimate of 10% relative infectiousness 
of Asymptomatic (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a), but, here, we decided to use the more 
modest estimate of 50% used for the Imperial College model (Ferguson et al., 2020) 
Infectivity_Calc.Transit_Day_TEST_INPUT[Infection_Day] = Infection_Day 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: This is a variable used to allow the simulation to run. The variable has no input other than 
the Arrayed element itself, so that i returns 1 for the array "Infection day = 1", 2 for the the array "Infection 
day = 2"" etc. 
{ The model has 56 (1552) variables (array expansion in parens). 
  In this module and 0 additional modules with 4 sectors. 
  Stocks: 0 (0) Flows: 0 (0) Converters: 56 (1552) 
  Constants: 6 (6) Equations: 50 (1546) Graphicals: 2 (46) 
  There are also 141 expanded macro variables. 






Testing.Asymptomatc_identified = (asymptomatic_testing * effectiveness_of_identification) 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The actual value of Asymptomatic that are identified through contact tracing is given as the 
product of those tested and the assumed effectiveness of identification via contact tracing 
Testing.asymptomatic_testing = MIN(max_asymptomatic_testing_capacity;  
MIN(SUM_AI_per_day/minimum_time_to_test_a_case; asymptomatic_testing_based_on_contact_tracing)) 
    UNITS: person/day 
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    DOCUMENT: The actual testing of Asymptomatic Infected is equal to whatever is the lowest, either the 
maximum testing capacity for Asymptomatic, the total number of Asymptomatic that have been traced through 
contact tracing, or the total number of people that are Asymptomatic Infected (structure by ISEE systems, 
2020) 
Testing.asymptomatic_testing_based_on_contact_tracing = SWITCH_Contact_Tracing_Activated*(IF TIME 
< Contact_Tracing_Starttime THEN 0 ELSE recent_testing_positive * 
over_time_contacts_tested_per_tested_positive_baseline) 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT:  
    structure by ISEE systems, 2020) 
Testing.Contact_Tracing_Starttime = 93 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: Contact tracing is hypothesised to have begun at the beginning of April 
Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests(t) = Cumulative_Positive_Tests(t - dt) + (testing_positives) * dt 
    INIT Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of all confirmed via testing positive cases of COVID-19 in Norway. 
Increases through the testing positives rate 
    INFLOWS: 
        Testing.testing_positives = Main_Infection_Model.Testing_rates_SUM 
            UNITS: Person/Day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of increase in cumulative positive tests. Is equal to the sum of the testing rates 
for all severity categories. 
Testing.effect_of_Testing_Capacity_on_Target_Test_Rate_CCI = GRAPH(Testing_Capacity) 
Points(11): (0, 0,000), (1000, 0,33583091167), (2000, 0,560945103841), (3000, 0,7118436595), (4000, 
0,812993986277), (5000, 0,880797077978), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The hypothesized effect of testing capacity on the target test rate of Critical Care Infected. 
Infected in this severity category were the most prioritised and, therefore, it is expected to increase steeply 
Testing.effect_of_Testing_Capacity_on_Target_Test_Rate_HI = GRAPH(Testing_Capacity) 
Points(12): (0, 0,000), (1590,90909091, 0,310543881188), (3181,81818182, 0,526416574697), 
(4772,72727273, 0,676479166897), (6363,63636364, 0,780794266745), (7954,54545455, 0,853308275045), 
... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The hypothesized effect of testing capacity on the target test rate of Hospitalied Infected. It 
is expected to increase steeply as Testing Capacity increases and to saturate at high levels of capacity.  
Testing.effect_of_Testing_Capacity_on_Target_Test_Rate_SI = GRAPH(Testing_Capacity) 
Points(11): (0, 0,00669285092428), (1750, 0,0179862099621), (3500, 0,0474258731776), (5250, 
0,119202922022), (7000, 0,26894142137), (8750, 0,500), ... 
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    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The hypothesized effect of testing capacity on the target test rate of Symptomatic Infected. 
It is expected to increase slowly at low levels of Testing Capacity and reach it maximum at rather high levels 
of such capacity.  
Testing.effectiveness_of_identification = ,1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: Represents the maximum fraction of those tested through contact tracing that might be 
actually infected. It is assumed here to be constant and equal to 10% of all tested. 
Testing.max_asymptomatic_testing_capacity = Testing_Capacity-
(symptomatic_HI_testing+symptomatic_CCI_testing+ symptomatic_testing) 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The maximum testing capacity that remains available for the testing of Asymptomatic 
Infected is given as the total available capacity minus that which is used for testing of all the more severe 
categories (structure by ISEE systems, 2020) 
Testing.maximum_Target_Test_Rate_CCI = ,85 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: the maximum fraction of Critical Care infected individuals that can be identified through 
testing 
Testing.maximum_Target_Test_Rate_HI = ,65 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: the maximum fraction of Hospitalised infected individuals that can be identified through 
testing 
Testing.maximum_Target_Test_Rate_SI = ,45 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: the maximum fraction of Symptomatic infected individuals that can be identified through 
testing 
Testing.minimum_time_to_test_a_case = 1 
    UNITS: day 
    DOCUMENT: The minimum time to test a case is assumed to be 1 day given appropriate capacity in place 
Testing.over_time_contacts_tested_per_tested_positive_baseline = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(11): (90,0, 0,00), (117,5, 3,4065749153), (145,0, 6,11863184831), (172,5, 8,27776616674), (200,0, 
9,99670537788), (227,5, 11,3651945851), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The contacts traced per positive test over time. Contact tracing is assumed to have begun at 
the beginning of April. We do not have adequate information of how many contacts per positive test are traced 
in reality and even more so, at different points in time but the baseline assumption assumes a faster rate of 
increase earlier on that saturates at a maximum of 15 contacts per person 
Testing.over_time_contacts_tested_per_tested_positive_test_down = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(11): (90,0, 0,00), (117,5, 0,37), (145,0, 1,21), (172,5, 2,46), (200,0, 3,85), (227,5, 5,35), ... 
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    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: An alternative assumption of contacts traced per confirmed COVID-19 test. Assumes a 
slower increase and lower saturation point. Used here for testing purposes 
Testing.over_time_contacts_tested_per_tested_positive_test_slower = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(256): (90,0, 0,00), (91,0784313725, 0,00), (92,1568627451, 0,00), (93,2352941176, 0,00), 
(94,3137254902, 0,08), (95,3921568627, 0,08), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: An alternative assumption of contacts traced per confirmed COVID-19 test. Assumes a 
slower increase and the same saturation point as the baseline assumption. Used here for testing purposes 
Testing.over_time_contacts_tested_per_tested_positive_test_up = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(11): (90,0, 0,00), (117,5, 11,7540819085), (145,0, 19,6330786344), (172,5, 24,9145280825), (200,0, 
28,4547895197), (227,5, 30,8278977292), ... 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: An alternative assumption of contacts traced per confirmed COVID-19 test. Assumes a 
similarly steep increase as the baseline assumption but with much higher upper bounds for traced contacts. 
Used here for testing purposes 
Testing.recent_testing_positive = SMTH1(Main_Infection_Model.Testing_rates_SUM;  
testing_smooth_time;  0) {DELAY CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: Person/Day 
    DOCUMENT: For a positive test to lead to traced contacts, it needs to be processed and contacts should be 
documented. The process represented as a first order smoothing (structure by ISEE systems, 2020) 
Testing.SUM_AI_per_day = SUM(Main_Infection_Model.AI_per_day_of_infection) 
    UNITS: persons 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of Asymptomatic, non tested, Infected at all days of infection 
Testing.SUM_CCI_per_day = SUM(Main_Infection_Model.CCI_per_day_of_infection) 
    UNITS: persons 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of Critical Care, non tested, Infected at all days of infection 
Testing.SUM_HI_per_day = SUM(Main_Infection_Model.HI_per_day_of_infection) 
    UNITS: persons 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of Hospitalised, non tested, Infected at all days of infection 
Testing.SUM_SI_per_day = SUM(Main_Infection_Model.SI_per_day_of_infection) 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of Symptomatic, non tested, Infected at all days of infection 
Testing.SWITCH_Contact_Tracing_Activated = 1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Testing.symptomatic_CCI_testing = MIN(Testing_Capacity;  
(SUM_CCI_per_day/minimum_time_to_test_a_case) * Target_Test_Rate_CCI) 
    UNITS: PErson/Day 
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    DOCUMENT: The actual testing of Critical Care Infected is equal to whatever is the lowest, either the 
testing capacity, or the total number of people at this category multiplied by the target test rate (structure by 
ISEE systems, 2020) 
Testing.symptomatic_HI_testing = MIN(Testing_Capacity-symptomatic_CCI_testing;  
(SUM_HI_per_day/minimum_time_to_test_a_case) * Target_Test_Rate_HI) 
    UNITS: PErson/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The actual testing of Hospitalised Infected is equal to whatever is the lowest, either the testing 
capacity (minus that which is used for the more severely infected), or the total number of people at this category 
multiplied by the target test rate (structure by ISEE systems, 2020) 
Testing.symptomatic_testing = MIN(Testing_Capacity-symptomatic_HI_testing-symptomatic_CCI_testing;  
(SUM_SI_per_day/minimum_time_to_test_a_case) * Target_Test_Rate_SI) 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: The actual testing of Symptomatic Infected is equal to whatever is the lowest, either the 
testing capacity (minus that which is used for the more severely infected), or the total number of people at this 
category multiplied by the target test rate (structure by ISEE systems, 2020) 
Testing.Target_Test_Rate_CCI = 
effect_of_Testing_Capacity_on_Target_Test_Rate_CCI*maximum_Target_Test_Rate_CCI 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total Target Test Rate CCI represents the maximum fraction of Critical Care infected 
that can be identified through testing. It is the product of the effect of testing capacity on target test rate for this 
category (given on a scale from 0 to 1) and the actual maximum fraction that can be reached through testing 
Testing.Target_Test_Rate_HI = 
effect_of_Testing_Capacity_on_Target_Test_Rate_HI*maximum_Target_Test_Rate_HI 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total Target Test Rate HI represents the maximum fraction of Hospitalised infected that 
can be identified through testing. It is the product of the effect of testing capacity on target test rate for this 
category (given on a scale from 0 to 1) and the actual maximum fraction that can be reached through testing 
Testing.Target_Test_Rate_SI = 
effect_of_Testing_Capacity_on_Target_Test_Rate_SI*maximum_Target_Test_Rate_SI 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total Target Test Rate SI represents the maximum fraction of Symptomatic infected that 
can be identified through testing. It is the product of the effect of testing capacity on target test rate for this 
category (given on a scale from 0 to 1) and the actual maximum fraction that can be reached through testing 
Testing.test_rate_A! = Asymptomatc_identified//SUM_AI_per_day 
    INIT Testing.test_rate_A! = 0 
    UNITS: dmnl/day 
    DOCUMENT: The test rate, in fractional terms, is given as the ratio of the infected that we can test over the 
all non-tested, infected individuals at this severity category  
Testing.test_rate_CCI = symptomatic_CCI_testing // SUM_CCI_per_day 
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    INIT Testing.test_rate_CCI = 0 
    UNITS: 1/Days 
    DOCUMENT: The test rate, in fractional terms, is given as the ratio of the infected that we can test over the 
all non-tested, infected individuals at this severity category  
Testing.test_rate_HI = symptomatic_HI_testing // SUM_HI_per_day 
    INIT Testing.test_rate_HI = 0 
    UNITS: 1/Days 
    DOCUMENT: The test rate, in fractional terms, is given as the ratio of the infected that we can test over the 
all non-tested, infected individuals at this severity category  
Testing.test_rate_SI = symptomatic_testing // SUM_SI_per_day 
    INIT Testing.test_rate_SI = 0 
    UNITS: 1/Days 
    DOCUMENT: The test rate, in fractional terms, is given as the ratio of the infected that we can test over the 
all non-tested, infected individuals at this severity category  
Testing.Testing_Capacity(t) = Testing_Capacity(t - dt) + (change_in_Testing_Capacity) * dt 
    INIT Testing.Testing_Capacity = 0 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The capacity for COVID-19 testing (how many people per day can Norway test). It is a stock 
increasing through the change in testing capacity 
    INFLOWS: 
        Testing.change_in_Testing_Capacity = (IF TIME > 50 AND TIME < 100 THEN 
(Testing_Capacity_daily_addition) ELSE 0) 
            UNITS: (People/Day)/Day 
            DOCUMENT: The daily increase in testing capacity is equal to the daily addition of tests 
Testing.Testing_Capacity_daily_addition = 200 
    UNITS: (People/Day)/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The daily addition of test is assumed to be 200. 
Testing.testing_smooth_time = 7 
    UNITS: Days 






Testing."Positive_tests_by_sp._coll_day_DATA_june" = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(116): (53,0, 0,0), (54,0, 0,0), (55,0, 0,0), (56,0, 2,0), (57,0, 2,0), (58,0, 3,0), ... 
    UNITS: person/day 
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    DOCUMENT: "Number of tested persons per specimen collection date and number of positive results" (FHI, 
2020). Accessed 02.05.2020 
Testing."TOTAL_tests_by_sp._coll_day_DATA_june_2" = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(116): (53,0, 0,0), (54,0, 12,0), (55,0, 62,0), (56,0, 148,0), (57,0, 249,0), (58,0, 290,0), ... 
    UNITS: person/day 
    DOCUMENT: "Number of tested persons per specimen collection date and number of positive results" (FHI, 
2020). Accessed 02.05.2020 
Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests_DATA(t) = Cumulative_Positive_Tests_DATA(t - dt) + 
(testing_positives_DATA) * dt 
    INIT Testing.Cumulative_Positive_Tests_DATA = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The, according to data, total number of all confirmed via testing positive cases of COVID-
19 in Norway. Increases through the testing positives rate 
    INFLOWS: 
        Testing.testing_positives_DATA = "Positive_tests_by_sp._coll_day_DATA_june" 
            UNITS: Person/Day 
{ The model has 48 (224) variables (array expansion in parens). 
  In this module and 0 additional modules with 1 sectors. 
  Stocks: 3 (3) Flows: 3 (3) Converters: 42 (218) 
  Constants: 9 (9) Equations: 36 (212) Graphicals: 9 (9) 
  There are also 141 expanded macro variables. 




Main Infection Model 
Main_Infection_Model.AI_avg_duration_of_infection_2 = 20 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The average duration of infection for an Asymptomatic individual is assumed to be 20 days. 
Estimates by Bi et al., 2020 
Main_Infection_Model.AI_Recent_Recovered(t) = AI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + (Recovery_AI_s3 + 
Recovery_AI_s2 + Recovery_AI_s1 - Flow_143) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.AI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
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    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_AI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_AI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_AI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_143 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
 170 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.AI_Recovered(t) = AI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_143 + inf_end_AI_s2 + 
inf_end_AI_s3 + inf_end_AI_s1) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.AI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recovered from this severity category in the "long-
term" (after the end of their stay in the "recent recovered" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_143 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_AI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_AI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_AI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow = 
AI_avg_duration_of_infection_2/number_of_stages 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category is divided by the number of 
sub-stages of the category to give the value of the recovery time for individuals at each sub-stage. 
Main_Infection_Model.AI_s2(t) = AI_s2(t - dt) + (AI_s2_rate - inf_end_AI_s2 - Testing_AI_s2 - AI_s3_rate 
- Recovery_AI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.AI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.AI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
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            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_AI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_AI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_A! 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.AI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_AI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.AI_s3(t) = AI_s3(t - dt) + (AI_s3_rate - inf_end_AI_s3 - Testing_AI_s3 - 
becoming_Symptomatic_Infected - Recovery_AI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.AI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.AI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_AI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_AI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_A! 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Symptomatic_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_AI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 




    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category is divided by the number of 
sub-stages of the category to give the value of the time to progress to a more severe stage for an average 
individual at each sub-stage. 
Main_Infection_Model.Asymptomatic_Infected(t) = Asymptomatic_Infected(t - dt) + (becoming_infectious + 
Imported_Cases - inf_end_AI_s1 - Testing_AI_s1 - AI_s2_rate - Recovery_AI_s1) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Asymptomatic_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Infected persons who do not show any symptoms associated with COVID-19. 
The stock of Asymptomatic Infected increases through the Infection Rate and decreases through Recovery, 
Testing, or progression to the next stage of the disease (AI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_infectious = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Imported_Cases = (Daily_Recorded_Imported_Cases_UTLAND+ 
(,4*Daily_Recorded_Imported_Cases_UTLAND)) {UNIFLOW} 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: The rate of imported cases introduced to Norway per day. The imported cases are 
assumed to directly enter the Infected (and infectious) Population from the first stage of infection, that is, the 
distribution of imported cases at different stages and days of infection is not considered. We also assume a 
(perhaps very moderate) additional 40% of confirmed cases as never tested.  
            NOT SURE CLEAR 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_AI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_AI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_A! 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.AI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_AI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.avg_incubation_period = 4 
 175 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The average incubation period (time from infection to development of symptoms) ranges 
from around 4 to 6 days (M. Park, Cook, Lim, Sun, & Dickens, 2020). Due to a 2-days discrete latency period, 
we use lower bound of 4 days. 
Main_Infection_Model.AVG_STAY_IN_CRITICAL_CARE_BEFORE_DEATH = 12 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: For the average duration of a Critical Care admission, we used the 12-day estimate from the 
two developed Norwegian models (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a; NTNU COVID-19 
Taskforce, 2020).  
Main_Infection_Model.AVG_STAY_IN_CRITICAL_CARE_BEFORE_RECOVERY = 10*0 +12*1 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: For the average duration of a Critical Care admission, we used the 12-day estimate from the 
two developed Norwegian models (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a; NTNU COVID-19 
Taskforce, 2020).  
Main_Infection_Model.avg_stay_in_hospital_before_CC_admission = 3 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The average duration of hospitalisation for patients who eventually get admitted to Critical 
Care units is 3 days. This time period was used by Tuite et al., (2020 based on estimates by Wang et al., 2020). 
Models in the Norwegian population optimise for a 4-day period (NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020); 
(Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a).  
     
Main_Infection_Model.AVG_STAY_IN_HOSPITAL_BEFORE_DEATH = 8 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The average stay in hospital for patients dying without a Critical Care admission is equal to 
the time the same patients would recover. The 8-day period is in accordance with values used by the Norwegian 
Institute of Public Health - FHI, (2020a) and by Ferguson et al., (2020) 
Main_Infection_Model.avg_stay_in_hospital_no_CC_admission = 8 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The average stay in hospital for patients recovering without the need for Critical Care 
Admission. An 8-day period was chosen in accordance with models applied to the norwegian population 
(Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020a; NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020) 
Main_Infection_Model.AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill = 5*1+ (5/2)*0 
    UNITS: days 
Main_Infection_Model.avg_time_to_hospitalisation_after_symptom_onset = 5 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The average time from symptom onset to hospitalisation varies in different countries and 
even different time period of the COVID-19 spread in the same country. We use the 5 days assumption used 
by Ferguson et al. (2020) and Struben (2020). 
Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Dead(t) = CCI_Dead(t - dt) + (Flow_140) * dt 
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    INIT Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Dead = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have died from this severity category in the "long-term" 
(after the end of their stay in the "recent dead" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_140 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Recent_Dead(t) = CCI_Recent_Dead(t - dt) + (Dying_CCI_s3 + Dying_CCI_s2 
+ Dying_CCI_s1 - Flow_140) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Recent_Dead = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently died from this severity category. Dead 
individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
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        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_140 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Recent_Recovered(t) = CCI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + (Recovery_CCI_s3 + 
Recovery_CCI_s2 + Recovery_CCI_s1 - Flow_135) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
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            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_135 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Recovered(t) = CCI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_135 + inf_end_CCI_s2 + 
inf_end_CCI_s3 + inf_end_CCI_s1) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.CCI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recovered from this severity category in the "long-
term" (after the end of their stay in the "recent recovered" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_135 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_CCI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_CCI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_CCI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow = 
AVG_STAY_IN_CRITICAL_CARE_BEFORE_RECOVERY/number_of_stages 
    UNITS: days 
Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s2(t) = CCI_s2(t - dt) + (CCI_s2_rate - inf_end_CCI_s2 - Dying_CCI_s2 - 
Testing_CCI_s2 - CCI_s3_rate - Recovery_CCI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_CCI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_CCI 
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            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s3(t) = CCI_s3(t - dt) + (CCI_s3_rate - inf_end_CCI_s3 - Dying_CCI_s3 - 
Testing_CCI_s3 - Recovery_CCI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
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            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_CCI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_CCI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 





    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category before death is divided by the 
number of sub-stages of the category to give the value of the time spent before death for each of the sub-stages 
Main_Infection_Model.Critical_Care_Infected(t) = Critical_Care_Infected(t - dt) + 
(becoming_Critical_Care_Infected - inf_end_CCI_s1 - Dying_CCI_s1 - Testing_CCI_s1 - CCI_s2_rate - 
Recovery_CCI_s1) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Critical_Care_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Infected persons who are in critical care due to a COVID-19 infection. The 
stock of Critical Care Infected increases through the becoming Critical Care Infected rate and decreases through 
Recovery, Testing, or progression to the next stage of the disease (CCI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Critical_Care_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_CCI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_CCI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.CCI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.Daily_Recorded_Imported_Cases_UTLAND = GRAPH(TIME+2) 
Points(151): (0,0, 0,0), (1,0, 0,0), (2,0, 0,0), (3,0, 0,0), (4,0, 0,0), (5,0, 0,0), ... 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: Developed based on data from FHIs daily reports. The 1st reported infection (by testing day) 
was the 21st of February (model time 51). We assume a 4-day delay in this identification and introduce the 
first case on the 17th of February (model time 47). Due to the lack of reporting between the first case (21.02) 
and the initiation of the Daily Reports (08.03), we extrapolated those points using a power trendline (R^2 = 
0,8721). To improve fit, we only used the first 22 data-points for the extrapolation (missing datapoints 5 to 16).  
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An exponential trendline, while giving higher R^2 seems unlikely as it might underrepresent the initial 
imported case. Due to an overestimation at the first extrapolated data points, the value of the actual confirmed 
cases data were used instead of the extrapolated ones.  
Main_Infection_Model.Exposed_Non_Contagious(t) = Exposed_Non_Contagious(t - dt) + (Infection_Rate - 
becoming_infectious) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Exposed_Non_Contagious = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = 2 
        INFLOW LIMIT = INF 
        CAPACITY = INF 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of people who are infected with the disease but are not yet contagious. It increases 
as people get infected and decreases as people become infectious. The total transit time, the time each individual 
spends in the non-contagious stage, is assumed to be 2 days  
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Infection_Rate = Infectivity_Calc.Infection_Rate_SUM {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of infections per day. The Infection rate is the sum of all possible infections for 
infected according to their infectivity profile (see Infectivity Module variables for more details). 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_infectious = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_AI_becoming_SI = ,6*0 +,55*1 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of the Asymptomatic Infected that will eventually develop symptoms. Estimates 
of the proportion of infections that remain asymptomatic range from 5% to 80% (for a quick review, see 
Heneghan, Brassey, & Jefferson, 2020) but commonly used values are closer to 35-50% (Ferguson et al., 2020; 
Ferretti et al., 2020; Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020; NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020). 
Here, we assume that 45% of infections will remain asymptomatic, hence the fraction of Asymptomatic 
Infected that will become Symptomatic is assumed to be 55%.  
     
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_AI_recovering = (1-fraction_AI_becoming_SI) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_becoming_more_severy = 2/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_CCI_dying = ,5*0 + 1/5 
    UNITS: dmnl 
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Main_Infection_Model.fraction_CCI_recovering = (1-fraction_CCI_dying) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category is divided by the number of 
sub-stages of the category to give the value of the recovery time for individuals at each sub-stage. 
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_HI_becoming_CCI = ,45 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of the Hospitalised Infected that are assumed to enter Critical Care. The value 
of 40% accounts for 11% of all infected. Values used in epidemiological models are relatively lower (e.g. 30% 
in Ferguson et al., 2020; NTNU COVID-19 Taskforce, 2020), however, those parameters are dependent to 
some extent to the structure used in these models. 
     
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_HI_dying = ,01*0 + 0,01 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_HI_recovering = (1-fraction_HI_dying) 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_SI_becoming_HI = ,4 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of the Symptomatic Infected that are assumed to become hospitalised. The value 
of 40% accounts for 22% of all infected. Estimates are closer to 16-17% (e.g. Gaythorpe et al., 2020; Homer, 
2020), however there are expected to be some discrepancies due to the structural components of our model  
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_SI_recovering = 1-fraction_SI_becoming_HI 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_Dead(t) = HI_Dead(t - dt) + (Flow_158) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.HI_Dead = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have died from this severity category in the "long-term" 
(after the end of their stay in the "recent dead" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_158 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_Recent_Dead(t) = HI_Recent_Dead(t - dt) + (Dying_HI_s3 + Dying_HI_s2 + 
Dying_HI_s1 - Flow_158) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.HI_Recent_Dead = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
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    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently died from this severity category. Dead 
individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_158 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
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Main_Infection_Model.HI_Recent_Recovered(t) = HI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + (Recovery_HI_s3 + 
Recovery_HI_s2 + Recovery_HI_s1 - Flow_157) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.HI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_157 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_Recovered(t) = HI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_157 + inf_end_HI_s2 + 
inf_end_HI_s3 + inf_end_HI_s1) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.HI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recovered from this severity category in the "long-
term" (after the end of their stay in the "recent recovered" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_157 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_HI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_HI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_HI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow = 
avg_stay_in_hospital_no_CC_admission/number_of_stages 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category is divided by the number of 
sub-stages of the category to give the value of the recovery time for individuals at each sub-stage. 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_s2(t) = HI_s2(t - dt) + (HI_s2_rate - inf_end_HI_s2 - Dying_HI_s2 - 
Testing_HI_s2 - HI_s3_rate - Recovery_HI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.HI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
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    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.HI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_HI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_HI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.HI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
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            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_s3(t) = HI_s3(t - dt) + (HI_s3_rate - inf_end_HI_s3 - Dying_HI_s3 - 
Testing_HI_s3 - becoming_Critical_Care_Infected - Recovery_HI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.HI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.HI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
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        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_HI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_HI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Critical_Care_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 




    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category before death is divided by the 
number of sub-stages of the category to give the value of the time spent before death for each of the sub-stages 
Main_Infection_Model.HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow = 
avg_stay_in_hospital_before_CC_admission/number_of_stages 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category is divided by the number of 
sub-stages of the category to give the value of the time to progress to a more severe stage for an average 
individual at each sub-stage. 
Main_Infection_Model.Hospitalised_Infected(t) = Hospitalised_Infected(t - dt) + 
(becoming_Hospitalised_Infected - inf_end_HI_s1 - Dying_HI_s1 - Testing_HI_s1 - HI_s2_rate - 
Recovery_HI_s1) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Hospitalised_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Infected persons who are hospitalised due to a COVID-19 infection. The stock 
of Hospitalsied Infected increases through the becoming Hospitalised Infected rate and decreases through 
Recovery, Testing, or progression to the next stage of the disease (HI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Hospitalised_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_HI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_HI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.HI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 5 
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            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.number_of_stages = 3 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The number of stages at each severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.SI_avg_duration_of_infection_3 = 16 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: We assume due to lack of evidence to the contrary that Asymptomatic and Symptomatic will 
have the same duration of infection of total 20 days. With an estimated average duration of infection for 
Asymptomatic Infected of 20 days and an average incubation period of 4 days, the average duration of infection 
for a Symptomatic Infected person is 16 days.  
Main_Infection_Model.SI_Recent_Recovered(t) = SI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + (Recovery_SI_s3 + 
Recovery_SI_s2 + Recovery_SI_s1 - Flow_150) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.SI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_SI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_SI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
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            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_SI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_150 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.SI_Recovered(t) = SI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_150 + inf_end_SI_s2 + 
inf_end_SI_s3 + inf_end_SI_s1) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.SI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recovered from this severity category in the "long-
term" (after the end of their stay in the "recent recovered" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_150 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_SI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_SI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
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            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_SI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow = 
SI_avg_duration_of_infection_3/number_of_stages 
    UNITS: days 
    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category is divided by the number of 
sub-stages of the category to give the value of the recovery time for individuals at each sub-stage. 
Main_Infection_Model.SI_s2(t) = SI_s2(t - dt) + (SI_s2_rate - inf_end_SI_s2 - Testing_SI_s2 - SI_s3_rate - 
Recovery_SI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.SI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.SI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_SI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_SI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_SI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.SI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_SI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.SI_s3(t) = SI_s3(t - dt) + (SI_s3_rate - inf_end_SI_s3 - Testing_SI_s3 - 
becoming_Hospitalised_Infected - Recovery_SI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.SI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.SI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
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    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_SI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_SI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_SI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Hospitalised_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_SI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 




    UNITS: days 
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    DOCUMENT: The total duration individuals spend at this severity category is divided by the number of 
sub-stages of the category to give the value of the time to progress to a more severe stage for an average 
individual at each sub-stage. 
Main_Infection_Model.Susceptible(t) = Susceptible(t - dt) + ( - Infection_Rate) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Susceptible = NORWAY_INIT_POP 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The Population that is Susceptible to an infection by COVID-19. The Susceptible Population 
decreases through the infection rate as people get infected with the virus. The initial Susceptible Population is 
the entire population of Norway, and births or deaths with cause other than COVID are not considered here. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Infection_Rate = Infectivity_Calc.Infection_Rate_SUM {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of infections per day. The Infection rate is the sum of all possible infections for 
infected according to their infectivity profile (see Infectivity Module variables for more details). 
Main_Infection_Model.Symptomatic_Infected(t) = Symptomatic_Infected(t - dt) + 
(becoming_Symptomatic_Infected - inf_end_SI_s1 - Testing_SI_s1 - SI_s2_rate - Recovery_SI_s1) * dt 
{CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Symptomatic_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Infected persons who show symptoms associated with COVID-19. The stock 
of Symptomatic Infected increases through the becoming Symptomatic Infected rate and decreases through 
Recovery, Testing, or progression to the next stage of the disease (SI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Symptomatic_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_SI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
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        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_SI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_SI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
        Main_Infection_Model.SI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_SI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_Recent_Recovered(t) = T_AI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + (Recovery_T_AI_s3 
+ Recovery_T_AI_s2 + Recovery_T_AI_s1 - Flow_161) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
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    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_AI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_AI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_AI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_161 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
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            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_Recovered(t) = T_AI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_161 + inf_end_T_AI_s2 + 
inf_end_T_AI_s3 + inf_end_T_AI_s1) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recovered from this severity category in the "long-
term" (after the end of their stay in the "recent recovered" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_161 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_AI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_AI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_AI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s2(t) = T_AI_s2(t - dt) + (T_AI_s2_rate + Testing_AI_s2 - inf_end_T_AI_s2 - 
T_AI_s3_rate - Recovery_T_AI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_AI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_A! 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_AI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_AI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s3(t) = T_AI_s3(t - dt) + (T_AI_s3_rate + Testing_AI_s3 - inf_end_T_AI_s3 - 
becoming_Tested_Symptomatic_Infected - Recovery_T_AI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
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    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_AI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_A! 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_AI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Tested_Symptomatic_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_AI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Dead(t) = T_CCI_Dead(t - dt) + (Flow_160) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Dead = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have died from this severity category in the "long-term" 
(after the end of their stay in the "recent dead" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_160 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Recent_Dead(t) = T_CCI_Recent_Dead(t - dt) + (Dying_T_CCI_s3 + 
Dying_T_CCI_s1 + Dying_T_CCI_s2 - Flow_160) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Recent_Dead = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently died from this severity category. Dead 
individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_160 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Recent_Recovered(t) = T_CCI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + 
(Recovery_T_CCI_s3 + Recovery_T_CCI_s2 + Recovery_T_CCI_s1 - Flow_159) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
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    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_159 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Recovered(t) = T_CCI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_159 + inf_end_T_CCI_s2 
+ inf_end_T_CCI_s3 + inf_end_T_CCI_s1) * dt 
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    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_159 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_CCI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_CCI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_CCI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s2(t) = T_CCI_s2(t - dt) + (T_CCI_s2_rate + Testing_CCI_s2 - 
inf_end_T_CCI_s2 - T_CCI_s3_rate - Dying_T_CCI_s2 - Recovery_T_CCI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_CCI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_CCI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_CCI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
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Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s3(t) = T_CCI_s3(t - dt) + (T_CCI_s3_rate + Testing_CCI_s3 - 
inf_end_T_CCI_s3 - Dying_T_CCI_s3 - Recovery_T_CCI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_CCI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_CCI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
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            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_CCI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Dead(t) = T_HI_Dead(t - dt) + (Flow_164) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Dead = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have died from this severity category in the "long-term" 
(after the end of their stay in the "recent dead" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_164 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Recent_Dead(t) = T_HI_Recent_Dead(t - dt) + (Dying_T_HI_s3 + 
Dying_T_HI_s1 + Dying_T_HI_s2 - Flow_164) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Recent_Dead = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently died from this severity category. Dead 
individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_164 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently dead individuals to the "long-term" dead stock 
after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Recent_Recovered(t) = T_HI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + (Recovery_T_HI_s3 
+ Recovery_T_HI_s2 + Recovery_T_HI_s1 - Flow_163) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
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    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_163 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
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Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Recovered(t) = T_HI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_163 + inf_end_T_HI_s2 + 
inf_end_T_HI_s3 + inf_end_T_HI_s1) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recovered from this severity category in the "long-
term" (after the end of their stay in the "recent recovered" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_163 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_HI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_HI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_HI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s2(t) = T_HI_s2(t - dt) + (T_HI_s2_rate + Testing_HI_s2 - inf_end_T_HI_s2 - 
Dying_T_HI_s2 - T_HI_s3_rate - Recovery_T_HI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
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        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_HI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_HI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_HI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
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            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s3(t) = T_HI_s3(t - dt) + (T_HI_s3_rate + Testing_HI_s3 - inf_end_T_HI_s3 - 
Dying_T_HI_s3 - becoming_Tested_Critical_Care_Infected - Recovery_T_HI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_HI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_HI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
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            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Tested_Critical_Care_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_HI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_Recent_Recovered(t) = T_SI_Recent_Recovered(t - dt) + (Recovery_T_SI_s3 + 
Recovery_T_SI_s2 + Recovery_T_SI_s1 - Flow_162) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_Recent_Recovered = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
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    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recently recovered from this severity category. 
Recovered individuals remain in this stock until 45 days (=transit time) have passed since they became 
infectious 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_SI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_SI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_SI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
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        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_162 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_Recovered(t) = T_SI_Recovered(t - dt) + (Flow_162 + inf_end_T_SI_s2 + 
inf_end_T_SI_s3 + inf_end_T_SI_s1) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_Recovered = 0 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people who have recovered from this severity category in the "long-
term" (after the end of their stay in the "recent recovered" stock) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Flow_162 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The drop-off flow transports recently recovered individuals to the "long-term" 
recovered stock after the end of the transit time (45 days) 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_SI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_SI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_SI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_s2(t) = T_SI_s2(t - dt) + (TSI_s2_rate + Testing_SI_s2 - inf_end_T_SI_s2 - 
T_SI_s3_rate - Recovery_T_SI_s2) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_s2 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.TSI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
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            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_SI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_SI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_SI_s2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_SI_s2 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
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Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_s3(t) = T_SI_s3(t - dt) + (T_SI_s3_rate + Testing_SI_s3 - inf_end_T_SI_s3 - 
becoming_Tested_Hospitalised_Infected - Recovery_T_SI_s3) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_s3 = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_SI_s3_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_SI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_SI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_SI_s3 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Tested_Hospitalised_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
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            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_SI_s3 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Asymptomatic_Infected(t) = Tested_Asymptomatic_Infected(t - dt) + 
(Testing_AI_s1 - inf_end_T_AI_s1 - T_AI_s2_rate - Recovery_T_AI_s1) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Asymptomatic_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Infected persons who do not show any symptoms associated with COVID-19. 
The stock of Tested Asymptomatic Infected increases through the testing rate for Asymptomatic at this stage 
and decreases through Recovery or progression to the next stage of the disease (T AI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_AI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_A! 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_AI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_AI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
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            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_AI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_recovering/AI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Critical_Care_Infected(t) = Tested_Critical_Care_Infected(t - dt) + 
(becoming_Tested_Critical_Care_Infected + Testing_CCI_s1 - inf_end_T_CCI_s1 - T_CCI_s2_rate - 
Dying_T_CCI_s1 - Recovery_T_CCI_s1) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Critical_Care_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Tested Infected who are in critical care due to a COVID-19 infection. The stock 
of Critical Care Infected increases either through the testing rate or through the becoming Hospitalised Infected 
rate and decreases through Recovery, Dying, or progression to the next stage of the disease (T CCI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Tested_Critical_Care_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
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            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_CCI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_CCI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_CCI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_becoming_more_severy/AVG_time_to_become_more_severely_ill 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_dying/CCI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_CCI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_CCI_recovering/CCI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
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            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Hospitalised_Infected(t) = Tested_Hospitalised_Infected(t - dt) + 
(becoming_Tested_Hospitalised_Infected + Testing_HI_s1 - inf_end_T_HI_s1 - Dying_T_HI_s1 - 
T_HI_s2_rate - Recovery_T_HI_s1) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Hospitalised_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Tested Infected persons who are hospitalised due to a COVID-19 infection. The 
stock of Tested Hospitalsied Infected increases either through the testing rate or through the becoming 
Hospitalised Infected rate and decreases through Recovery, Dying, or progression to the next stage of the 
disease (T HI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Tested_Hospitalised_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_HI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
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            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_HI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.Dying_T_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_dying/HI_time_spent_before_death_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage die. It is represented as a 
material delay given by the fraction of infected dying over the avg time before death for this particular outflow. 
        Main_Infection_Model.T_HI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = 
fraction_HI_becoming_CCI/HI_time_to_become_CCI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_HI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_HI_recovering/HI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 4 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
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Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Symptomatic_Infected(t) = Tested_Symptomatic_Infected(t - dt) + 
(becoming_Tested_Symptomatic_Infected + Testing_SI_s1 - inf_end_T_SI_s1 - TSI_s2_rate - 
Recovery_T_SI_s1) * dt {CONVEYOR} 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.Tested_Symptomatic_Infected = 0 
        TRANSIT TIME = "transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" 
    CONTINUOUS 
    ACCEPT MULTIPLE BATCHES 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The stock of Tested Symptomatic Infected persons who show symptoms associated with 
COVID-19. The stock of Tested Symptomatic Infected increases either through the testing rate or through the 
becoming Symptomatic Infected rate and decreases through Recovery or progression to the next stage of the 
disease (T SI s2 rate). 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.becoming_Tested_Symptomatic_Infected = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_AI_becoming_SI/AI_time_to_become_SI_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Testing_SI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = Testing.test_rate_SI 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage get tested. It is given as the 
product of the number of people currently in the stock and the respective fractional testing rate. 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.inf_end_T_SI_s1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            UNITS: person/day 
        Main_Infection_Model.TSI_s2_rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_becoming_HI/SI_time_to_become_HI_distribution_per_flow 
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            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 1 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 2 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate of movement to the next stage of infection is represented as a material delay 
controlled by the fraction that is expected to move to the next stage over the avg time to move to the next stage 
        Main_Infection_Model.Recovery_T_SI_s1 = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
            LEAKAGE FRACTION = fraction_SI_recovering/SI_recovery_time_distribution_per_flow 
            EXPONENTIAL LEAKAGE 
            LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
            CONVEYOR FILL = BASED ON SOURCE 
            INFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            OUTFLOW PRIORITY: 3 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: The rate at which Infected individuals at this severity stage recover. It is represented as 
a material delay given by the fraction of infected recovering over the avg recovery time controlling this 
particular outflow. 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Dead_CCI = CCI_Recent_Dead+CCI_Dead 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have died from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Dead_HI = HI_Recent_Dead+HI_Dead 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have died from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Dead_T_CCI = T_CCI_Recent_Dead+T_CCI_Dead 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have died from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Dead_T_HI = T_HI_Recent_Dead+T_HI_Dead 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have died from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_AI = AI_Recovered+AI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have recovered from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_CCI = CCI_Recovered+CCI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have recovered from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_HI = HI_Recovered+HI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 
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    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have recovered from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_SI = SI_Recovered+SI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have recovered from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_T_AI = T_AI_Recovered+T_AI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have recovered from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_T_CCI = T_CCI_Recovered+T_CCI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have recovered from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_T_HI = T_HI_Recovered+T_HI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of infected persons who have recovered from this severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Recovered_T_SI = T_SI_Recovered+T_SI_Recent_Recovered 
    UNITS: People 





Main_Infection_Model.fr_AI_of_Total = Total_AI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_ALL_who_have_been_CCI_of_total = 
(Total_Dead_CCI+Total_Recovered_CCI)//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 




    UNITS: dmnl 




    UNITS: dmnl 





    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has recovered or died as Tested Hospitalised Infected out of all COVID-19 
infections  
Main_Infection_Model.fr_CCI_of_Total = Total_CCI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_DEAD_as_CCI_of_Total = Total_Dead_CCI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has died as Critical Care Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_DEAD_as_HI_of_Total = Total_Dead_HI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has died as Hospitalised Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_DEAD_as_T_CCI_of_Total = Total_Dead_T_CCI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has died as tested Critical Care Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_DEAD_as_T_HI_of_Total = Total_Dead_T_HI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has died as Tested Hospitalised Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_DEAD_who_have_been_CCI_or_T_CCI_of_Total = 
fr_DEAD_as_CCI_of_Total+fr_DEAD_as_T_CCI_of_Total 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has died as Critical Care Infected (tested or not tested) out of all COVID-
19 infections  
Main_Infection_Model.fr_DEAD_who_have_been_HI_or_T_HI_of_Total = 
fr_DEAD_as_HI_of_Total+fr_DEAD_as_T_HI_of_Total 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has died as Hospitalised Infected (tested or not tested) out of all COVID-
19 infections  
Main_Infection_Model.fr_HI_of_Total = Total_HI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_REC_who_have_been_CCI_or_T_CCI_of_Total = 
fr_recovered_as_CCI_of_Total+fr_recovered_as_T_CCI_of_Total 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has recovered as Critical Care Infected (tested or not tested) out of all 
COVID-19 infections  
Main_Infection_Model.fr_REC_who_have_been_HI_or_T_HI_of_Total = 
fr_recovered_as_HI_of_Total+fr_recovered_as_T_HI_of_Total 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has recovered as Hospitalised Infected (tested or not tested) out of all 
COVID-19 infections  
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Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_AI_of_Total = Total_Recovered_AI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Asymptomtic Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_CCI_of_Total = Total_Recovered_CCI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Critical Care Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_HI_of_Total = Total_Recovered_HI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Hospitalised Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_SI_of_Total = Total_Recovered_SI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Symptomatic Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_T_AI_of_Total = Total_Recovered_T_AI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Tested Asymptomtic Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_T_CCI_of_Total = 
Total_Recovered_T_CCI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Tested Critical Care Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_T_HI_of_Total = Total_Recovered_T_HI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Tested Hospitalised Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_recovered_as_T_SI_of_Total = Total_Recovered_T_SI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of all cases that has recovered as Tested Symptomatic Infected 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_SI_of_Total = Total_SI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_T_AI_of_Total = Total_T_AI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_T_CCI_of_Total = Total_T_CCI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_T_HI_of_Total = Total_T_HI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fr_T_SI_of_Total = Total_T_SI//All_Cumulative_Cases 
    UNITS: dmnl 
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_Asymptomatic_of_Total_Infected = 
fr_recovered_as_AI_of_Total+fr_recovered_as_T_AI_of_Total 
    UNITS: dmnl 
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    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has recovered or died as Critical Care Infected (tested or not tested) out of 
all COVID-19 infections  
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_Hospitalised_of_Total_Infected = 
fr_ALL_who_have_been_HI_of_total+fr_ALL_who_have_been_T_HI_of_total 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has recovered or died as Hospitalised Infected (tested or not tested) out of 
all COVID-19 infections  
Main_Infection_Model.fraction_Symptomatic_of_Total_Infected = 
fr_recovered_as_SI_of_Total+fr_recovered_as_T_SI_of_Total 
    UNITS: dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction that has recovered as Symptomatic (tested or not tested) out of all COVID-19 
infections  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_AI = AI_s2 + AI_s3 + Asymptomatic_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Asymptomatic infected at all three sub-stages  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_CCI = CCI_s2 + CCI_s3 + Critical_Care_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Critical Care infected at all three sub-stages  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_HI = HI_s2 + HI_s3 + Hospitalised_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Hospitalised infected at all three sub-stages  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_SI = SI_s2 + SI_s3 + Symptomatic_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Symptomatic infected at all three sub-stages  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_T_AI = T_AI_s2 + T_AI_s3 + Tested_Asymptomatic_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All tested Asymptomatic infected at all three sub-stages  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_T_CCI = T_CCI_s2 + T_CCI_s3 + Tested_Critical_Care_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All tested Critical Care infected at all three sub-stages  
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Main_Infection_Model.Total_T_HI = T_HI_s2 + T_HI_s3 + Tested_Hospitalised_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All tested Hospitalised infected at all three sub-stages  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_T_SI = T_SI_s2 + T_SI_s3 + Tested_Symptomatic_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 




These calculations have been exluded from the full documentation. The all consist from the following 
calculation: 
Persons are arrayed by “slats”, positions within the conveyor for every DT. With our used ¼ DT and 45 
days of Transit Time for each Conveyor, each Conveyor stock has 180 slats. Those slats are calculated 
from the end of the Conveyor, (person enters the Conveyor at the 180th slat, moves to 179th etc. until it 
leaves it from slat 1). To transform “slats” to days of infection, we have inversed the positioning and 
combined 4 slats to represent 1 time unit (1 day). An example of the calculation is: 
Main_Infection_Model.AI_per_day_of_infection[1] = SUM(AI[177:180]) 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: The number of Asymptomatic Infected persons, arrayed by the day of infection they are 
currently underway.  
In this example, we take the SUM of Asymptomatic Infected at slats 177 to 180, and place them in the 1st 
position of the “day of infection” array. In this way, the sum of all units within those slats is now what 
we will get if we ask the Software to return the value of Asymptomatic Infected at day of infection = 1. 




Main_Infection_Model.Becoming_Tested_CCI = Testing_CCI_s1 + Testing_CCI_s2 + Testing_CCI_s3 + 
becoming_Tested_Critical_Care_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of infected people who enter daily Intensive care or are being confirmed as 
infected after admission. 
Main_Infection_Model.Becoming_Tested_Hospitalised = Testing_HI_s1 + Testing_HI_s2 + Testing_HI_s3 + 
becoming_Tested_Hospitalised_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of infected people who become daily hospitalised or are being confirmed as 
infected after admission. 
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Main_Infection_Model.Testing_rates_SUM = Testing_AI_s1 + Testing_AI_s2 + Testing_AI_s3 + 
Testing_CCI_s1 + Testing_CCI_s2 + Testing_CCI_s3 + Testing_HI_s1 + Testing_HI_s2 + Testing_HI_s3 + 
Testing_SI_s1 + Testing_SI_s2 + Testing_SI_s3 {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: PErson/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The sum of daily testing rates in all severity categories.  
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Dying = Dying_CCI_s1 + Dying_CCI_s2 + Dying_CCI_s3 + Dying_HI_s1 + 
Dying_HI_s2 + Dying_HI_s3 + Dying_T_CCI_s1 + Dying_T_CCI_s2 + Dying_T_CCI_s3 + Dying_T_HI_s1 
+ Dying_T_HI_s2 + Dying_T_HI_s3 {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The total number of people dying per day due to a COVID-19 infection or related 
complications 
Main_Infection_Model.Total_Dying_Tested = Dying_T_CCI_s1 + Dying_T_CCI_s2 + Dying_T_CCI_s3 + 
Dying_T_HI_s1 + Dying_T_HI_s2 + Dying_T_HI_s3 {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People/Day 






Main_Infection_Model.All_Cumulative_Cases(t) = All_Cumulative_Cases(t - dt) + (Daily_New_Cases) * dt 
    INIT Main_Infection_Model.All_Cumulative_Cases = 0 
    UNITS: person 
    DOCUMENT: All the cases ever to have been infected by covid-19. increases through the daily new cases 
flow 
    INFLOWS: 
        Main_Infection_Model.Daily_New_Cases = Infection_Rate+Imported_Cases 
            UNITS: person/day 
            DOCUMENT: the sum of local and imported cases of covid-19 
Main_Infection_Model.All_ever_infected_as_fraction_of_the_population = 
All_Cumulative_Cases//NORWAY_INIT_POP 
    UNITS: Dmnl 
    DOCUMENT: The fraction of the population that has been ever infected by covid-19 is given as the ratio of 





Main_Infection_Model.Confirmed_Daily_New_Cases_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
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Points(119): (50,0, 0,0), (51,0, 1,0), (52,0, 0,0), (53,0, 0,0), (54,0, 0,0), (55,0, 0,0), ... 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: Daily new cases as reported by the Norwegian Health authorities. Data from "Number of 
reported COVID-19 cases by specimen collection date" (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020). 
Accessed 15.06.20 
Main_Infection_Model.Cumulative_Confirmed_Cases_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(119): (50,0, 0,0), (51,0, 1,0), (52,0, 1,0), (53,0, 1,0), (54,0, 1,0), (55,0, 1,0), ... 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: Cumulative COVID-19 confirmed cases as reported by the Norwegian Health authorities. 
Data from "Number of reported COVID-19 cases by specimen collection date" (Norwegian Institute of Public 
Health - FHI, 2020). Accessed 15.06.20 
Main_Infection_Model.Cumulative_Deaths_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(79): (70,00, 0,0), (71,00, 1,0), (72,00, 1,0), (73,00, 1,0), (74,00, 3,0), (75,00, 3,0), ... 
    UNITS: Persons 
    DOCUMENT: Cumulative as reported by the Norwegian Health authorities. Data from daily reports 
(Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020). Accessed 15.06.20 
Main_Infection_Model.Cumulative_Intensive_Care_Admissions_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(78): (68,00, 0,0), (69,00, 3,0), (70,00, 5,0), (71,00, 6,0), (72,00, 7,0), (73,00, 8,0), ... 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: "Number of new patients with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 admitted to intensive care, 
by admission date" (FHI, 2020). Accessed 30.05.20 
Main_Infection_Model.Cumulative_Total_Hospital_Admissions_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(78): (68,00, 0,0), (69,00, 6,0), (70,00, 11,0), (71,00, 14,0), (72,00, 21,0), (73,00, 29,0), ... 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: "Number of new patients admitted to hospital with COVID-19 as main reason for admission, 
by admission date" (FHI, 2020). Accessed 30.05.2020 
Main_Infection_Model.Currently_Hospitalised_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(84): (67,00, 0,0), (68,00, 2,0), (69,00, 8,0), (70,00, 13,0), (71,00, 23,0), (72,00, 27,0), ... 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: Data on number of COVID-19 hospitalised cases. "Covid-19 - antall innlagte pasienter på 
sykehus" (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020). Accessed 30.05.20 
Main_Infection_Model.Currently_Intensive_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(84): (67,00, 0,0), (68,00, 0,0), (69,00, 0,0), (70,00, 0,0), (71,00, 1,0), (72,00, 4,0), ... 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: Data on number of COVID-19 cases in intensive care. "Covid-19 - antall innlagte pasienter 
på sykehus" (Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI, 2020). Accessed 30.05.20 
Main_Infection_Model.New_Deaths_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(79): (70,00, 0,0), (71,00, 1,0), (72,00, 0,0), (73,00, 0,0), (74,00, 2,0), (75,00, 0,0), ... 
    UNITS: Persons/Day 
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    DOCUMENT: The number of daily deaths, as reported by the Norwegian Institute of Public Health - FHI 
(2020) 
Main_Infection_Model.New_Hospital_Admissions_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(78): (68,00, 0,0), (69,00, 6,0), (70,00, 5,0), (71,00, 3,0), (72,00, 7,0), (73,00, 8,0), ... 
    UNITS: People/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of daily new hospital admissions, as reported by the Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health - FHI (2020) 
    "Number of new patients admitted to hospital with COVID-19 as main reason for admission, by admission 
date" (FHI, 2020). Accessed 30.05.2020 
Main_Infection_Model.New_Intensive_Care_Admissions_DATA = GRAPH(TIME) 
Points(78): (68,00, 0,0), (69,00, 3,0), (70,00, 2,0), (71,00, 1,0), (72,00, 1,0), (73,00, 1,0), ... 
    UNITS: people/Day 
    DOCUMENT: The number of admissions to the intensive care, as reported by the Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health - FHI (2020). 
    "Number of new patients with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 admitted to intensive care, by admission 
date" (FHI, 2020). Accessed 30.05.20 
Main_Infection_Model.NORWAY_INIT_POP = 5367580 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: The Population of Norway as of February 27th 2020 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå - Statistics 
Norway, 2020) 
Main_Infection_Model."transit_time_-_max_duration_of_infection" = 45 





Main_Infection_Model.All_AI = AI_s2 + AI_s3 + Asymptomatic_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Infected who are currently Asymptomatic as the sum from all three stages of the 
Asymptomatic severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Asymptomatic_Infected = All_AI + All_T_AI {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All who are currently infected and Asymptomatic, both tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.All_CCI = CCI_s2 + CCI_s3 + Critical_Care_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Infected who are currently in Critical Care as the sum from all three stages of the Critical 
Care severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Critical_Care_Infected = All_CCI + All_T_CCI {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
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    DOCUMENT: All who are currently infected in Critical Care, both tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.ALL_CURRENTLY_INFECTED = All_Currently_Infected_NonTested + 
All_Currently_Infected_Tested {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All the individuals who are currently infected with COVID-19 infection in any of the severity 
categories, both tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Currently_Infected_NonTested = All_AI + All_CCI + All_HI + All_SI 
{SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All people who are currently infected but not tested. It is the sum of all currently infected 
Asymptomatic, Symptomatic, Hospitalised, and Critical Care stages 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Currently_Infected_Tested = All_T_AI + All_T_CCI + All_T_HI + All_T_SI 
{SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All people who are currently infected and tested. It is the sum of all currently infected and 
Tested Asymptomatic, Symptomatic, Hospitalised, and Critical Care stages 
Main_Infection_Model.ALL_DEAD = All_Dead_NonTested + All_Dead_Tested {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All the individuals who have died due to a COVID-19 infection from any of the severity 
categories, both tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Dead_NonTested = Total_Dead_CCI + Total_Dead_HI {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All people who have died from Covid-19 without ever being tested. It is the sum of the total 
(non-tested) dead after either being Hospitalised or in Critical care 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Dead_Tested = Total_Dead_T_CCI + Total_Dead_T_HI {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All people who have died from Covid-19 after being tested. It is the sum of the total tested 
dead after either being Hospitalised or in Critical care 
Main_Infection_Model.ALL_EVER_INFECTED = Cumulative_infected_NonTested + 
Cumulative_infected_Tested {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All the individuals who were ever infected by COVID-19 infection in any of the severity 
categories, both tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.All_HI = HI_s2 + HI_s3 + Hospitalised_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
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    DOCUMENT: All Infected who are currently Hospitalised as the sum from all three stages of the 
Hospitalised severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Hospitalised_Infected = All_HI + All_T_HI {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All who are currently infected and Hospitalised, both tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.ALL_RECOVERED = All_Recovered_NonTested + All_Recovered_Tested 
{SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All who have recovered from a Covid-19 infection from any of the severity categories, both 
tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Recovered_NonTested = Total_Recovered_AI + Total_Recovered_CCI + 
Total_Recovered_HI + Total_Recovered_SI {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All people who have recovered and had never been tested. It is the sum of all (non-tested) 
recovered Asymptomatic, Symptomatic, Hospitalised, and Critical Care stages 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Recovered_Tested = Total_Recovered_T_AI + Total_Recovered_T_CCI + 
Total_Recovered_T_HI + Total_Recovered_T_SI {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All people who have recovered and had been tested. It is the sum of all Tested recovered 
Asymptomatic, Symptomatic, Hospitalised, and Critical Care stages 
Main_Infection_Model.All_SI = SI_s2 + SI_s3 + Symptomatic_Infected {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Infected who are currently Symptomatic as the sum from all three stages of the 
Symptomatic severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.All_Symptomatic_Infected = All_SI + All_T_SI {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All who are currently infected and Symptomatic, both tested and non-tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.All_T_AI = T_AI_s2 + T_AI_s3 + Tested_Asymptomatic_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Tested Infected who are currently Asymptomatic as the sum from all three stages of the 
Asymptomatic severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.All_T_CCI = T_CCI_s2 + T_CCI_s3 + Tested_Critical_Care_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Tested Infected who are currently in Critical Care as the sum from all three stages of the 
Critical Care severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.All_T_HI = T_HI_s2 + T_HI_s3 + Tested_Hospitalised_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
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    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Tested Infected who are currently Hospitalised as the sum from all three stages of the 
Hospitalised severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.All_T_SI = T_SI_s2 + T_SI_s3 + Tested_Symptomatic_Infected {SUMMING 
CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: People 
    DOCUMENT: All Tested Infected who are currently Symptomatic as the sum from all three stages of the 
Symptomatic severity category 
Main_Infection_Model.Cumulative_infected_NonTested = All_Currently_Infected_NonTested + 
All_Dead_NonTested + All_Recovered_NonTested {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All the people who were ever Infected and not tested Tested. It is the sum of all the people 
who are currently infected, who have recovered, and who have died without ever being tested. 
Main_Infection_Model.Cumulative_infected_Tested = All_Currently_Infected_Tested + All_Dead_Tested + 
All_Recovered_Tested {SUMMING CONVERTER} 
    UNITS: people 
    DOCUMENT: All the people who were ever Infected and Tested. It is the sum of all the people who are 
currently infected, who have recovered, and who have died after being tested. 
{ The model has 307 (2091) variables (array expansion in parens). 
  In this module and 0 additional modules with 6 sectors. 
  Stocks: 51 (51) Flows: 110 (110) Converters: 146 (1930) 
  Constants: 56 (56) Equations: 200 (1984) Graphicals: 11 (11) 
  There are also 141 expanded macro variables. 
 
